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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study brings Christian theology and Christian analytic philosophy into dialogue 
through an examination of the compatibility and complementarity of Karl Barth’s 
theology of revelation, and Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief.  
The first two chapters are aimed at elucidating the central features of Karl Barth’s 
theology of revelation and clarifying his attitude toward the place of philosophy in 
theology. We establish that, for Barth, human knowledge of God is objective, personal, 
cognitive knowing, enabled by the Spirit’s transforming gift of participation in revelation. 
We dispel the notion that Barth is hostile to philosophy per se and chart the boundaries he 
gives for its interface with theology. 
In chapters 3 and 4, we focus on Alvin Plantinga’s Christian epistemology of 
warranted belief, and its relationship to Barth’s theology of revelation. A general 
alignment emerges in their shared inductive approach and agreed rejection of the 
necessity and sufficiency of human arguments for warranted Christian belief. Their 
contributions are complementary, with Barth providing what Plantinga lacks in 
theological depth, and Plantinga providing what Barth lacks in philosophical clarity and 
defense. Despite their general compatibility, two areas of significant potential 
incompatibility are flagged for closer analysis in the final two chapters. 
In chapter 5, we consider their views on natural theology. We extend our thesis of 
complementarity with respect to negative apologetics, and argue for a harmonizing 
interpretation of their views with respect to a potential positive contribution from natural 
theology. The final chapter addresses the role of faith and the constitution of a genuine 
human knowledge of God. We conclude that Barth and Plantinga do not disagree about 
the personal and propositional character of revelation, but may disagree about the 
possibility of a generically theistic de re knowledge of God independent of the Spirit’s 
gift of faith. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a certain kind of pleasant disappointment that comes when, upon finally 
meeting head-to-head a long standing and deeply respected opponent, a much anticipated 
fight evaporates into essential agreement. There are those for whom such a 
disappointment is not pleasant at all, who would generally prefer fighting over peace. We 
can, after all, so cherish the principle at stake in the fight that we begin mistakenly to 
associate the fight with that principle itself. The advantage, however, of a fighting 
impulse is that it prevents an easy concord—an all too quick and simple resolution that, 
for its failure to trouble the heart of the matter, turns true enemies into false friends and 
invites them to tea. 
Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga are not long standing opponents, and neither are they 
acknowledged as close comrades. They are, in fact, rarely brought into dialogue at all, 
and not without some reason. The surface picture is doubtful for the prospect of fruitful 
exchange. There is the obvious separation of more than a generation, making the 
opportunity for interaction rather one-sided. Barth was 46 years old and had just finished 
his first volume of the Church Dogmatics when Plantinga was born. At the time of 
Barth’s death in 1968 Plantinga was 36 years old and had only just published his first 
major work, God and Other Minds. Plantinga confirms that he never met Barth in 
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person.1 Contextual and disciplinary distinctions also seem to place Karl Barth and Alvin 
Plantinga worlds apart—absorbed in different questions, using different methods and 
addressing different audiences. Barth, as a theologian with particular philosophical 
concerns, addresses himself to theology, with the audience of philosophical theologians 
and philosophers of religion being only a distant second.2 Plantinga’s audience is not as 
clear-cut. He is a philosopher with particular theological concerns addressing himself to 
philosophical theology and philosophical atheology. What may seem a chasm between 
the disciplines of philosophy and theology for Barth, can appear almost transparent for 
Plantinga. Barth’s core objective, it will be argued, is to challenge perspectives on 
theological epistemology predominantly and uncritically accepted in 19th and 20th century 
theology. Plantinga’s work, on the other hand, is, to a large degree, aimed at challenging 
philosophical arguments against Christian belief on philosophy’s own terms. 
Disciplinary differences, however, have never stopped theologians from doing 
philosophy or philosophers from doing theology. The real reason for our restrained 
expectations is that Barth is often understood to have denounced quite explicitly the 
possibility of a fruitful dialogue with philosophy. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Plantinga’s 
closest philosophical compatriot,3 expresses this common view: “Barth has little direct 
influence on philosophy. There is, in that, a certain historical justice: Barth made clear 
that in his theology he had little use for philosophy. He regarded philosophical theology 
as idolatrous; and as to philosophy of religion, he insisted that Christianity is not a 
religion.”4 The reigning view seems to be that, in his zeal to preserve the character and 
                                                 
1  It would seem that Plantinga’s best opportunity to have met Karl Barth would have been on his 1962 
U.S. lecture tour while Plantinga was teaching philosophy at Wayne State University. That same year 
Plantinga attended a colloquium of philosophers and theologians at Princeton Seminary where Barth’s 
views were at the center of debate. See Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick (London: MacMillan 
& Co Ltd, 1964), 159–200. 
2  In an article written in honor of his brother, a philosopher, Barth describes the chasm separating theology 
from philosophy but cautions that “the philosopher and the theologian will surely before everything else 
not permit themselves to be farther apart than within earshot or to lose sight of each other” (PTet, 90 [PT, 
102]). 
3 Alvin Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, eds. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1985), 31. 
4 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Reformed Tradition,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion: Blackwell 
Companions to Philosophy, eds. Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 
1997), 166. 
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freedom of theology, Barth utters a resounding “No!” to any role for philosophy.5 This 
injunction is taken to be an absolute parting of ways, where philosophy is 
“excommunicated as not merely an alien but an enemy.”6 Brian Hebblethwaite blames 
Karl Barth for the persisting divide between Christian philosophers and theologians, 
claiming that Barth rejected “any ‘points of connection’ between theology and 
philosophy.” He contends that Barthianism takes the “extreme position” that theology has 
its own philosophically inaccessible, internal logic, and is, therefore, “protected from 
debate and criticism.”7 This presents a daunting initial picture of incompatibility between 
Plantinga and Barth. 
The primary conclusion of the research here conducted is that there is very little 
warrant for the initial supposition of incompatibility, and far greater support for a positive 
                                                 
5 Barth has clearly and famously said a resounding “No!” to natural theology in his response to Emil 
Brunner (Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner [München: Kaiser, 1934]). This denouncing of natural 
theology is misunderstood by some to be an embargo on all philosophy. It is common, particularly of 
philosophers, to suggest that Barth’s approach is: “anti-philosophical” (John Edwin Smith, “Experience 
and Its Religious Dimension: Response to Vincent G. Potter,” in Reason, Experience, and God, ed. 
Vincent Michael Colapietro [New York: Fordham University Press, 1997], 93, 98); posits an “inherent 
opposition between faith and reason” (Dewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: 
An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology [Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991], 
238); “allow[s] very little place to reason” (John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, 2d ed. 
[New York: Scribner, 1977], 16); “has had the courage to break with philosophy frankly and thoroughly” 
(Brand Blanshard, “Critical Reflections on Karl Barth,” in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick 
[London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1964], 159); recommends “theology should not touch philosophy with a 
barge pole” (Aidan Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to Its Sources, Principles, 
and History [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1991], 43); and, “rejects philosophy as the work of 
the devil” (Kevin Hart, “The Experience of God,” in The Religious, ed. John D. Caputo [Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002], 161). 
6 H. L. Stewart, “The ‘Reverent Agnosticism’ Of Karl Barth,” Harvard Theological Review 43, no. 3 
(1950): 231. 
7 Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion, 3 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005), 5. Hebblethwaite singles out T. F. Torrance as a prime exemplar of this noetically 
insular Barthian theological position. The reference Hebblethwaite offers, however, refutes his own 
claim. Torrance is clear and emphatic that, “The interior or material logic of theological knowledge does 
not allow us to neglect the external or formal logic of our human modes of thought and speech” (T. F. 
Torrance, Theological Science [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], 219). One aim of the first 
chapter will be to show that just as Hebblethwaite is wrong about Torrance, he is also wrong about 
Barth. 
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assessment of the compatibility and complementarity of Barth’s theology of revelation 
and Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. Barth’s chief concern can be expressed 
negatively, though incompletely, as a denial of the possibility of a theological 
epistemology from below. In similar terms, Plantinga’s project can be summarized as a 
denial of the impossibility of a theological epistemology from above. This is not to 
suggest that the relationship between their thought can simply be construed as two sides 
of the same coin. Not settling for an easy peace, we will have to consider several points of 
conflict and divergence along the way before arriving at what will turn out to be a 
qualified positive assessment. 
Our approach will focus, though not exclusively, on the first part of the first volume of 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics, and Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief. The study is 
divided into three parts, the first two examining the main lines of the proposals of Barth 
and Plantinga respectively, and the third concentrating on areas of potentially significant 
disagreement. Part 1 devotes two chapters to Barth’s theology of revelation and its 
implications for the dialogue with philosophy. Part 2 consists of two chapters focused on 
Plantinga’s Christian philosophy, his epistemology of warranted belief, and the 
contrasting relationship between Plantinga’s views and Barth’s theology of revelation. 
These first four chapters are written to provide, in detailed relief, an exposition and 
comparison of the decisive features of their theological epistemologies. The intent is to 
set-out with as much clarity as possible the pivotal elements of their arguments, in order 
to grasp the heart of their views and to minimize, as far as possible, false impressions 
created by difficulties in conceptual translation. We give particular attention to the 
intersections between their very different campaigns as we trace their common opposition 
to the despotism of the epistemological cannons of Enlightenment rationalism, and shared 
commitment to a knowledge of God dependent on God’s own revealing. Along the way, 
we engage critiques and misapprehensions of their thought and highlight the points of 
greatest tension between them. The chief conclusion of the first two parts of the study is 
that, in the main, and with respect to a number of critical details, Barth’s view of 
revelation and Plantinga’s notion of warranted Christian belief are remarkably 
compatible.  
Part 3 offers an additional two chapters, analyzing the most significant areas of 
potential disagreement raised in the preceding investigation of their thought. We first 
consider just where Plantinga and Barth stand relative to each other in the historic debate 
over natural theology and the possibility of general revelation. We then take a closer look 
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at how each conceives of the nature of faith and what constitutes a genuine human 
knowledge of God. These issues test the limits of the compatibility of their thought, 
though we again find substantial concord, even at the points of greatest apparent 
discontinuity. Each of these chapters identifies a point at which Plantinga and Barth 
appear to part ways, and suggests possible approaches to synthesis. The principle 
contribution of the third part of this study is to bolster the general positive assessment of 
compatibility, while qualifying that assessment with specific potential limitations. 
Throughout our discussions, we will find several opportunities to support and extend the 
position of one thinker with that of the other. These instances support a secondary thesis 
of the complementarity of the theological epistemologies of Plantinga and Barth. 
Beyond the specific aims of this study with respect to Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga, 
it is also hoped that a contribution will be made more broadly to enlivening exchange 
between Christian theology and Christian analytic philosophy. Russell R. Reno has 
recently and perceptively highlighted a perplexing cleavage that exists between 
contemporary Christian theology and contemporary Christian analytic philosophy. He 
does not offer an historical analysis of its development, but does express lament over the 
fact that theology has largely ignored a party of philosophical partners who exhibit 
particular promise for assisting with theology’s postmodern challenges. “Catholic or not, 
in the main [theology] cannot see the apparent renewal of philosophy in the English-
speaking world. Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, William Alston, and the rest of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers can meet for twenty years, but theology remains blind. . 
. .”8 By focusing on a question of central importance, in light of the thought of two 
intellectual giants, who have, to a great degree, shaped the landscapes of these disciplines, 
this study may be seen both as an attempt to overcome the divide between Christian 
theology and Christian analytic philosophy, and as a case-study to support Reno’s 
intuition that a significant compatibility exists between at least some of those inhabiting 
these disciplines at the level of fundamental loyalties. It is hoped, furthermore, that 
enlivening dialogue in the area of theological epistemology with a view to clarifying core 
commitments, terms, and the implications of positions each for the other will help to 
correct misconceptions which may have discouraged exchange in the past and in that way 
contribute to a revival of constructive collaboration. 
 
                                                 
8 R. R. Reno, “Theology’s Continental Captivity,” First Things 162 (2006): 29.  
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BARTH’S THEOLOGY OF REVELATION: 
THE WAY VON OBEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intent of these first two chapters is to explore Barth’s uncompromising 
theologically driven epistemology along with his safeguards against the usurpations of 
philosophy. I will endeavor to show that Barth’s attitude toward philosophy is understood 
best in the light of his theology of revelation, centered on the self-revelation of God in 
Christ by the Spirit. I will begin in this chapter with an analysis of the salient implications 
of his theology of revelation for theological knowing. The second chapter will look at 
how these implications shape Barth’s understanding of the role of philosophy in theology. 
I will attempt to elucidate Barth’s central concerns and their implications for the 
relationship between faith and philosophy, charting what seems to be Barth’s notion of 
philosophy’s proper function. In chapters three and four we will bring Plantinga into 
dialogue with Barth’s concerns and see to what extent the initial supposition of conflict 
evaporates into essential agreement.  
 
The first volume of the Church Dogmatics is, above all else, Barth’s attempt to 
elucidate and defend the “way of knowledge”1 followed in theology. It is legitimate to 
refer to this as Barth’s theological epistemology though sharply distinguishing it from a 
                                                 
1 CD I/1, 25 (KD I/1, 23, “Erkenntnisweg”), an account of “how knowledge is attained.” 
1 
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general theory of knowledge.2 Barth’s theological epistemology is exclusively focused on 
the knowledge of God as the gift of God, and therefore diverges in both scope and 
direction from general epistemologies. Nevertheless, Barth addresses the chief questions 
posed by any theory of knowledge, including the nature, object, subject, source, direction 
and criteria of theological knowing. A brief exposition and clarification of Barth’s 
theology of revelation will allow us to draw the following conclusions about Barth’s 
theological epistemology: 1) the principles of theological knowing are known in 
reflection on the gift of the knowledge of God; 2) knowing God is personal, cognitive, 
participative knowing; 3) knowing God is divinely initiated, self-attesting, grace; and, 4) 
knowing God effects personal transformation. Once this groundwork is established, we 
will move on in chapter two to discuss the implications for Barth’s view of the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. 
Knowing in Reflection on Revelation 
The key move in any theory of knowing is the first move, or the logically primary 
move. How does an epistemology get off the ground or what primal glue holds it 
together? In the case of theological epistemology we are particularly concerned with what 
basis is given for the possibility of knowing God. In order to understand Barth’s 
distinctive theological epistemology, therefore, it is important to pay close attention to 
how it emerges. Barth suggests, at one point, that his comments on knowing God are 
simply an “analysis of the biblical concept of revelation.”3 As even an expeditious stroll 
through the Church Dogmatics will attest, at every turn Barth defends the legitimacy of 
his position by appeal to Scripture. Scripture as the written word of God has the 
‘supremacy.’4 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that either the Bible or a 
biblically informed theory of revelation are for Barth the foundation of a theological 
system of knowing. Here enters Barth’s famous qualification that Scripture is not 
                                                 
2 Some comments on human cognition in general can be found in KD II/1 §27. See Andrew McFarlane, 
“Sense and Spontaneity: A Critical Study of Barth’s Kantian Model of Human Cognition in CD II/1,” 
paper given at the Scottish Barth Colloquium (St Andrews University, St Mary’s College: 2006). 
3 CD I/1, 359 (KD I/1, 379, “Analyse des biblischen Offenbarungsbegriffes”). 
4 CD I/1, 102 (KD I/1, 105, “die Überlegenheit”). Holy Scripture is supreme over proclamation. Scripture 
imposes itself as norm for the church (CD I/1, 106; KD I/1, 109). 
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revelation but a means5 used by God to “bear witness to revelation.”6 The initiating move 
in Barth’s theological epistemology is not the claim that the Bible by itself, or the Bible 
read in the light of human reason, is the foundation or source of knowledge. Barth 
believes that the real initiating move is not a claim we make but a claim made on us. The 
initial move is made by God himself. In the light of this initiating self-revelation, we see 
that God is not revealed by us or the Bible, or anything other than God himself. The basis 
for the possibility of knowing God is “God’s action on man.”7 It is “not therefore that 
man has grasped at the Bible but that the Bible has grasped at man”8—or more directly 
that God has acted to reveal himself through the means of the written word. In Barth’s 
view, therefore, there are no first principles to establish or appeal to. God has taken the 
initiating action, such that “already on the way, we give an account of the way which we 
tread.”9 What is taken as the a priori ground of knowing in Barth’s theological 
epistemology is the effectual self-revealing action of God making himself known to us 
prior to any theological reflection. This is why Barth insists that the path of knowing is 
from above to below (von oben nach unten).10 It is common for commentators well 
versed in the philosophical debates in epistemology to struggle to grasp this theo-
                                                 
5 By referring to Scripture as a medium, means, instrument or form, Barth is emphatic that Scripture is 
useless on its own. Compare these statements: “Thus God does reveal Himself in statements, through the 
medium (Mittel) of speech, and indeed of human speech” (CD I/1, 137–138; KD I/1, 142), and “The fact 
that God takes form does not give rise to a medium (kein Medium), a third thing between God and man, a 
reality distinct from God that is as such the subject of revelation” (CD I/1, 321; KD I/1, 339). 
6 CD I/1, 111 (KD I/1, 114, “Offenbarung bezeugt”). We will touch upon this again in chapter 6. 
7 CD I/1, 110 (KD I/1, 113, “Handeln Gottes am Menschen”). Note that I have not endeavored to update 
the translations with gender inclusive language. All of Barth’s references to Mensch(en), translated 
‘man’ or ‘men,’ should be understood to be gender inclusive. 
8 CD I/1, 110 (KD I/1, 113, “also nicht daraufhin, daß der Mensch nach der Bibel, sondern daraufhin, daß 
die Bibel nach dem Menschen gegriffen hat”). 
9 CD I/1, 43 (KD I/1, 43, “geben wir uns—schon auf dem Wege befindlich—Rechenschaft über den Weg, 
den wir gehen”). 
10 Barth uses the expression “von unten nach oben” to describe the wrong way to ground theological 
knowing and to distinguish from the only proper and indeed possible orientation for theology “von oben 
nach unten” (KD I/1, 135, 178, 179, 189, 255, 440). This does not mean that the medium of revelation is 
not of the unten. The incarnation is an historical, this-worldly, and indeed empirical reality; nevertheless, 
the Ursprung is von oben and therefore the way of revelation, the way we come to know God “von oben 
nach unten führt” (KD I/1, 440; CD I/1, 419). 
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foundationalism11 in Barth. In order to make sense of Barth, often an expedition is 
launched to unearth a basic principle that is motivating his thought—the real foundation 
or source.12 Barth insists, however, that his theological reflections (whether it be on the 
wholly otherness of God, the freedom of God or the fallenness of humans) are not the 
basis of his view of revelation, but really are reflections based on the revelation given.13 
What may seem confusing is that at no point does Barth offer an argument to ground this 
supposition. He urges instead that all theology should be done as an attempt to think 
correctly from this a priori.14 Von oben nach unten. 
The discussion so far has introduced Barth’s theo-foundational, from-above view of 
theological knowing, and should be sufficient to establish the first proposition about 
Barth’s theological epistemology: 1) the principles of theological knowing are known in 
reflection on the gift of the knowledge of God. 
God as Object and Subject of His Personal, Cognitive Revelation 
It is Barth’s radical reorientation of the starting point and direction of theological 
knowing that explains his assertion that the primary question in theological reflection is 
                                                 
11 In adopting the term theo-foundationalism to apply to Barth’s theological epistemology I do not intend to 
suggest that Barth has committed himself to a general foundationalism. Other metaphors could be 
substituted so long as they affirm that the ground for the knowledge of God is not only given by God, but 
as we shall discuss next, is God in his self-revelation. The distinction between classical foundationalism 
and what I am calling Barth’s theo-foundationalism will be clarified in chapter 2. 
12 Both Helm and Wolterstorff determine that what motivates Barth’s theology of revelation is his notion of 
the sovereign freedom of God. See Paul Helm, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues, Foundations for 
Faith (London: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1982), 40–41; and, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: 
Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 73–74. Looking for a hidden motivator for Barth’s theological epistemology is an academically 
legitimate pursuit. It must, however, be recognized that Barth believed that the ground for knowing God 
really is laid and occupied a priori by God himself. 
13 As Alan Torrance observes, “our very conceptions of divine freedom are themselves freely conditioned 
by God” (Persons in Communion: an Essay on Trinitarian Description and Human Participation 
[Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996], 49). 
14 “All its knowledge, even its knowledge of the correctness of its knowledge, can only be an event, and 
cannot therefore be guaranteed as correct knowledge from any place apart from or above this event” (CD 
I/1, 42; KD I/1, 42). 
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not “How do we know God?” but rather “Who is our God?”15 The how question only 
becomes the initial question if we are starting from outside of the fact of the reality of 
given revelation. Theology, as a second order reflection on a first-hand personal 
revelation, seeks to clarify its understanding of who this revealed God is. This is just what 
Barth attempts to do in his theology of revelation. God is none other than who he, through 
himself, reveals himself to be in his revelation. The nature of the knowledge of God is the 
self-revealing revelation of God.16 
To grasp properly what Barth is saying, it may be helpful to distinguish, as Barth does, 
the components of revelation. There is the revealer, the act of revealing, and the 
consequence or effect of the act of revealing (which Barth calls the “revealedness”). Barth 
maps these to the persons of the Trinity, united yet distinct as the Revealer, Revelation 
and Revealedness. He contends that this is what “distinguishes the Christian concept of 
revelation as Christian.”17 Revelation (Offenbarung) has an objective and a subjective 
sense. We use it to refer either to the objective action and content being revealed, or to the 
subjective appropriation that results from being revealed to. In Barth’s notion of 
revelation these two senses are united, though distinct. In the act of revelation, the 
revealer is united to the content and reception of revelation. Revelation is the address of 
God. Revelation “is itself the Word of God.” Jesus Christ is the Revelation of God. God 
is his revelation.18 “He is also His self-revealing.”19 The effect of revelation in us is the 
gift of the Spirit. In this way, God remains “indissolubly subject, in His revelation”20  
Many clear-headed individuals in the English speaking world, and especially those 
with a background in analytic philosophy, will find the sentences of the preceding 
paragraph highly perplexing, if not nonsensical.21 For some, such Barthianisms are 
evidence of Barth’s anti-rational tendencies. After all, if revelation is interlaced with the 
                                                 
15 CD I/1, 301 (KD I/1, 317, “die konkrete und entscheidende Frage: Wer ist [unser] Gott?”). 
16 See CD I/1, 295–304 (KD I/1, 311–320, “sich offenbarenden Gott”). 
17 CD I/1, 301 (KD I/1, 318, “die den christlichen Offenbarungsbegriff als christlichen vor allen möglichen 
andren Gotteslehren und Offenbarungsbegriffen grundlegend auszeichnet”). 
18 CD I/1, 118 (KD I/1, 121, “Sie [Offenbarung] ist selber das Wort Gottes”). 
19 CD I/1, 299 (KD I/1, 315, “Gott selbst ist . . . auch sein Sich-Offenbaren”). 
20 CD I/1, 382 (KD I/1, 403, “der in seiner Offenbarung Subjekt ist, und zwar unauflöslich Subjekt ist”). 
21 Harnack apparently found such constructions in Barth utterly “obscure” (James McConkey Robinson 
and Jürgen Moltmann, eds., The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology [Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968]). 
Quoted in George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 331–334. 
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mystery of the Trinity, what hope is there of understanding it? Some Barth interpreters 
suggest that the confusions and apparent contradictions in Barth’s writing are intended to 
be just that. It is not that Barth’s theology is anti-rational, but that it confronts and is 
confronted by the crisis of human language and fallen reason. On this view, we will reach 
a point in Barth’s writing where rational tensions cannot and should not be resolved; and 
furthermore, retaining unresolved confusion is what it means really to get Barth. Stephen 
Webb expresses this view when he writes, “it is possible that more sense can be made 
from Barth’s position than I have allowed here, but really to read Barth is to refuse to 
resist his endless perplexities and contradictions.”22 In the present case applying this 
principle would be doubly confusing: In a way we cannot humanly conceive of, God 
gives us a knowledge of God that we cannot know. What is at issue here is at the heart of 
our main concern about Barth’s attitude towards reason and philosophy, and the prospects 
of constructive dialogue with Alvin Plantinga. The contention we face here is that Barth 
is finally and only an apophatic theologian. He may appear to be making positive 
theological claims, but he then expunges any meaning associated with those claims, so 
that they are ultimately negations and not claims at all. If it is actually the case that Barth 
is merely an apophatic theologian, then it is hard to see how there can be positive, 
cognitive Christian belief—much less a discussion about its warrant. Moreover, by 
radically undercutting reason and language such a position, appealing to reason and 
expressed in language, is patently self-defeating. 
Surely the mere apophatic Barth is an option we can quickly dismiss. On the one hand, 
Barth does commonly use dialectic negatively, to cut through a false synthesis.23 This 
negative action, however, is almost always part of a positive theological declaration. 
Barth is clearly not saying that God in God’s self-revealing revelation remains 
unrevealed.24 Barth is making a concrete cognitive claim: “We have made a positive 
                                                 
22 Stephen H. Webb, Re-Figuring Theology: The Rhetoric of Karl Barth (Albany, N.Y.: State University of 
New York Press, 1991), 74. 
23 Barth commonly uses dialectic negatively, to cut-down a false synthesis, most pungently in his earlier 
period. “How things were cleared away there and almost only cleared away!” (The Humanity of God 
[London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960], 43). See also Paul Brazier, “Barth’s First Commentary 
on Romans (1919): An Exercise in Apophatic Theology?,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 
6, no. 4 (2004). 
24 Barth does affirm that in the mediation itself, God remains hidden (CD I/1, 175ff, 320ff; KD I/1, 180ff, 
338ff). This will be discussed further in chapter 6. It is sufficient here to affirm that, though God is 
unveiled through a veil, God is really revealed. 
Chapter 1: Barth’s Theology of Revelation 
 
13
assertion, pronouncing a definite Yes to the knowability of the Word of God.”25 He is 
even willing to declare that it is possible for a human knowledge of God to be “a clear 
and certain knowledge, not equal but at least similar to the clarity and certainty with 
which God knows Himself in His Word.”26 Interpreting Barth as merely apophatic 
undermines Barth’s central thesis about revelation—namely that revelation is the 
effectual self-revealing of God. The crisis of language and fallen human reason are 
neither the first nor the final word. God in Christ miraculously overcomes these humanly 
insurmountable barriers to make himself known by the power of the Spirit. And if these 
considerations are not enough, Barth explicitly condemns apophatism as a way to God.27 
“Even knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge of the Word of God outside its 
reality is possible only on the presupposition of this real knowledge.”28 An apophatic way 
to God, as a negative human word, might suggest a means of arriving at the destination by 
human steam.29 Barth’s theology of revelation may strike some as initially obscure, but 
there is no reason to think that by it Barth merely intends to be obscurant. To be sure, 
revelation is for Barth both a miracle and mystery;30 but, it would be neither if it were not 
a real revealing. 
Returning then to Barth’s core claim about revelation—that “God the Revealer, is 
identical with His act in revelation and also identical with its effect”31—it may be 
possible to clarify what Barth means by looking more closely at what seems so perplexing 
about it. One challenge is to understand how both identity and distinction can be 
                                                 
25 CD I/1, 196 (KD I/1, 204, “haben in bezug auf die Erkennbarkeit des Wortes Gottes ein bestimmtes Ja 
ausgesprochen”). 
26 CD I/1, 243 (KD I/1, 256, “die Möglichkeit einer gewissen und klaren Erkenntnis, nicht gleich, wohl 
aber ähnlich der Gewißheit und Klarheit, in der Gott in seinem Worte sich selber erkennt”). 
27 “An indication of the limits of our conceiving . . . must not be allowed to condense into a negative proof” 
(CD I/1, 164; KD I/1, 170, “ein Aufweis der Grenzen unseres Begreifens . . . der sich auch nicht zu 
einem negativen Beweis verdichten wollen darf.”). 
28 CD I/1, 197 (KD I/1, 206, “Auch die Erkenntnis der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis des Wotres Gottes 
außerhalb ihrer Wirklichkeit ist nur möglich unter Voraussetzung dieser wirklichen Erkenntnis”). 
29 As Colin Gunton has noted, “the apparent modesty and humility of the negative way masks quite a 
different movement, a movement for unity with God which operates apart from that communion 
mediated through Jesus” (Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2003], 63). Of course, apophaticism does not require this assumed independent movement. 
30 CD I/1, 331 (KD I/1, 350). 
31 CD I/1, 296 (KD I/1, 312, “Gott, der Offenbarer, identish ist mit seinem Tun in der Offenbarung, 
identisch auch mit dessen Wirkung”). 
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maintained between the subject, act and effect in revelation. What does Barth mean by 
identifying God with action and effects? And, could this not lead to untoward theological 
consequences?32 Indeed the theological consequences could be disastrous if we begin 
with an abstract notion of any of the three. We might, for instance, start with an abstract 
notion of action and propose that the revealing subject in identity with the act of revealing 
should be understood in terms of this notion of action. This kind of essentialist actualism 
could easily reduce God to a totemic principle or an impersonal force. In the same way, 
equating God with an abstract notion of the effect of revelation has radical implications. 
This approach reduces God to a way of speaking about subjective transformation or 
enlightenment. These paths are out-of-bounds for Barth, who with traditional Christian 
orthodoxy would reject affirmations that identify God with anything that is not the 
objective, personal and concrete God of the Bible. In order to come to grips with Barth’s 
notion of revelation, therefore, we must heed his words that “the Bible always 
understands what it calls revelation as a concrete relation to concrete men.”33 Barth’s 
identification of subject, act and being are not the fruit of reflection on general 
philosophical notions of being and act or cause and effect. As before, these also are 
intended to be the fruit of reflection on the gift of the knowledge of God. Barth’s theology 
of revelation will remain unintelligible as long as general philosophical presumptions are 
assumed to be the key either to understanding its motivation or to unlocking its 
interpretation. 
Barth contests that he is attempting to be faithful to the concrete God of the Bible who 
is revealed as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. That the revealing Father is one with his act of 
revelation is nothing more than the confession of John 1: “the Word was God.” Since the 
Word of God, is the speech of God, and because “we shall have to regard God’s speech as 
also God’s act,”34 Jesus Christ, therefore, is God’s self-revealing act. The same concrete 
                                                 
32 It is my intent here to clarify Barth’s notion of revelation, not to defend Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. 
Along these lines, Barth has been critiqued as flirting with modalism (Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and 
the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981], 139–144); de-emphasizing 
intra-trinitarian communion and consequently human participation in it (Alan Torrance, Persons in 
Communion, 103–107, 213ff); as well as deriving the doctrine of the trinity analytically from a theory of 
revelation (William J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to 
Feminism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 388).  
33 CD I/1, 325 (KD I/1, 343, “immer als eine konkrete Beziehung zu konkreten Menschen”). 
34 CD I/1, 133 (KD I/1, 137, “Wir werden Gottes Rede auch als Gottes Tat zu verstehen sein”). 
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biblical analysis shapes Barth’s conclusion that the Spirit of God is the revealedness of 
God. That the Revealer and revealing act are one with the effect of that act is the 
confession that in revelation we are given the Spirit of truth. It is the fellowship of the 
Spirit that unites us to Christ. This union in the Spirit is the subjective impartation of the 
revelation of God. The Spirit guarantees for us “personal participation in revelation.”35 
Christ is the objective revelation of God and the Spirit is the gift of the subjective 
realization of that revelation in us: the gift of “faith, knowledge and obedience.”36 The 
ministry of the Spirit enables a participation in Christ’s human knowing of the Father. 
The gift of the effect of revelation is the gift of God giving himself. 
Barth’s theology of revelation is plainly at odds with some assumptions that 
accompany a general philosophical or history-of-religions approach to the question of 
revelation. It is dissonance with these background assumptions that obscures Barth’s 
position. In the vernacular or “plain sense,” revelation has to do with bringing to light 
heretofore hidden information.37 In its traditionally distinguished forms, special and 
general, revelation is typically imagined to be a deposit of information or traces of God 
left for humans to discover and decipher, e.g. Scripture as propositional revelation. I have 
in mind what Paul Helm calls the “disclosure of truths” in the form of a “straight 
propositional account.”38 Barth stresses, on the other hand, that revelation is 
fundamentally personal39—the person of Jesus Christ is God’s revelation. Revelation is 
never merely a description or an idea, it is “God’s speaking person.”40 A strictly or 
fundamentally propositional view of Christian revelation would replace intimate, personal 
knowing with a theoretical, depersonalized abstraction.41 “For the point of God’s speech 
                                                 
35 CD I/1, 453 (KD I/1, 475, “persönliche Teilnahme an der Offenbarung”). 
36 CD I/1, 453 (KD I/1, 475, “Glaube, Erkenntnis, Gehorsam”). 
37 See Alan Torrance’s penetrating analysis of this in which he notes that importing a general model of 
revelation “can lead one to postulate a distinction (which too easily becomes a disjunction) between the 
being of S1 [the divine subject] and the being and nature of x [what is revealed]” (Persons in 
Communion, 66). 
38 The Divine Revelation, 35. 
39 Barth grants that in revelation we may have to do with facts, but these are not isolated propositions, they 
are facts that are “created and presented by a person” (CD I/1, 205; KD I/1, 214). 
40 CD I/1, 136–137 (KD I/1, 141). 
41 “But will the truth of revelation submit to such materialisation and depersonalisation? Can one have it in 
abstraction from the person of Him who reveals it and from the revelatory act of this person in which it is 
given to other persons to perceive?” (CD I/1, 270; KD I/1, 285). See also the priority of the question 
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is not to occasion specific thoughts or a specific attitude but through the clarity which 
God gives us, and which induces both these in us, to bind us to Himself.”42 The fact, 
however, that revelation is personal and relational does not mean that it is a strictly 
numinous, supra-rational and extramental experience with no impact on our minds. “The 
supremely real and determinative entry of the Word of God into the reality of man”43 
induces and encompasses “specific thoughts.” The personal nature of revelation does not 
“impl[y] its irrationality.”44 In the gift of hearing God’s speaking, we are said to be given 
“very distinct and in themselves clear thoughts regarding what is said to us.”45 Barth 
affirms that personal revelation remains rational, verbal, and cognitive.46 In fact, Barth 
believes that personal communication is fundamentally rational. “Speech, including 
God’s speech, is the form in which reason communicates with reason and person with 
person.”47 Barth will grant to the common notion of revelation that revelation is indeed 
intellectually engaging, but not that it is a mere transmission of propositional 
statements.48 God makes himself personally known to us in relationship with us by the 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Who is God in His Revelation?” (CD I/1, 297–301; KD I/1, 313–317). In chapter 6 we will take a closer 
look at the distinction between personal and propositional knowing, including the objections of Helm 
and Wolterstorff. 
42 CD I/1, 175 (KD I/1, 181–182, “der Sinn der Rede Gottes ist . . . uns an ihn selbst zu binden”). 
43 CD I/1, 193 (KD I/1, 201, “das höchst reale und bestimmende Eintreten des Wortes Gottes in die 
Wirklichkeit des Menschen”). 
44 CD I/1, 138 (KD I/1,142, “nun doch seine Irrationalität bedeuten”). This affirmation is missed by those 
who assume that Barth is advocating “irrationalism,” famously by Brand Blanshard at a 1962 gathering 
of philosophers and theologians at Princeton Seminary and the philosophers in agreement who were 
noted to have “cheered on so enthusiastically,” Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick (London: 
MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1964), 159–200, 232–233. The thirty-year-old Alvin Plantinga was included in 
this auspicious gathering though his recorded contribution makes no comment on the debate over Barth. 
45 CD I/1, 174 (KD I/1, 181, “sehr bestimmte und in sich deutliche Gedanken”). 
46 The personal character of God’s Word is not, then, to be played off against its verbal or spiritual 
character (CD I/1, 138; KD I/1,142). 
47 CD I/1, 135 (KD I/1, 139, “Rede ist, auch als Rede Gottes, die Form, in der sich Vernunft der Vernunft, 
Person der Person mitteilt”). 
48 Barth warns against thinking that “propositions or principles are certain in themselves like the supposed 
axioms of the mathematicians and physicists, and are not rather related to their theme and content, which 
alone are certain, which they cannot master, by which they must be mastered if they are not to be mere 
soap-bubbles” (CD I/1, 165; KD I/1, 171). 
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gift of communion with the Spirit who is the subject of the knowing relation.49 It is in this 
participative communion only, however, that information about God is personally and 
cognitively enjoyed and properly known. 
These comments on the nature of the knowledge of God serve to support the second 
claim about Barth’s theological epistemology: 2) knowing God is personal, cognitive, 
participative knowing. This statement affirms both the objective revelation of God’s 
address to us in Christ and the subjective response of our participation in that knowing by 
the gift of the Spirit. We have not, however, in these few words removed the mystery of 
the miracle of revelation; nor, on Barth’s view, is it ever possible on our side of the 
relation to unravel the mystery. 
The Hiddenness of God in Revelation 
Some of what Barth has to say about revelation appears to temper, if not contradict, his 
positive affirmations on the possibility for humans to know God. Although Barth affirms 
that the speech of God is rational, cognitive and verbal, it is nevertheless indirect and 
therefore, in its creaturely, secular form, leaves God hidden. Barth claims not only that for 
us the speech of God remains shrouded in mystery, but that this is necessarily so. The 
notion that God is necessarily hidden in his revelation seems flatly self-contradictory. 
Given our concern to understand Barth’s theological epistemology, it is vital for us to get 
clear about the way in which he understands God to be both hidden and yet revealed. If 
Barth is affirming the necessary and absolute unrevealedness of God we will certainly not 
get far in the dialogue with Plantinga. We have already seen, however, that Barth 
promotes revelation as a real revealing.50 It would be difficult to view Barth’s 
constructive approach to revelation as simply a slight-of-hand skepticism. How then are 
we to resolve this pointed confrontation between revelation and mystery? One possibility 
is that in God’s revelation God is only partially revealed and therefore only partially 
hidden. We can safely rule this out as an option for Barth. On the contrary, Barth actually 
seems to assert both that our knowledge of God is “similar to the clarity and certainty 
                                                 
49 “To say Holy Spirit in preaching or theology is always to say a final word. For when we do this . . . we 
are always speaking of the event in which God’s Word is not only revealed to man but also believed by 
him” (CD I/1, 182; KD I/1, 189). 
50 Cf. Alan Torrance’s rebuttal of Battista Mondin’s charge that Barth’s form-content distinction “is 
heading in the direction of a credo quia absurdum” (Persons in Communion, 168–176). 
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with which God knows Himself,”51 and yet that God remains completely hidden behind 
an “untearably thick veil.”52 Barth really is affirming both hiddenness and revealedness to 
be absolutely and simultaneously true. There is a key difference, however, in the 
perspective from which both of these claims can be simultaneously made. From above or 
inside the knowing relation, God is really revealed; but, from below or outside the 
knowing relation, God is utterly hidden. The stark opposition between these perspectives 
must be emphasized in order to maintain a narrow path that runs between two lethal 
theological trip wires. On one side is the error of divinizing the creaturely, on the other 
side is the error of secularizing the divine, on a third side, which actually connects the 
other two, is the consequence of negating real divine-to-human revelation. 
In the hindsight of faith, we know God to be the holy, infinite, independent, creator 
fully distinct from his fallen, finite, dependent creatures. As creatures, knowledge must 
come to us in creaturely form. But the knowledge of God has no human analogy by which 
it could come to us directly in creaturely form.53 The divine content of revelation must 
therefore be communicated indirectly through a creaturely form,54 but in such a way that 
the divine content does not become the creaturely form. This means that in terms of the 
creaturely form alone, God is hidden behind a “wall of secularity.”55 From outside, this 
wall is unscalable. This does not mean that the form of the creaturely form is 
unimportant, only that the nature of its reference to God is such that “the power of this 
reference does not lie in itself; it lies in that to which it refers.”56 The creaturely form is a 
                                                 
51 CD I/1, 243 (KD I/1, 256, “ähnlich der Gewißheit und Klarheit, in der Gott in seinem Worte sich selber 
erkennt”). 
52 CD I/1, 168 (KD I/1, 174, “unzerreißbar dichten Schleiers”). 
53 In chapter 6 we will discuss Barth’s rejection of the analogia entis in a more detailed discussion of the 
nature of human knowledge of God. 
54 Barth’s point here is both more severe and yet more optimistic that Calvin’s notion of accommodation. 
In the famous passage in the Institutes (I.13.1), Calvin explains that accommodating to our feebleness 
(tenuitati) God in a certain way lisps (quodammodo balbutire) to give us a knowledge of him by 
stooping down to our level (longe infra eius altitudinem descendere). For Barth the creaturely form on 
its own is not an accommodated, lesser form of revelation, it is utter hiddenness—non-revelation. As an 
instrument in the hands of the self-revealing action of God, however, this creaturely form becomes the 
place of the real revelation of God at his full height. 
55 CD I/1, 165 (KD I/1, 171, “Mauer von Welthaftigkeit”). 
56 CD I/1, 197 (KD I/1, 205, “Die Kraft dieses Verweises liegt nicht in ihm selber, sondern in dem, worauf 
er verweist”). 
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means by which God chooses to break through to us. The origination of revelation is, 
however, unidirectional;57 we cannot use the means to break through to God. God gives 
himself in and through the creaturely form, not as the creaturely form. The creaturely 
form, although it is only form and not content, is nevertheless, indispensable because of 
our creatureliness. “The secular form without the divine content is not the Word of God 
and the divine content without the secular form is also not the Word of God.”58 The 
“united but not confused” Chalcedonic formula fits exactly.59 Incarnation is revelation. 
The creaturely form, or human nature of Christ is united with the divine nature in the 
person of the Logos. This revelation is established by God uniting himself to an 
anhypostatic creaturely nature. The human does not become the divine. The creaturely 
form has no personhood of its own. It is not, on its own, revelation. Outside of the gift of 
faith, the creaturely form only hides God. This hiddenness is graciously overcome in the 
miracle of revelation, where God, who remains a mystery in a creaturely form, lifts 
people up by means of the creaturely form in faith to participate in the knowing relation 
whereby God knows himself. 
The possibility of the personal and cognitive revelation of God is, next to all other acts 
of human knowing, unreservedly sui generis.60 In every other instance, the object and 
subject in the knowing relation are both created. Human knowledge of God is necessarily 
indirect and therefore cannot be penetrated from below. It is not enough that God takes on 
a creaturely form; because, God does not become transparently visible in the creaturely 
form. There are two reasons for this opacity: our fallenness and our finitude.61 Our 
fallenness means the distortion of our knowledge structures and language for grasping 
                                                 
57 Referring to revelation as unidirectional means that only by God are we drawn into the knowledge of 
God, it does not mean that knowing God is somehow unilateral—that it fails somehow to be genuine 
human knowing with genuine human reciprocation. 
58 CD I/1, 175 (KD I/1, 182, “die welthafte Gestalt ohne den göttlichen Gehalt ist nicht das Wort Gottes”). 
59 “The central thrust of the ancient dogma was that the Logos (the second Person of the Holy Trinity) took 
to Himself human flesh (i.e. a human ‘nature’, complete, whole, and entire) and lived a human life in and 
through it. The proximity to Barth’s dialectic of veiling and unveiling was obvious. In that God takes to 
God’s Self a human nature, God veils God’s Self in a creaturely medium” (Bruce L. McCormack, Karl 
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909–1936 [Oxford, 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995], 327). See also Trevor Hart, Regarding 
Karl Barth: Essays Toward a Reading of His Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 14-17. 
60 CD I/1, 164 (KD I/1, 170). 
61 CD I/1, 167–168 (KD I/1, 173–174). 
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truth. Our finitude means the lack of any capacity for, or bridge of analogy to, God. Both 
of these keep us from seeing God through the veil of the creaturely form. In the gracious 
miracle of revelation, both of these problems are overcome. We are given the eyes of 
faith to see despite the brokenness of our knowledge structures and language, and we are 
born across the gulf that separates creator and creature through a participation by the 
Spirit in the Son’s knowledge of the Father. Only God could make God known. 
One significant question raised by the miracle of revelation is: is the miracle of 
revelation a perpetual reality or not? Barth is clear that we cannot assume that it is. 
Revelation cannot be presupposed, even as a present fulfillment.62 Barth warns that we do 
not have at our disposal a “constantly available relationship between God and man.”63 
That is not to say that God does not draw us into ongoing relationship, but that the 
relationship is not made available to us in such a way that it is in our control. This is, for 
Barth, another affirmation of the hiddenness of God from outside the unidirectional 
movement from God to us in revelation. We are never left with a capacity that would 
reverse this direction. This is what Barth is most intent on guarding against. Not even on 
the basis of the move having already been made from above to below do we have an 
assurance of our own grasp. The past experience of revelation cannot be allowed to 
become a postulate in a system whereby we build back to a demonstration of the 
knowledge of God. Barth rejects the idea of the perpetual availability of revelation 
because we are never brought into a state where we have hold of the ground of grace. We 
confess and know God on the basis of the gift of grace alone, but we cannot show how we 
know. We are not required to interpret Barth to be suggesting that God in his freedom 
could not perpetually give us the gift of faith and personal revelation. Barth’s comments 
on this are geared toward obliterating any confidence that could be placed on our 
independent perpetual experience, understanding, appropriation, translation, or 
communication of revelation. 
This brings us to an important observation regarding the freedom of God in his 
revelation. The gift of the knowledge of God is given to us with assurance in the knowing 
relation, but we are not also given any means whereby we could demonstrate either to 
ourselves or others that we have been given this knowledge. The question might be put 
                                                 
62 CD I/1, 261 (KD I/1, 275). 
63 Barth argues that to view revelation as a “constantly available relationship” reduces grace to nature (CD 
I/1, 41; KD I/1, 40, “kontinuierlich vorfindlichen Beziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch”). 
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this way: can we know that we have true knowledge of God? But stating the question like 
this might result in a misleading answer from Barth. We have already established that the 
experience of the Word of God is cognitive. One implication of this is that when we are 
addressed by God in his revelation we are cognizant of what is happening. In the gift of 
knowing God we are aware that it is God we are knowing. In other words, in God’s self-
disclosure, we know that we truly know God. Knowing that we truly know is part of the 
gift of participating in Christ’s knowledge of the Father. The question is misleading, 
however, if it is assumed that in order to know that we know, we must have some reason 
to justify our knowledge claim. A justifying reason in the form of some tangible evidence 
or argument we are not given, according to Barth. The only justification we have is the 
event of revelation itself.64 What justifies our knowing that we know God is the fact that 
God has made himself known and nothing else.65 All we have to point to as a basis for 
our knowledge of God is the gift of grace. But this basis, precisely because it is divinely 
given and “thus withdrawn from our grasp,”66 is therefore “an assurance with a metal that 
makes it superior to every other assurance.” 67 
This brings us to the third conclusion about Barth’s theological epistemology: 3) 
knowing God is divinely initiated, self-attesting, grace. The grace of revelation is God’s 
overcoming our fallenness and finitude. It is initiated from the object of revelation—from 
above to below. From the outside we cannot break through the creaturely form to see God 
directly; nor do we have in our being a capacity or analogy for spanning the gulf. 
Revelation always requires God’s action. God’s action in the grace of faith attests to the 
truth of the knowledge of God and allows us to know God through the creaturely form. 
So God’s hiddenness and revealedness are not in contradiction. In fact, if God did not 
                                                 
64 Calvin, similarly, says that revelation in Scripture is self-attesting (αυ’ τοπιστον), it is not subject to 
rational demonstration but is confirmed by the testimony of the Spirit (neque demonstrationi et 
rationibus subiici eam fas esse: quam tamen meretur apud nos certitudinem, Spiritus testimonio 
consequi, Institutes, I.7.5). He also observes here the human form serving the disclosure of the divine 
content (hominum ministerio, ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse). 
65 Barth argues that “self-certainty” must be based only on the “certainty of God” (CD I/1, 196; KD I/1, 
204). Barth affirms the same when he writes, “In faith man has and knows and affirms only this 
possibility of knowledge of God’s Word, the possibility which lies in the Word of God itself, has come 
to him in the Word, and is present to him in the Word” (CD I/1, 224; KD I/1, 236). 
66 CD I/1, 226 (KD I/1, 238, “unserem Zugriff entzogen”). 
67 CD I/1, 226 (KD I/1, 238, “eine Sicherheit, die ein Metall in sich trägt, das sie jeder anderen Sicherheit 
überlegen macht”). 
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take the creaturely form that hides him there would be no means for revealing himself 
either. “What seems in the first instance an absurd obstacle that God Himself has put in 
the way is in fact His real way to us.”68 And if our assurance were grounded in anything 
other than the self-attesting grace of revelation it would be built only on sinking sand. 
Revelation as Whole Person Transformation 
We have covered the features of Barth’s theology of revelation that are salient for 
clarifying his from-above-to-below theological epistemology. But before we begin to 
investigate the implications of these features for the relationship with philosophy, we 
should first take note of the connection between revelation and personal transformation. 
Just as the way of knowing God is fundamentally different from the way we know other 
objects of knowledge, so too is the nature of the knowing itself unlike any other 
knowledge. We have already touched upon this uniqueness when we looked at Barth’s 
claim that God is not just the object but he is also, particularly as the Spirit, the subject of 
the knowing. For theological knowledge to be possible, according to Barth, we must be 
drawn up, by the gift of the Spirit, to participate in the knowing by which God knows 
himself. God cannot properly be known from a distance. Theological knowing requires 
that God establish a relationship, a relationship that cannot but be not only cognitively 
illuminating but also personally transformative. For this reason Barth speaks of God’s 
address as, “the transposing of man into the wholly new state.”69 The knowledge of any 
object has far reaching and determinative consequences for the knower. We exist in 
relationship to, though distinct from, the objects of our knowledge both past and present. 
Barth provisionally defines knowledge as “the confirmation of human acquaintance with 
an object whereby its truth becomes a determination of the existence of the man who has 
the knowledge.”70 If this is so for ordinary objects, then how much more significant (and 
                                                 
68 CD I/1, 168 (KD I/1, 175, “Was zunächst wie ein absurdes Hindernis erscheint, daß Gott sich selbst in 
dem Weg legt, das eben ist sein wirklicher . . . Weg zu uns”). 
69 CD I/1, 152 (KD I/1, 158, “die Versetzung des Menschen in den ganz neuen Stand”). 
70 CD I/1, 198 (KD I/1, 206, “diejenige Bewährung menschlichen Wissens um einen Gegenstand, durch 
den sein Wahrsein zu einer Bestimmung der Existenz des erkennenden Menschen wird”). Barth is clear 
that no general definition of knowledge can be imposed or presumed. Definitions must be left open to 
correction “in the light of the object concerned” (CD I/1, 190; KD I/1, 197). 
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radically different) must the determination of the existence of the knower be in the human 
acquaintance with God. 
The impact of the Word of God is on all human faculties, not “intellect alone, yet at 
any rate the intellect also and not last of all.”71 Revelation never fails to be cognitive, but 
“the determination of human existence by God’s Word can be understood just as much as 
a determination of feeling, will, or intellect.”72 “Πίστις says more than γνωˆ σις, but in all 
circumstances it says γνωˆ σις too.”73 It is therefore the whole person who is impacted by 
this revelation. We have already established that the barrier of our fallenness is overcome 
in revelation. The impact on the whole person in the experience of knowing God is a 
turning of our rebellion against God and a being brought into conformity with God. “To 
have experience of God’s Word is to yield to its supremacy.” 74 “It comes . . . in such a 
way as to bend man, and indeed his conscience and will no less than his intellect and 
feeling. It does not break him; it really bends him, brings him into conformity with 
itself.”75 Every aspect of who we are is touched by revelation. Revelation is made 
possible by the gift of faith, which is required for those without eyes to be able to see 
Him.76 But this gift and the seeing imply a reconstitution of our minds, the submission of 
our wills and the transformation of our being.77 
We must be cautious, nevertheless, about the conclusions drawn from the insistence 
that revelation involves whole person transformation. There are a least three faulty 
inferences that must be avoided: Firstly, the consequence of personal transformation must 
never be read backwards as a condition of revelation. Repentance and obedience are 
given with the gift of faith, they are not a pre-requisite for revelation. Barth leaves no 
                                                 
71 CD I/1, 205 (KD I/1, 214, “nicht nur den Intellekt, aber jedenfalls auch und nicht zuletzt den Intellekt”). 
72 CD I/1, 204 (KD I/1, 213, “ebensowohl als eine Gefühls- wie als eines Willens- wie als eine 
Intellektsbestimmung verstanden werden”). 
73 CD I/1, 229 (KD I/1, 241, “Πίστις sagt mehr als γνωˆ σις, es sagt aber auch und unter allen Umständen auch 
γνωˆ σις”). 
74 CD I/1, 206 (KD I/1, 215, “Erfahrung vom Worte Gottes haben heißt zurückweichen vor seiner 
Überlegenheit”). 
75 CD I/1, 206 (KD I/1, 215, “es kommt . . . so, daß es den Menschen und zwar sein Gewissen und seinen 
Willen ebenso wie seinen Intellekt und sein Gefühl beugt—nicht zerbricht, aber wirklich beugt, in eine 
Konformität mit sich selber bringt”). 
76 CD I/1, 223 (KD I/1, 234). 
77 Barth understands the New Testament notion of repentance (µετανοεινˆ ) to refer not only to a 
transformation of the mind, but more comprehensively to death and rebirth (CD I/1, 387; KD I/1, 408). 
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doubt that, in his view, the Word of God is spoken in “unconditional freedom.”78 
Secondly, following from the first, God is free to reveal Himself by the Spirit in Christ to 
all people. The free revelatory work of the Spirit is not confined to the institutional church 
or only to those who have “professed Christ.” Thirdly, following from the second, the 
personal transformation involved in revelation does not create a privileged class of God-
knowers. The transformation that comes with revelation neither revives nor implants an 
independent capacity for knowing God. While it is true that “a new, regenerate man will 
arise” it is also true that he “does not possess this regenerate man.”79 There is no sense in 
which one is transformed to stand as a new creature on one’s own, as if it were possible to 
have direct access to the knowledge of God outside of communion with God freely 
established by God.80 Barth seems most anxious to dispel this erroneous conclusion 
because of its seductive appeal in the history of theology.81 To grant that there could be a 
human faculty which enables independent knowing of God is to ignore all that Barth 
believes we discover about the nature of revelation in the gift of revelation. Our 
dependence on God’s breaking through from above to below is removed if there is another 
more direct channel of knowing that is under our control. For Barth, the God we know to be 
God in his revelation could not be known in any other way.82 Moreover, it is impossible 
to have any assurance in a knowledge of God delivered by a human faculty. This move 
would attempt to ground faith in a human source, thus dangling it over the abyss of 
uncertainty and opening the door to the diabolical illusion of a way of theological 
knowing from below to above. 
                                                 
78 CD I/1, 157 (KD I/1, 164 , “unbedingte Freiheit”). 
79 CD I/1, 222 (KD I/1, 311 , “Ein neuer, ein wiedergeborener Mensch wird . . . dastehen” “nicht diesen 
neugeborenen Menschen besitzen”). 
80 In Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1985), 42–43, Ronald Thiemann argues that Barth “denies us our humanity” by stipulating that 
God is only known when the human subject is given a participation in God’s self-knowing. He suggests 
that the human subject is discounted because the human is not the one doing the knowing in that relation. 
Thiemann fails to consider the possibility of a real human participation in Christ’s human knowing of the 
Father. This charge ignores Barth’s strong affirmation of humanity inherent in the participation by which 
the human subject genuinely, humanly knows God. 
81 We will meet these concerns particularly in chapter 5 where we look at what room Barth and Plantinga 
make for natural theology. 
82 “The revelation attested in [Scripture] refuses to be understood as any sort of revelation alongside which 
there are or may be others” (CD I/1, 295; KD I/1, 311). 
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The personal, cognitive, self-attesting, divinely initiated knowledge of God can never 
be conceived of as anything other than gift freely given. Barth strictly maintains that 
nothing could merit or deliver independent access to the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, 
revelation could not involve a person’s participation by the Spirit in Jesus Christ, the 
Word of God, without also transforming that person. This transformation involves the 
reconstitution of mind and will such that the knower is brought into conformity with God, 
a transformation that is maintained only in the knowing relation effected by the Spirit in 
the gift of faith. This is, of course, not to say that personal transformation is 
comprehensive and instantaneous, though the ultimate goal of reconciliation is the 
regeneration of the whole person. It is with these provisos that the forth observation about 
Karl Barth’s theological epistemology should be understood: 4) knowing God effects a 
personal transformation in conformity with God. 
Conclusion 
In this first chapter I have sought to clarify the most important implications of Barth’s 
theology of revelation for understanding his theological epistemology. We have 
summarized these implications into four statements that address his understanding of the 
order, nature, direction and impact of theological knowing. With this positive groundwork 
laid, we are now ready to investigate how Barth’s uncompromising from-above theo-
foundationalism shapes his view of the role and limits of philosophy for theology. 
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While the conclusions of Barth’s theology of revelation do indeed curtail the free-reign 
of philosophy over theology, they hardly amount to an all-out ban. The intent of this 
second chapter is to determine what Karl Barth understands to be the primary theological 
boundaries for properly functioning philosophy in the service of theology, and thereby to 
correct the misunderstanding that Barth’s position is one of blanket interdiction and 
isolation. We will explore the implications of Barth’s theological epistemology to grasp 
his primary concerns with what he takes in fact to be the inevitable use of philosophy in 
the theological task. 
Our approach will focus on a selection of Barth’s work where he comments 
extensively on the relationship between philosophy and theology. With the exception of 
an essay penned for his brother Heinrich’s seventieth birthday Festschrift in 1960, the 
material we will consider is taken primarily from KD I/1 and material from Barth’s time 
just prior, in Göttingen and Münster. In this period, Barth clarifies theology’s independent 
starting point and the proper relationship of philosophical assumptions and methods to the 
theological task.1 We will begin with a consideration of some explicit statements Barth 
                                                 
1 The dubious suggestion of Hans Urs von Balthasar that Barth’s “final emancipation from the shackles of 
philosophy” did not come until 1930 after “a struggle, that lasted nearly ten years” should not deter us 
from concluding that the positions Barth enunciates during the Göttingen and Münster years constitute 
2 
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makes concerning philosophy and how it differs from theology. This discussion will 
establish that it is not philosophy per se that Barth rejects, but the way in which 
philosophy typically operates. Then we will look at Barth’s censure of the uncritical 
acceptance in theology of modernist philosophical presuppositions. Here we will nuance 
Barth’s response to a collection of philosophical assumptions that are rarely distinguished 
in theological literature. Finally, we will highlight a representative instance of Barth’s 
reflections on philosophy in relationship to theology. This will enable us to see that the 
criterion for evaluating the usefulness of philosophical assumptions and methods in the 
service of theology is the same criterion by which theology itself is evaluated, namely, the 
revelation of God. Our modest goal is to understand how Barth’s convictions about the 
givenness of divine self-revelation sets the priorities for constructive theological 
engagement with philosophy. 
Why Theology is Not Philosophy 
The suggestion that Barth’s theology has ‘little use for philosophy’ is in most respects 
untenable. From the 1920s onward, Barth’s position did not change. Theology cannot 
avoid philosophy because theology is done in philosophy’s own arena. “If we open our 
mouths, we find ourselves in the province of philosophy.”2 In fact, Barth begins his 
                                                                                                                                                  
his mature position. The material from 1932 and 1960 diverges in no way from the earlier material we 
will discuss. The English translation of Balthasar here tries to soften the claim by opting for “final 
emancipation” and mysteriously inserting “a gradual process, indeed a struggle.” Refering to what he 
finds to be Barth’s second turning point, Balthasar writes, “Der zweite [Wendepunkt] ist der Endpunkt 
der Befreiung aus den Schlacken der Philosophie, um zu einer echten, selbständigen Theologie zu 
gelangen; er liegt, nach einem fast zehnjährigen Ringen um diese Befreiung, ungefähr 1930” (Karl 
Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie [Köln: J. Hegner, 1951], 101, The Theology of Karl 
Barth: Exposition and Interpretation [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992], 93). 
2 From a lecture given at the University of Utrecht in 1935, Credo: A Presentation of the Chief Problems 
of Dogmatics with Reference to the Apostles’ Creed, trans. J. Strathearn McNab (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1936), 183 (Credo: Die Hauptprobleme der Dogmatik dargestellt im Anschluß an das 
Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis [München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1935], 158, “Wenn wir den Mund 
auftun, so befinden wir uns im Bereich der Philosophie”). Similarly, in 1928, Barth says that theology is 
done in the domain (das Gebiet) of philosophical reflection (EI, 32; Eet, 21). In 1929, Barth writes that 
theology works within the framework (im Raum) of philosophy (SIT, 57; SITet, 27). And, in 1960, Barth 
places theologians and philosophers in the same sphere (Raum) confronted by common problems 
(gemeinsamen Probleme), taking different paths (PTet, 80; PT, 94). 
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Church Dogmatics with the observation that there is only a pragmatic justification for 
distinguishing theology from philosophy. Philosophy is not necessarily “secular or 
pagan.” “There might be such a thing as philosophia christiana.”3 He later expands on 
this suggestion, by proposing the possibility of a Christian philosopher who is in fact a 
“Krypto-Theologe.”4 These and other positive statements about philosophy and its 
relationship to theology require that any explanation of Barth’s much vaunted aversion to 
philosophy must retain for philosophy some rightful place. It must be stressed that Barth’s 
strict cautions about philosophy are not aimed at philosophy “in principal”5 but only at 
the non-Christian stance that philosophy has in fact adopted. There is no reason why there 
could not be a Christian philosophy, but the fact is “there never has actually been a 
philosophia christiana, for if it was philosophia it was not christiana, and if it was 
christiana it was not philosophia.”6 It is philosophy’s abandoning of the theological task 
and way of knowing that has occasioned the need for theology as a stop gap measure.7 
Both theology and philosophy, and the other sciences for that matter, are human 
concerns to know the truth that theology knows to be the Truth which has made itself 
known as the ground of all other being and truth. As fellow-human beings engaged in this 
enterprise, the philosopher and theologian are companions. Barth says they face 
“common difficult tasks.”8 But it is exactly this commonality that gives rise to a turf-war-
like confrontation. It is the way in which philosophy approaches the Truth that has 
provoked theology to take its artificial independent stand. The theological way of 
knowing is “motivated wholly by the power of the primordial movement from above to 
below. The theologian stands and falls with this sequence, in fact, with its 
irreversibility.”9 It is significant to note that Barth sees the movement from below to 
above as legitimate and important, but only as a secondary movement from the first 
                                                 
3 CD I/1, 5 (KD I/1, 4, “nicht ‘profan’, nicht heidnisch sein” . . . “Sie könnte philosophia christiana sein”). 
4 PT, 98–99 (PTet, 85–86). 
5 CD I/1, 5 (KD I/1, 3, “als prinzipiell”). 
6 CD I/1, 6 (KD I/1, 4, “Philosophia christiana ist faktisch noch nie Wirklichkeit gewesen. . .”). 
7 It is “unfortunate that the question of the truth of talk about God should be handled as a question apart by 
a special faculty” (CD I/1, 5; KD I/1, 3, “Die Behandlung der Frage nach der Wahrheit der Rede von 
Gott als Spezialfrage einer besonderen Fakultät ist eine Mißlichkeit”). 
8 PTet, 80 (PT, 94, “gemeinsamen Probleme”). 
9 PTet, 84–85 (PT, 98, “die ganz allein durch die Kraft der ursprünglichen Bewegung von oben nach unten 
motiviert. . . Der Theologe steht un fällt mit dieser Folge, und zwar mit ihrer Unumkehrbarkeit”). 
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movement that is irreversibly from above to below.10 The faux pas of philosophy has 
been to reverse this order, believing that it has started from below with creation and the 
light of independent human reason. If indeed there is any consideration for the Creator, it 
is made in philosophy on the basis of the creation. In so doing philosophy judges 
according to “alien principles”11 rather than theology’s first and final criterion, Jesus 
Christ, the revelation of God. 
The distinction between philosophy and theology, therefore, must be carefully drawn. 
Barth identifies two strategies that must be rejected. The first is to distinguish theology as 
a special off-shoot of philosophy submitting to same general criteria of evaluation. This is 
the strategy of apologetics as Barth uses the term—“the attempt to establish and justify 
theological thinking in the context of philosophical, or, more generally and precisely, 
nontheological thinking.”12 The second strategy, connected to the first, is “the method of 
isolation.”13 Theology is distinguished as the enlightened and now independent 
philosophy. There are, however, two reasons why theology cannot assert a special 
superiority to philosophy. Firstly, Barth stresses that “Just as well and just as badly as 
philosophy, theology is a human science.”14 It has no special super-human access to the 
Truth by which to demonstrate its truth. Secondly, “all truth is enclosed in God’s 
Word.”15 There is no special preserve of theological truth that is by nature hidden from 
philosophy. In fact, a philosophy which “has the hearing of the Word of God as its 
presupposition” would be an “equal partner” to theology.16 Philosophy may be Christian 
philosophy and theology Christian theology to the extent that each is aligned with the 
Truth. Such philosophy would “speak very differently but will not in fact have anything 
                                                 
10 Barth even suggests that the priority and attention philosophy gives to creation could serve to remind 
theology of the importance of humanity and the world, which being relegated to a secondary concern are 
actually thereby exalted (PTet, 84, 92–93; PT, 98, 104–105). 
11 CD I/1, 6 (KD I/1, 4, “fremden Prinzipien”). 
12 Eet, 21 (EI, 33, “der Versuch einer Begründung und Rechtfertigung des theologischen im Rahmen des 
philosophischen oder—allgemeiner und bezeichnender—des nichttheologischen”). 
13 Eet, 24 (EI, 38, “die Methode der Isolierung”). 
14 Eet, 34 (EI, 54, “Theologie ist so gut und so schlimm wie Philosophie eine Menschliche Wissenschaft.”). 
15 Eet, 27 (EI, 42, “alle Wahrheit im Worte Gottes beschlossen ist. . .”). 
16 Eet, 23 (EI, 42, “Eine Philosophie . . . das Hören des Wortes Gottes zur Voraussetzung hat” . . . “der 
Theologie als ebenbürtiger Gegenspieler an die Seite treten”). 
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different to say.”17 For this reason any distinction between philosophy and theology is 
“only a relative and methodological but not material antithesis.”18 
Barth’s aversion to philosophy is not, therefore, an interdiction on the language, 
conceptions or questions of philosophy; these are all fair game for the theologian and part 
of what it means that theology is inevitably done in the overlapping Raum der 
Philosophie. The difference is that theology stands in an orientation acknowledging the 
primacy of God’s self-revelation for the understanding and appropriation of everything 
with which it and philosophy share an interest. It is not the realm of philosophy that Barth 
objects to, that would be to cut theology off from its own turf. It is the anti-theological 
orientation of philosophy that requires vigorous resistance. Bruce McCormack speaks to 
this difference when he clarifies what it means for Barth to be “anti-metaphysical.” What 
Barth objects to is the “order of knowing” in classical metaphysics from below, 
“extrapolating from observed phenomena.” But this rejection of the metaphysical way 
“does not entail the bracketing-off of particular regions of discourse from discussion in an 
a priori fashion.”19 The proposal that Barth has ‘little use for philosophy’ is only accurate 
if applied to the historic neglect philosophy has shown for the theological task and way of 
knowing. This neglect has created the need for “the separate existence of theology” as an 
“emergency measure.”20  
The charge that Barth’s theological epistemology is finally anti-philosophical and 
possibly even irrational21 is one that Barth himself addressed. This critique has often 
come packaged with the “neo-orthodox” designation.22 The implication is that Barth 
                                                 
17 Eet, 33 (EI, 54, “zwar dasselbe ganz anders, aber nicht etwas Anderes dazu zu sagen”). 
18 Eet, 30 (EI, 47, “nur ein relativer, methodisher, nicht aber sachlicher Gegensatz”). There is a significant 
translation error here where “theological” stands in place of the original “philosophischen,” obscuring 
entirely the point of this sentence. 
19 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909–1936 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995), 246. 
20 CD I/1, 7 (KD I/1, 5, “Die Sonderexistenz der Theologie bedeutet die Notmaßnahme. . .”). 
21 Pope Benedict XVI has called Barth’s position the “amputation of reason” (Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, 
Introduction to Christianity [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004], 139). 
22 Often the two are conflated, as in “Karl Barth’s anti-philosophical neo-orthodoxy” (Herbert Spiegelberg 
and Karl Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3rd rev. ed. [Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1982], 430). Bruce McCormack challenges the von Balthasarian thesis of a later non-dialectical 
Barth that may have bolstered the ‘neo-orthodox’ reading of Barth which “remains the predominant one 
in the English-speaking world” (Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 24–25). 
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champions a return to a pre-modern, pre-critical era of positive orthodoxy, choosing to 
remain naïve by ignoring the epistemological questions raised by modernity. The notion 
that Barth was advocating a pre-modern or pre-scientific theology began several years 
before the first volume of the Church Dogmatics, and is addressed directly by Barth in 
correspondence with Adolf von Harnack.23 Barth had challenged what Harnack would 
call “contemporary scientific theology,”24 which marked its origins from the 
Enlightenment.25 Harnack was clear that to abandon this Enlightenment project was, in 
his view, to abandon “the only possible way of grasping the object epistemologically.”26 
He advanced the notion that “historical knowledge and critical reflection” were the 
conduits for a proper human reception of revelation.27 In response, Barth catalogs and 
rejects those human grounds that had been proposed to fulfill the Enlightenment’s 
foundationalist requirements. He rejects both those subjective grounds that Harnack also 
rejects, as well as those foundations sacred to Harnack.28 Barth, however, protests 
Harnack’s conclusion that Barth is, on this account, a despiser of reason and science. In a 
move that only serves to confirm Harnack’s suspicions, Barth appeals to Luther and 
Paul.29 This leads Harnack to suspect that Barth simply wishes to recast an uncritical, pre-
modern theology. However, and this is the salient point, Barth categorically rejects any 
simple ‘repristination’ of classical or pre-Enlightenment theology. He sees the value of 
reclaiming for theology the “idea of a determinative object” unconstrained by “the 
determinate character of the method.”30 But he is resolute in the face of the question of 
“repristinating a classical theological train of thought” that, as theologians, “we must 
think in our time for our time.”31 The idea that Barth advocates at any stage a positive 
                                                 
23 Harnack addressed his original grievances to “the despisers of scientific theology,” of which Barth was 
foremost in his estimation (BHet, 29; BH, 7). 
24 BHet, 36 (BH, 14, “wissenschaftlichen Theologie der Gegenwart”). 
25 BHet, 31 (BH, 9). 
26 BHet, 36 (BH, 14, “die einzige mögliche Weise, sich des Gegenstandes erkenntnismäßig zu 
bemächtigen”). 
27 BHet, 29 (BH, 7, “geschichtliches Wissen und kritisches Nachdenken”). 
28 “‘Inner openness, heuristic knowledge, experience, heart’ and the like on the one hand and ‘historical 
knowledge and critical reflection’ on the other. . .” (BHet, 32; BH, 10). 
29 BHet, 38 (BH, 16). 
30 BHet, 41–42 (BH, 20, “der Begriff eines maßgeblichen Gegenstandes . . . Maßgeblichkeit der Methode”). 
31 BHet, 41–42 (BH, 19–20, “Repristinieren eines klassischen theologischen Gedankenganges,” . . . “wir in 
unserer Zeit für unsere Zeit zu denken haben”). 
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neo-orthodoxy that is uncritical with respect to epistemological problems is indefensible 
even on a surface reading. Barth recognized that a theology which thinks in and for its 
time would have to take seriously the question of theology’s way and ground of 
knowledge; and, he does just that by giving this very question pride of place in CD I/1. 
Despite Barth’s clear display of critical appreciation for the question Harnack still only 
saw in Barth an unscientific notion of revelation teetering “between absolute religious 
scepticism and naive biblicism.”32 Harnack could not fathom the validity of a starting 
point that grasps the knower but is not grasped by the knower independent of the given 
knowing relation. Harnack’s commitment to the exclusive rationality of the way of 
knowing from below to above forces his conclusion that Barth was rejecting critical 
thought en masse.  
Harnack’s difficulties with Barth are similar to those of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Like 
Harnack, Pannenberg determines that Barth’s rejection of an earth-bound scientific 
epistemology must leave Barth hopelessly mired in subjectivism.33 Pannenberg believes 
that if human reason and experience are subjugated, only two options remain: 
subjectivism and fideism. In explicit agreement with the Enlightenment, Pannenberg 
states that “a ‘positive’ theology of revelation which does not depend on rational 
argument can rely only on a subjective act of will or an irrational venture of faith.”34 It is 
clear, moreover, that for Pannenberg these two alternatives collapse into each other. Both 
are an indication of a wholly arbitrary and irrational positivism that stifles intersubjective 
dialogue.35 Neither Pannenberg nor Harnack could understand Barth’s “from above” as 
anything other than making an arbitrary human start. For this reason, Pannenberg sees 
rejecting Barth’s “from above” as crucial for theology “if it does not want to fall into the 
hopeless and, what is more, self-inflicted isolation of a higher glossolalia, and lead the 
whole church into this blind alley.”36 But this conclusion only follows if one rules out a 
priori that God has acted to give himself in Jesus Christ by the Spirit as the ground of 
                                                 
32 BHet, 53 (BH, 31, “zwischen dem absoluten religiösen Skeptizismus und dem naiven Biblizismus”). 
33 Harnack assumes that if the ground is not “historical knowledge” (geschichtliches Wissen) then the basis 
must be in the individual’s “subjective experience” (BHet, 29; BH, 7). 
34 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 
273. 
35 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 274. 
36 Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology; Collected Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), II, 
189–190. 
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theological knowing. This a priori ban on the givenness of divine self-revelation is the 
arbitrary assumption driving Pannenberg’s conclusions. He writes, “Barth’s apparently so 
lofty objectivity about God and God’s word turns out to rest on no more than the 
irrational subjectivity of a venture of faith with no justification outside itself.”37 But 
dependence on faith becomes fideistic in Pannenberg’s sense only if that faith is an 
arbitrary human choice. The tables turn dramatically if that faith is the gift of divine self-
revelation. Barth would agree that it has no justification outside itself. But what 
justification could be more secure than God’s own self-attestation? Far from fideistic, this 
alternative, invisible to Pannenberg and Harnack, offers what Barth would see as the only 
escape possible from the ghettos of human reason.38 
For those who would presume that cognitive human knowledge of God could not be 
given from above, Barth’s rejection of the from-below way of philosophical knowing is 
patently irrational, and amounts to an uncritical and naïve wholesale rejection of 
philosophical thought. For Barth, however, the distinction between philosophy and 
theology is only necessary to preserve (against this mindset) a from-above, theo-
foundational way of knowing. In no way does this require a retreat on the part of theology 
from the realm of philosophy. On the contrary, it is this order of knowing that motivates a 
critical awareness of and response to the language, concepts and questions raised by 
philosophy.39 
Contesting the Ontological Presupposition of the Enlightenment 
Our focus thus far on Barth’s theological epistemology recognizes that the first volume 
of the Church Dogmatics is, above all else, Barth’s attempt to elucidate and defend the 
way of knowledge followed in theology. He famously renounces traditional post-
Enlightenment prolegomena, operating as a philosophic preamble to theology, undertaken 
in an attempt to establish the noetic grounds, scientific character and academic legitimacy 
                                                 
37 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 273. 
38 I take a closer look at whether and in what sense Barth may be considered a fideist in “Does 
Contemporary Theology Require a Postfoundationalist Way of Knowing?” Scottish Journal of Theology 
60, no. 3 (2007): 16–19. 
39 Barth even grants that “it is quite right . . . that an education in the arts and a familiarity with the thinking 
of the philosopher, psychologist, historian, aesthetician, etc., should be demanded of the dogmatician or 
the theologian” (CD I/1, 283; KD I/1, 300). Though this familiarity is not what makes one a theologian. 
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of theology.40 In so doing, Barth was making a break with core epistemological 
assumptions of modernity’s Enlightenment project. The question could be raised whether 
the reading of Barth being advanced here is at odds with the received opinion that Barth 
stands the Enlightenment on its head by reversing the priorities of epistemology and 
ontology that were themselves reversed by Descartes.41 Is not Barth’s real priority 
ontology rather than epistemology? Though our focus has been on understanding Barth’s 
theological epistemology we have already seen that God in God’s self-revealing action 
precedes ontologically and makes possible theological knowing. Conceding priority to the 
question of theology’s way and ground of knowledge does not mean that Barth allows the 
traditional, post-Enlightenment, attending epistemological assumptions to go 
unquestioned. Conceding priority to the question does not mean that Barth allows the 
question itself to establish the terms of the debate or condition its outcome. It is in fact the 
ontological priority of the object of theological knowing that provides the epistemic basis 
for theology.  
Barth saw that, despite all appearances, Enlightenment modernism begins with its own 
ungrounded ontological assumption.42 This presumption was an optimism about the 
constitution and capacity of unassisted human reason which provides the basis for 
knowing God from-below. What follows here is an analysis of how Barth’s insistence on 
the priority of God’s self-revelation leads to his dismantling of the Enlightenment 
                                                 
40 As Eberhard Busch notes: “The dogmatics of the 19th century understood the ‘prolegomena’ with which 
it began as a preamble addressing the general human and human-religious presuppositions which would 
make a ‘doctrine of faith’ possible” (Eberhard Busch, The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl 
Barth’s Theology, eds. Darrell L. Guder and Judith J. Guder, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004], 42). For Barth “the prefix pro in prolegomena is to be understood loosely to signify 
the first part of dogmatics rather than that which is prior to it” (CD I/1, 42; KD I/1, 41). Nancy Murphy 
provides a concise overview of the way in which theology after Descartes, both conservative and liberal, 
acquiesced to the general philosophical requirements of foundationalism (Nancey Murphy, Beyond 
Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda, 
Rockwell Lecture Series [Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996], 11–35). 
41 E.g., “what characterizes the modernity which is the target of Barth’s critique? The first is the inversion 
of the order of being and knowing, of ontology or metaphysics and epistemology. In pre-modern times, 
the question of the being (or essence) of something had primacy over the question of how it can be 
known” (Christoph Schwöbel, “Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John B. 
Webster [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 29). 
42 “This nexus of problems, however, is that of an ontology, and since Descartes. . .” (CD I/1, 36; KD I/1, 
35–36). 
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assumptions. The question, as Barth puts it in CD I/1, is: what is the “particular way of 
knowledge taken in dogmatics”?43 Originating with Descartes, and extending through 
Locke, Kant, Schleiermacher, Harnack and many others, this question came packaged 
with a least three constraining assumptions about its answer: 
 
1. The obligation assumption: An explanation or an account of the way 
of theological knowledge is an obligation upon which the legitimacy 
of the theological knowledge claim rests. 
 
2. The general starting-point assumption: An account of the way of 
theological knowing must stem from a general epistemology that 
grounds all knowing or all metaphysical claims. 
 
3. The evidentialist foundationalist assumption: The way of theological 
knowledge must be anchored in trustworthy and readily accessible 
grounds. 
 
These three assumptions are related and given in order of increasing specificity. The first 
assumes an obligation to give an account; the second defines the direction that must be 
taken in fulfilling that obligation; and, the third stipulates the rules that must be obeyed 
while following the defined direction in fulfillment of the obligation.44 Barth was not 
willing to give any of these attending assumptions a free pass. 
The Obligation Assumption  
Firstly, Barth rejects the notion that theology is obligated to give a reckoning of its 
particular theological way of knowing. In fact, he does not grant, as an initial assumption, 
that giving such an account is even possible. He does resolve retrospectively that it is 
                                                 
43 CD I/1, 25 (KD I/1, 24, “den besonderen Erkenntnisweg, der in der Dogmatik begangen werden”). 
44 This parsing of the assumptions of Enlightenment modernism can be mapped to the elements of 
Plantinga’s ‘classical package’ (WCB, 82). The obligation assumption corresponds to the duty of 
classical deontologism; the evidentialist foundationalist assumption corresponds to both classical 
evidentialism and classical foundationalism. The general starting-point assumption is implied in most 
versions of classical foundationalism. 
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possible to give an account, but he refuses to grant it as a requirement for theology. It is 
helpful to recall from our discussion in chapter 1 that for Barth the principles of 
theological knowing are only known in reflection on the gift of the knowledge of God. 
Providing an account of how the knowledge of God becomes a human possibility cannot 
be a required first-move, prior to reflecting on the actually given knowledge of God. In 
fact, Barth believed, that it did not necessarily undermine the scientific character of 
theology if it had no prolegomena whatsoever.45 “Das Ab esse ad posse valet 
consequentia könnte ihre Rechtfertigung sein.”46 It could be sufficient to note that 
beginning with reflection on the fact of the esse of the knowledge of God renders its 
posse a foregone conclusion requiring no account. So the possibility of theological 
knowing was a valid assumption, not on the basis of a foregoing confidence in human 
noetic capacity, but only as nachdenken (reflection, lit. thinking after) on an already given 
reality. 
Similarly, Barth only acknowledges retrospectively an obligation to give an account of 
the way of theological knowing. The obligation is seen in the light of an already given 
knowledge, it therefore cannot be understood as a foregoing obligation to establish the 
grounds for theological knowing. Granting an obligation as an initial assumption would 
be to suggest that one is required, or duty bound, to produce an account in order to have a 
right to the belief.47 In Barth’s view, it is only in accepting its designation as a science 
that theology recognizes an obligation to “submit to itself, i.e., everyone who has a share 
in it, an account regarding this path of knowledge.”48 What is clear here is that the 
knowledge is already granted. Never is the knowledge itself contingent upon fulfilling the 
obligation. Barth provides an account of theological knowing without granting the 
assumed obligation. 
                                                 
45 “It cannot be taken for granted that this question can be explicitly raised and answered, and therefore that 
there can be such a thing as dogmatic prolegomena. . .The lack of prolegomena, or at least of extensive 
prolegomena, might well indicate, not a naive attitude, but one which is scientifically mature and well-
considered. Nor need such an attitude rest on an illusion. It might well have a solid basis in the simplicity 
of truth, in supreme scientific soundness” (CD I/1, 25; KD I/1, 24). 
46 KD I/1, 24 (CD I/1, 25). 
47 Cf. Plantinga on ‘classical deontologism’ in WCB, 86. 
48 CD I/1, 275 (KD I/1, 291, “. . .sie sich selbst, d. h. aber jedermann, der an ihrem Problem beteiligt ist, 
über diesen ihren Erkenntnisweg Rechenschaft abzulegen hat”); also see CD I/1, 8 (KD I/1, 6). 
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The General Starting-Point Assumption 
The general starting-point and evidentialist foundationalist assumptions drew Barth’s 
sharpest attacks. To grant these assumptions would be to commit to a foolishly optimistic 
and hopelessly insecure theology von unten. Unlike the first assumption, these two 
assumptions cannot be affirmed even after-the-fact.49 Barth has been charged with naïveté 
for suggesting that theology finds its noetic grounds in the object of theology itself and 
not in a general epistemology with indubitable, accessible foundations.50 This charge 
cannot be sustained, however, as Barth demonstrates time and again that he is fully aware 
of the problems, issues and various alternatives in play. Moreover, he launches the 
counter charge that the real naïveté is displayed by those who uncritically accept these 
packaged assumptions.51  
Regarding the general starting-point assumption, Barth was clearly not the first to 
reject the requirement that the way of knowing in theology must be grounded in a general 
epistemology. It can and has been argued that Barth was following along in the footsteps 
of Albrecht Ritschl and Barth’s Marburg professor Wilhelm Herrmann.52 Both Ritschl 
and Herrmann sought independent epistemological footing for theology that would 
protect its scientific character while keeping it epistemically differentiated from 
philosophy. It will be helpful in clarifying the dissent that Barth was registering with the 
Enlightenment project to briefly examine to what extent he was or was not simply 
                                                 
49 Barth does not believe it is possible, even retrospectively to “deduce any independent, generally true 
insights that are different from God’s Word and hence lead up to it” (CD I/1, 131; KD I/1, 135). 
50 Bultmann accuses Barth of having “failed to enter into debate with modern philosophy and naively 
adopted the older ontology from patristic and scholastic dogmatics” (Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann 
Letters, 1922–1966, eds. Bernd Jaspert and G. W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981], 38). 
Harnack sees in Barth’s unscientific notion of revelation a teetering between “absolute religious 
scepticism and naive biblicism” (BHet, 53; BH, 31). Harnack’s critique is aimed at Barth’s failure to 
meet the second assumption. Barth’s account of theological knowing is ailing because it is not 
subsumable “under one generic concept” (unter einem Gattungsbegriff) and is therefore not scientific. 
The accusation that Barth heralds an uncritical neo-orthodoxy is in this same vein. 
51 “The confidence of the Enlightenment in the right and the power of rational thought was naïve, untested 
and therefore unsecured, stuck fast in half-truths and open to all kinds of counter-blows” (Protestant 
Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History [London: S.C.M. Press, 1972], 394). 
52 Simon Fisher argues that in Barth’s early writings he “appears as an authentic, though sometimes critical, 
follower of Ritschl and Herrmann” (Revelatory Positivism?: Barth’s Earliest Theology and the Marburg 
School [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988], 171). 
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reiterating the positions of Ritschl and Herrmann. We will look at Ritschl in connection 
with the general starting-point assumption, and Herrmann in connection with the 
evidentialist foundationalist assumption. 
Like Barth, Ritschl rejects the possibility that the way of knowing in theology can be 
anchored in a general epistemology that serves as the basis for all philosophical knowing. 
While agreeing with Ritschl’s conclusion, Barth does not agree with the reasons he 
employs in its support. Ritschl held that cognition in theology and cognition in 
philosophy are of two fundamentally different kinds, namely, Natur und Geist. The way 
of knowing followed in religion and pertaining to morals is sui generis. The search for a 
shared foundation between natural and spiritual knowing cannot be conducted without 
obscuring their fundamental differentiation.53 This move served to insulate theology from 
philosophy and vice versa. In a time when the scientific character and academic 
legitimacy of theology was often in question, this move to carve out an independent 
noetic position for theology was strategic. Reductionist tendencies in materialism and 
idealism that cast doubt on the object and foundation of theology as a science were 
avoided by Ritschl’s firm epistemological dualism. On his view, philosophical reasoning 
cannot be used to undermine Christian truth claims. By the same token, attempts to 
establish theology with general metaphysical arguments, simply “fall short of their 
goal.”54 
Barth does agree with many of Ritschl’s conclusions. Vis-à-vis the other sciences, 
dogmatics “does not have to justify itself before them, least of all by submitting to the 
demands of a concept of science which accidentally or not claims general validity.”55 He 
even agrees on a sui generis concept of knowledge for theology, which “cannot be 
definitively measured by the concept of the knowledge of other objects, by a general 
concept of knowledge.”56 For Barth, however, the uniqueness of the way of knowing in 
                                                 
53 “…any investigation of the common foundations of all being must set aside the particular characteristics 
by which one represents the difference between nature and spirit. . . . Such an analysis is inadequate for 
grasping the form and peculiarity of the spirit, and in that sense is without value” (Albrecht Ritschl, 
Three Essays [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972], 154–155). 
54 He has in mind here particularly the traditional proofs for the existence of God (Three Essays, 154). 
55 CD I/1, 8 (KD I/1, 6, “Sie hat sich nicht vor ihnen zu rechtfertigen, vor allem nicht dadurch, daß sie sich 
den Anforderungen eines zufällig oder nicht zufällig allgemein gültigen Wissenschaftsbegriffs 
unterzieht”). 
56 CD I/1, 190 (KD I/1, 198, “. . .der Begriff seiner Erkenntnis durchaus nicht ultimativ an dem Begriff der 
Erkenntnis anderer Gegenstände, an einem allgemeinen Erkenntnisbegriff gemessen warden darf. . .”). 
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theology is entirely dependent on the uniqueness of its object and not a dualist 
epistemology57 that merely nuances general knowing into two types, leaving them both 
anchored in general human noetic capacity. In Barth’s view Ritschl did not prevail over 
the Enlightenment by overturning its false assumptions. Quite to the contrary, he saw 
Ritschl’s thought as the ‘quintessence’58 and the ‘fulfillment’59 of the Enlightenment. 
Barth recognized in Ritschl little more than a return to the Kantian division between 
theoretical and practical reason.60 It is not the freedom of God to determine for us the way 
to know God, rather it is a general principle of practical reason that provides and anchors 
theological knowing.  
Another important difference with Ritschl is Barth’s seeming nonchalance about the 
scientific character of theology, which was, for Ritschl, an essential demand. On Ritschl’s 
scheme the rational credentials of theology depended on its scientific character flowing 
from the principles of geistiges Leben. Barth’s concern was that no systematic constraints 
be put in place which would interfere with or limit the freedom of God in revelation, or 
presume a foregoing human access to God. He even allows that “it would make not the 
slightest difference to its real business if it had to rank as something other than science.”61 
                                                                                                                                                  
The English translation unnecessarily inserts an ‘or’ in this sentence which I have removed to more 
accurately render the original. 
57 Barth explicitly rejects the notion that human cognition in theological knowing is of a different kind 
from other instances of human cognition: “We are speaking of the human knowledge of God on the basis 
of this revelation and therefore of an event which formally and technically cannot be distinguished from 
what we call knowledge in other connexions, from human cognition” (CD II/1, 181; KD II/1, 203). 
58 “It was a tired age that thought it could see a gleam of hope in the theology of A. Ritschl, which in the 
event merely reached back over Idealism and Romanticism to the quintessence of the Enlightenment” 
(CD I/1, 276; KD I/1, 293). 
59 Regarding Ritschl, Barth writes “We can ask whether the entire theological movement of the century 
resulted not at all in an overcoming of the Enlightenment, of its decisive interest of man in himself, but 
in its fulfillment” (Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 655–656). 
60 “… he [Ritschl] energetically seized upon the theoretical and practical philosophy of the Enlightenment 
in its perfected form. That is, he want back to Kant, but Kant quite definitely interpreted as an 
antimetaphysical moralist” (Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 655). 
61 CD I/1, 8 (KD I/1, 6, “Es würde aber an dem, was sie zu tun hat, nicht das Geringste ändern, wenn sie als 
irgendetwas anderes denn gerade als ‘Wissenschaft’ zu gelten hätte”). 
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For Barth, the way in which theology goes about its task can be considered ‘scientific,’62 
but whether or not theology is viewed from the outside as a science according to criteria 
external to theology, is unimportant. Ritschl’s concern to preserve theology as a science, 
in contrast, stemmed from his conviction that prevailing scientific standards really did 
have a proper claim on theology if theology was to be considered a rational enterprise. 
The distinction between Barth and Ritschl is crucial though somewhat counter-intuitive, 
and therefore often missed. Ritschl’s division of knowledge is in fact positivistic63 but 
derives from an underlying commitment to an Enlightenment movement of knowledge 
flowing from general and generally accessible principles of reason. Barth, on the other 
hand, often accused of positivism,64 is actually much more concerned with the direction 
rather than the division of knowledge. He is not pitting revelation against reason, or 
‘giving up the integrity of reason,’ as is often suspected.65 He is merely rejecting the 
assumed priorities of an Enlightenment view of reason concerning what it means for 
theology to be reasonable or scientific. Unlike Ritschl, Barth is willing to grant that 
theology does not “know an object of enquiry necessarily concealed from other sciences.” 
The distinction that Barth makes, once again, is that theology is not held to the same way 
of knowing that may govern contemporary science, because the way of the knowledge of 
God does not begin from below with a general theory of knowledge. 
The Evidentialist Foundationalist Assumption 
This brings us to the evidentialist foundationalist assumption, the final of the three 
mentioned assumptions traditionally smuggled in with the question of the way of 
knowing in theology. The assumption here is that theological knowledge, like every other 
                                                 
62 Barth gives practical reasons for considering theology a science, but never would he allow the direction 
of interpretation to begin from a general notion of science; on the contrary, simply by pursuing its task 
theology “shows what it means by true science” (CD I/1, 10–11; KD I/1, 9–10). 
63 “Positivism” is an elusive term, often casting more shadow than light. I am using the term in the sense 
defined by Paul Janz, “positivism in theology is any position that seeks to uphold the integrity of 
transcendence (or revelation) by giving up the integrity of reason or of natural enquiry” (God, the Mind’s 
Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 5). 
64 We have already considered this charge in Pannenberg. Perhaps Dietrich Bonhoeffer is the first to level 
the critique of positivism, though without much development in Letters and Papers from Prison, 
enlarged ed. (London: SCM Press, 1971), 280, 286, 328–339. 
65 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 5. 
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set of beliefs that aspires to the rank of knowledge, must spring from trustworthy grounds 
which are readily accessible to the theologian. This assumption is at the heart of the 
modernist commitment to foundationalism so roundly criticized in the latter half of the 
20th century.66 It is important to note that there are two parts to this assumption, just as 
there are two aspects to the traditional foundationalist claim.67 On the one hand there is a 
thesis about the structure of human knowing, on the other hand there is a requirement that 
the human knower have self-reflective ‘access’ to the basis of that structure. The first 
claim is that theological knowledge must spring from solid and dependable grounds. This 
means that there exist bedrock experiences or ideas that yield foundational beliefs that 
can be trusted to be true; and, that all knowledge must either be an instance of such a 
belief, or in a linear inferential relationship to it. The second claim is that these grounds 
are ‘readily accessible.’ This means that the human knower must be able to provide a 
reason for accepting a belief by demonstrating how that belief is inferentially connected 
to a foundational belief or itself could not fail to be true.68 I’ll refer to the first claim as 
the foundation requirement and the second claim as the accessibility requirement.69 The 
distinction between these two claims will be crucial for a proper understanding of Barth 
and for the prospect of binging him with Plantinga into fruitful dialogue later. I will argue 
here that it is clear only that Barth rejects the second of the two claims. Once again 
                                                 
66 Bruce Marshall surmises that “Few theologians any longer will admit to being foundationalists” (Trinity 
and Truth [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 80). A widely discussed critique of 
foundationalism from analytical philosophy is found in Laurence Bonjour, “Can Empirical Knowledge 
Have a Foundation?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1978). 
67 In the next chapter we will look at Plantinga’s challenge to foundationalism, where he helpfully 
distinguishes various stripes of foundationalist doctrine. What we are here calling evidentialist 
foundationalism is what Plantinga distinguishes as classical or strong foundationalism. 
68 This is the accessibility requirement of epistemological “internalism,” which BonJour defines as follows: 
“a theory of justification is internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to 
be epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively accessible to that person, internal to his 
cognitive perspective” (“Externalism/Internalism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, eds. Jonathan 
Dancy and Ernest Sosa [Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992], 132). 
69 Bruce Marshall divides foundationalism into three claims which map to our discussion as follows: his 
(F1) and (F2) taken together are the accessibility requirement, while his (F3) is the foundational 
requirement (Trinity and Truth, 54). 
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Barth’s position can be clarified by distinguishing it from one of his theological 
predecessors—this time it is his most esteemed Marburg mentor, Wilhelm Herrmann.70 
The most obvious attempts to meet the requirements of the evidentialist 
foundationalist assumption have been through philosophical proofs for the existence of 
God or truth of Christianity, beginning with Descartes Meditations and proceeding with 
more or less subtlety right up to the present day.71 Herrmann thoroughly rejected the use 
of rational proofs in theology, whether as prolegomena or apologetics. Barth’s summary 
of Herrmann’s position is close to a stating of his own:72 “The thought underlying such 
proofs—God is Lord of all—has validity only as an idea of religion itself; not as a road to 
religion.”73 On the freedom of God in revelation tied to the impossibility of a scientific 
demonstration, it appears Barth was a dutiful disciple of Herrmann: “The God of faith is 
neither ‘demonstrable’ reality nor is he merely a possibility. . . he is known only where he 
reveals his life; and where and to whom he will reveal it is his concern alone.”74 There is 
no hint in these quotations of an epistemological dualism (à la Ritschl) employed to 
secure theology’s independence. It would seem that the independence of theology is itself 
                                                 
70 Barth came to Marburg to study under Herrmann in 1908. “Finally in the summer of 1908, various 
circumstances brought it about that I was able to visit Marburg, which I had earnestly wanted to do 
because of Herrmann. I was now able to hear whom I wanted. . . . These three semesters in Marburg 
easily form my happiest memory as a student. I absorbed Herrmann through every pore” (Karl Barth-
Rudolf Bultmann Letters, 153). 
71 See especially the Third Meditation in Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, rev. ed. 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 24–36. At present, Richard Swinburne is probably best 
known for his pursuit of evidentialist arguments and natural theology. E.g., The Resurrection of God 
Incarnate (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2003), 204–216. Approaches 
since the enlightenment are arguably different in character from medieval natural theology. For a defense 
of this point with respect to Aquinas’ Five Ways, see Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 52–72. 
72 Barth, however, would never use the term ‘religion’ generically when referring to the revelation of God 
in Christ. Herrmann’s “has validity only as an idea of religion itself” (ist kraftvoll nur als Gedanke der 
Religion selbst) could be understood here to be suggesting that the validity of the claim only holds within 
a particular sphere of human knowing (i.e. religion). Herrmann’s point is rather about from where the 
validity is secured, not about the scope of that validity (DHet, 243; DH, 560). 
73 DHet, 243 (DH, 560, “Der jenen Beweisen zugrunde liegende Gedanke: Gott der Herr über allem! ist 
kraftvoll nur als Gedanke der Religion selbst, nicht als Weg zur Religion”). 
74 DHet, 243 (DH, 560, “Sein Gott ist weder ‘nachweisbar’ Wirklichkeit noch auch nur Möglichkeit. . . . 
‘Er wird also nur erkannt, wo er sein Leben offenbart, und es ist seine Sache, wo und wem er es 
offenbaren will’”). 
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secured by God’s freedom in revelation and not the sui generis quality of a general 
ethical-religious knowing. Does this agreement between Herrmann and Barth, however, 
extend to the rejection of the evidentialist foundationalist assumption?  
Barth acknowledges his indebtedness to Herrmann for imparting to him “one essential 
truth.” He writes, “This truth, followed out to its consequences, later forced me to say 
almost everything else quite differently and finally led me even to an interpretation of the 
fundamental truth itself which was entirely different from his.”75 Barth is undoubtedly 
speaking here of what Herrmann sometimes referred to as the autopistia of Christian 
truth, “the conviction of Christian truth as based on itself.”76 This insight, however, did 
not receive the stress and clarity required in Barth’s view.77 It was shrouded instead by 
Herrmann’s emphasis on the role of individual human experience in getting theology off 
the ground. Barth seizes on this statement of Herrmann to illustrate his point: 
“Knowledge of God is the expression of religious experience wholly without weapons.”78 
Barth hails the “without weapons” precisely because of his rejection of the accessibility 
requirement, that requires the human knower to come armed with an argument to defend 
the knowledge claim. For Barth a human defense is not possible.79 “He [God] Himself 
will uphold and defend it without human help or strength.”80 “Only the Logos of God 
Himself can provide the proof.”81 It is because of the principle of autopistia that such 
knowledge “has no basis or possibility outside itself.”82 This also explains why Barth 
cannot countenance Herrmann’s double mindedness,83 which while insisting that 
                                                 
75 DHet, 239 (DH, 552, “Ich mir von Herrmann etwas Grundlegendes habe sagen lassen, das, in seine 
Konsequenzen verfolgt, mich nachher nötigte, so ziemlich alles Übrige ganz anders zu deuten als er”). 
76 DHet, 258 (DH, 585, “das In-sich-selbst-Gegründetsein der christlichen Wahrheit”). 
77 DHet, 268–270 (DH, 599–601). 
78 DHet, 248, 259 (DH, 568, 587, “Gotteserkenntnis ist der wehrlose Ausdruck des religiösen Erlebens”). 
79 This impossibility of human demonstration leads William Abraham to conclude that Barth’s “central 
epistemological claims about divine revelation have been a disaster, leaving its adherents stripped of help 
in confronting competing claims” (Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2006], 3). 
80 CD I/1, 31 (KD I/1, 30) quoting Luther “. . .also will ers auch selbs on menschen hülff und sterck 
handhaben und verteydigen. . .” (Fastenpostille, 1525, W.A., 172, p. 108, 1. 26). 
81 CD I/1, 163 (KD I/1, 169, “. . .nur der Logos Gottes selbst den Beweis führen kann. . .”). 
82 CD I/1, 120 (KD I/1, 123, “. . .keinen Grund und keine Möglichkeit außer seiner selbst hat. . .”). 
83 Barth often anguishes over the tension in Herrmann between two contradicting points of view and the 
lamentable conclusion that the emphasis in Herrmann was on the wrong view. “If we ask first on which 
of the contradictory positions which he presented Herrmann himself, his heart, his professional character, 
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Christian truth is self-grounded, persistently undermines this claim with an appeal to the 
“inherent power of our (that is the believing Christian’s) experiencing intuition.”84 
Conscience (Gewissen) becomes the human point of contact with God.85 It is important to 
see that the difference between Barth and Herrmann on this point is not a minor nuance or 
trivial detail; in Barth’s view, the separation is “only by a blade’s breadth and yet by a 
chasm’s depth.”86 It finally makes the difference between an outright dismissal of the 
requirement for human access to the grounds of knowledge and merely a slight 
modification of that requirement which remains essentially unchanged. At this point 
Herrmann is more akin to Ritschl; the kind of human access granted to the basis of the 
religious knowledge claim does not take the form of syllogistic reasoning or scientific 
proof. Nevertheless, the basis remains accessible in the intuition of human experience,87 
what Herrmann often calls, “das innere Leben des Glaubens.”88 One might argue that 
Herrmann does not claim that accessibility is required, only that it exists. But this is all 
we need to differentiate his position from Barth’s. 
Distinguished from Herrmann, it should be clear that Barth makes a clean break with 
the accessibility requirement of the evidentialist foundationalist assumption. Theological 
knowing does not require human access or defense in order to be considered legitimate 
knowing primarily because it is self-grounded by its object—God. Barth not only denies 
cognitive accessibility to epistemic grounds as a requirement, he denies the very 
                                                                                                                                                  
is to be sought, there can be no doubt of the answer” (DHet, 266–267; DH, 597). See also CD I/1, 86 
(KD I/1, 88). 
84 DHet, 265 (DH, 597, “. . .die eigene Kraft unsrer, der gläubigen Christen erlebenden Intuition”). 
85 “Auf jedes noch einigermaßen rege Gewissen wirkt die Verbindung jener beiden Thatsachen in seiner 
Person als eine befreiende Offenbarung” (Wilhelm Herrmann, Die Gewissheit des Glaubens und die 
Freiheit der Theologie [Freiburg: Mohr, 1889], 30). 
86 CD I/1, 213 (KD I/1, 223, “. . .Messers Breite, aber abgrundtief. . .”). 
87 Religion is unlike “Wissenschaft und Kunst.” As Herrmann puts it, “Anders ist es in der Religion. . . . 
wir werden doch immer nach seiner persönlichen Haltung beurtheilen, ob seine Gefühle echt find. . . . 
Die wirkliche Herrschaft christlicher Frömmigkeit in einer Seele scheint uns ein inneres Leben zu 
begründen, dem wir gern vertrauen” (Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschichtlicher Thatsachen?: Vortrag 
zur Feier des 22. März 1884 in Marburg gehalten, Zweite Auflage [Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1891], 22). 
88 Alternatively, Herrmann emplys the term, “persönliche Leben” (Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott: im 
Anschluss an Luther dargestellt, Zweite gänzlich umgearbeitete Auflage [Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1892], 8–
12, 75–101). 
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possibility that we could ourselves provide a complete and independent justification or 
demonstration of the basis of our theological knowing. 
Having addressed the accessibility requirement we now turn to the foundational 
requirement. It is possible to be a foundationalist without accepting the accessibility 
requirement—without accepting the requirement to have an independent means of 
demonstrating the legitimacy of foundational beliefs.89 Barth rejects the accessibility 
requirement because it violates the above-to-below way of theological knowing 
encountered in revelation. His is a theological epistemology that eschews all human 
foundations. We should resist, nevertheless, referring to Barth’s position as ‘non-
foundational,’ as if it lacked grounding altogether.90 Barth is a foundationalist—not a 
classical foundationalist, but a theo-foundationalist. 
In its most unassuming form, the foundational requirement stipulates that the structure 
of knowledge includes and is anchored in trustworthy foundational beliefs. In Barth’s 
view our knowledge of God is anchored in a trustworthy foundation. Barth’s theological 
epistemology, based on the reality of revelation breaking through from above to below, 
certainly rules out anti-foundationalism or pure coherentism.91 What serves as the 
trustworthy foundation in Barth’s theological epistemology is unambiguously God 
himself who is his speaking to us. The speech of God is his Word, Jesus Christ, self-
revealed as we are brought into communion with God by the Spirit. This being-revealed-
to is the trustworthy foundation and well-spring of all human knowing of God. Is there 
such a thing then as a foundational belief? The answer to this question, and therefore the 
answer to the question about Barth’s attitude toward the foundational requirement, turns 
on what counts as a foundational belief. It is clear that human knowledge of God for 
Barth involves believing. Knowing God is the gift of faith where knowing, believing and 
                                                 
89 It is possible to be a foundationalist without being an evidentialist foundationalist. 
90 Nowhere does Barth commend an insulated coherentism. Barth would have warmed to aspects of Ronald 
Thiemann’s nonfoundational theology, while firmly repudiating the suggestion that “theology seeks its 
criteria of judgment within the first-order language of church practice” (Revelation and Theology: The 
Gospel as Narrated Promise [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985], 75). Although 
Thiemann, like Barth, emphasizes God’s prevenience, the criterion for Barth is God in his revelation—
the act of divine self-disclosure. The criterion is not something handed over to the church by means of 
this revelation (e.g., the ‘narrated promise’). 
91 On a coherentist model the mutual support of beliefs is an intuition that characterizes the entire structure 
of knowledge. Coherentism, in its purest form, considers coherence with the belief structure to be the 
only criteria for belief justification. See WCB, 78–80. 
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obeying the Truth are inseparable. We are given the gift of trustworthy foundational 
believing, but we are not given the gift of the knowledge of God packaged in individual 
foundational truth-statements.92 As discussed earlier, individual propositional expressions 
in human language do not have the power to contain the Truth.93 That is not to say that 
there are not objectively better and worse ways of striving to express in human terms the 
trustworthy human knowledge of God. But these expressions are always second order 
reflections, derivative and dependent on the actual knowing relation. 
What we have then is an affirmation of the absolute certainty of the foundation but a 
rejection of any confidence in human attempts to build either to it or upon it. We should 
acknowledge that this is to undo completely what the foundational requirement was 
intended to do. The foundational requirement assumes that truth can be adequately 
conveyed in belief-statements, and furthermore that truth value can be transferred to 
belief-statements in a direct inferential relationship to previously established belief-
statements. At one level, we should recognize that this is indeed rightly how we strive to 
build our knowledge. It is an implicit assumption in all human reasoning.94 For Barth, 
however, this striving which is indeed part of the task of theology, is ever only a striving 
after the given foundation in an inevitably imperfect effort to aim at the truth of 
revelation, in which we only succeed by the grace of the Holy Spirit.95 This means that 
                                                 
92 “The concept of truths of revelation (Offenbarungswahrheiten) in the sense of Latin propositions 
(lateinischen Sätzen) given and sealed once for all with divine authority in both wording and meaning is 
theologically impossible . . . The freely acting God Himself and alone is the truth of revelation 
(Offenbarungswahrheit)” (CD I/1, 15; KD I/1, 14–15). 
93 See again CD I/1, 165 (KD I/1, 171). The distinctions between true propositions about God, their 
expression in human words, and grasp in human conception are taken up in greater detail in chapter 6. 
94 F. LeRon Shults correctly observes that “inferential patterns in thinking” and the “intuition that being 
rational includes having good reasons as a basis for our beliefs” are even for nonfoundationalists 
“evident in their argumentative performance” (The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart 
Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999], 30). 
95 Barth states that the real task of dogmatics is to question the Church’s talk about God in light of God’s 
self-revelation. He distinguishes dogma from dogmas and dogmatic propositions. The formulation of 
dogmas and dogmatic propositions is always only a striving to aim at the truth of revelation without any 
possibility of succeeding outside of the grace of God. The truth of revelation cannot be isolated and 
contained in a mere human proposition, “in abstraction from the person of Him who reveals it and from 
the revelatory act of this person in which it is given to other persons to perceive” (CD I/1, 267–270; KD 
I/1, 283–285). 
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the foundation of our theological knowing is also its apex.96 We cannot independently 
build on this knowledge but only revel in, reflect on and point to it, again and again 
subjecting our speech to the criterion of Christ the one and only True Revelation of 
God.97 Truth is not transferred to our belief-statements but rather sits in judgment over 
them. Another way to put this is that Barth is not first an epistemological foundationalist 
but first an ontological foundationalist.98 The ontological foundation of theological 
knowing is its epistemological foundation and basis for judging all theological reflection. 
This brings us to the close of our brief excursus on Barth’s rejection of the 
epistemological assumptions of the Enlightenment. I have argued that it is on the basis of 
the way of knowing established by the ontological priority of God’s self-revelation that 
Barth refuses to accept these assumptions, with their attending contrary ontological 
presuppositions. On the basis of this discussion we can conclude that, for Barth, theology 
is not required to accept the obligations, direction or rules of any philosophy which would 
impinge upon its way of knowing. In short, Barth’s theo-foundationalism shares the 
conviction that knowledge has a ground, while granting nothing to Enlightenment 
foundationalist assumptions about the nature of that ground. 
The Boundary of Philosophy 
We have discussed Barth’s recognition that engagement with the realm of philosophy 
is inevitable for theology99 and that “familiarity with the thinking of the philosopher”100 is 
                                                 
96 It is worth noting that there is an ambiguity in our use of the term foundation. With respect to 
foundationalism, foundation refers to that set of our beliefs which is accepted without an inferential 
ground in other beliefs. They way I am using the term here, however, is in the sense of the foundation 
undergirding our foundational beliefs, which is for Barth an undemonstrable free act of God. Theo-
foundationalism, therefore, calls into question the stability of foundational belief by highlighting our 
epistemic dependence on a foundation for our believing.  
97 “The criterion of past, future and therefore present Christian utterance is thus the being of the Church, 
namely, Jesus Christ, God in His gracious revealing and reconciling address to man” (CD I/1, 4; KD I/1, 
2–3). 
98 Regarding the Bible and church proclamation, “both renounce any foundation apart from that which God 
has given once and for all by speaking” (CD I/1, 120; KD I/1, 123). 
99 “[Theology] involves a fundamental reflection upon reality by means of that very same thought which is 
also the tool of the philosophers” (SITet, 32; SIT, 61). 
100 CD I/1, 283 (KD I/1, 300, “Vertrautheit mit dem Denken des Philosophen”). 
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a requirement for the theologian. We have also seen that Barth’s theology of revelation 
dethrones philosophy as the founder and judge of theological knowledge. From these two 
assertions, one affirming the other cautioning, we can conclude that in Barth’s view there 
is a proper though constrained role for philosophy in theology. The boundaries of 
philosophy are established by revelation in its movement from above to below. The 
implications of these boundaries for Barth were evident in our discussion of his rejection 
of Enlightenment foundationalism. But what is to guide the theologian in the proper use 
of philosophy? 
An excellent source for locating Barth’s material concerns for the interaction with 
philosophy is in his 1929 essay “Schicksal und Idee in Der Theologie.” Here he 
highlights the benefits and dangers for theology of realism and idealism, which he sees as 
opposite poles in philosophy. Barth begins with realism because he finds a measure of 
realism to be an unavoidable (we might even say incorrigible) starting point. “If we are 
going to talk about God as the object of theology, then we will already be advancing a 
typically realist proposition.”101 God is objectively real; and, by claiming that God is real 
we include God in the reality in which we experience ourselves and the world.102 But 
philosophical realism must be kept in check. The danger, if taken uncritically, is that the 
realist will suppose that knowledge of God can be read directly from the data of given 
experience, whether subjectively or empirically. But the confidence with which the 
theologian knows God is a “confidence in God’s self-giving” which is “rather different 
from realism’s confidence in God’s givenness.”103 A confidence in God’s givenness 
entails an unwarranted anthropological assumption that we have a properly functioning 
human capacity to know God by means of the use of our own endowments applied to the 
data of given experience. This assumption is not entailed in the presupposition of 
revelation; in fact, the order of knowing in revelation and the powerlessness of the 
creaturely form independently to deliver the knowledge of God suggests quite the 
opposite. The knowledge of God requires the accompanying action of God breaking 
                                                 
101 SITet, 35 (SIT, 64–65, “Wenn wir Gott als den Gegenstand der Teologie bezeichnen, so ist das bereits ein 
typisch realistischer Satz”). 
102 SITet, 36 (SIT, 65–66). 
103 SITet, 40 (SIT, 70, “. . .die Zuversicht auf sein Gegebensein, die etwas Anderes wäre als die Zuversicht 
auf sein Sichselbergeben. . .”). 
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through to us in revelation, in which he himself is the very content.104 God lifts our reason 
to give us a knowledge of himself through the medium of creaturely experience. 
“Reason’s normal activity is not interrupted; but it is directed, guided and ordered by 
something superior to itself, something that has no part in its antithesis.”105 While 
encountering us through the data of given experience, however, the knowledge of God 
can never be reduced to that experience or derived from it independently from the 
determining act of God.106 This is where the chastening of idealism is helpful.  
In its pursuit of truth, idealism is critically reflective about the limits of human 
knowing.107 Idealism recognizes the problem of our inability to secure a neutral ground of 
knowing outside of ourselves, a “view from nowhere.” We have no unobscured access to 
the knowledge of God through the data of experience. If we are to know God, God must 
make himself known to us. “If theology is to remain grounded in God’s revelation, then 
the idealist is going to have to dampen his ardor for a generally accessible truth, and to 
join forces with the realist.”108 But the chastening of a critical idealism should never be 
seen to repudiate what Barth has affirmed in a proper critical realism—namely, that God 
really reveals himself to us in otherwise inadequate creaturely thoughts, experience and 
words, without becoming identical to them.109 The fact that knowing God is, from below, 
                                                 
104 “‘The Word became flesh and dwelt among us’—what does that mean if not that the Word, and hence the 
God with whom we have to do, entered into our own particular mode of being, that of nature and 
history? Jesus Christ as the Word of God to us and therefore himself as God is the content of revelation. 
And also the Holy Spirit, who illumines the Word for us and us for the Word, is himself God, is the 
content of revelation” (SITet, 35; SIT, 65). 
105 SITet, 50 (SIT, 81, “. . .daß die durchaus nicht zu unterbrechende Vernunfttätigkeit Weisung, Leitung, 
Ordnung bekommt aus einem Oberhalb ihrer selbst, das an ihrer Antithetik keinen Anteil hat”). 
106 SITet, 49 (SIT, 80). 
107 SITet, 42–43 (SIT, 72–73). 
108 SITet, 47 (SIT, 78, “Er müßte sich gegenüber allem undisziplinierten Hunger nach allgemein 
zugänglicher Wahrheit darin schon mit dem Realisten zusammenfinden. . . wenn wir die Begründung der 
Theologie in Gottes Offenbarung nicht verleugnen wollen”). 
109 Those who would claim Barth for postmodernism are in danger of hearing the second word of chastening 
idealism as a repudiation of the first word of critical realism, which stakes its confidence in the Word 
that became flesh. See especially Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 27–33. Ward suggests that Barth presents two 
antithetical views without providing a way to move between them. He presents these as two competing 
models of language which reflect respectively a naïve realism and a strong idealism. “Barth needs to 
provide a . . . coherent account of the interplay between two antithetical models for the nature of language. 
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a human impossibility does not change the fact that God, from above, has made it 
possible for humans to know him. While much is made of the influence of Kantianism or 
neo-Kantianism on Barth110 it is clear that in Barth’s view Kantian idealism could not get 
passed its antithesis with realism,111 and theology admits no more of a proof from 
practical reason than it did from pure reason.112 Kantianism may be helpful in its critique 
of realism, but it has no privileged philosophical status with Barth.113 
                                                                                                                                                  
One offers a direct correspondence between signifier and signified, word and Word, but constitutes a 
natural theology and dissolves the distinction between the creaturely and the divine, the human and God 
as Wholly Other. The other denies the possibility of moving beyond mediation and, therefore, the 
possibility of any true knowledge of God as Wholly Other.” Word become flesh is not enough for Ward. 
See critical reviews in Bruce L. McCormack, “Graham Ward’s Barth, Derrida and the Language of 
Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 49, no. 1 (1996), and David Guretzki, “Barth, Derrida and 
Différance: Is There a Difference?,” Didaskalia 13, no. 2 (2002). 
110 There is, of course, Bonhoeffer’s famous praise of Barth’s second Romans edition, “in spite of all the 
neo-Kantian egg-shells,” Bonhoeffer, 328. Simon Fisher stresses the early influence of neo-Kantianism 
on Barth but rightly points to Bonhoeffer’s caution that Barth merely “makes use of the philosophical 
language of neo-Kantianism” and that it would be “rash to call him a neo-Kantian” (quoted in Revelatory 
Positivism?, 185). In the same way, Bruce McCormack stresses that while Marburg neo-Kantianism was 
an important influence on Barth, even in his early theology Barth made use of it only “where to do so 
strengthened the case he wanted to make theologically—or at least, did not infringe upon that theology” 
(Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 42). 
111 “Kant still moves within this antithesis of the singular and the general, the empirical and the rational” 
(CD I/1, 146; KD I/1, 151). Barth saw evidence of this in Kant’s rejection of the incarnation: “if, 
according to Kant, something corresponding to what is called the ‘Word’ in the prologue to St John’s 
Gospel exists, there is certainly, according to him, no suggestion that this Word might by any chance 
have become flesh” (Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 288). 
112 Neil MacDonald is right to protest that “Barth’s theology itself, is not dependent on Kant’s 
anthropocentric turn implicit in his critique of the bounds of reason” (Neil B. Macdonald, Karl Barth and 
the Strange New World within the Bible: Barth, Wittgenstein, and the Metadilemmas of the 
Enlightenment [Carlisle, England: Waynesboro Paternoster Press, 2000], 11). 
113 It has recently been suggested in John Hart’s very useful translation and commentary on the Barth-
Brunner correspondence that Barth proclaims Kantianism to be “the most desirable and helpful position” 
(“The Barth-Brunner Correspondence,” in For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of 
Ecclesial Theology, ed. George Hunsinger [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 29). Daniel Migliore picks 
up on this supposed concession as an example of Barth’s position not being isolationist with respect to 
other faiths (“Response to the Barth-Brunner Correspondence,” in For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth 
and the Future of Ecclesial Theology, ed. George Hunsinger [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 50). The 
translation, however, is flawed. “Was ich höchstens als wünschenswert und hilfreich bezeichnen 
Chapter 2: Barth’s Engagement with Philosophy 
 
51
What we can see from this example of Barth’s interaction with philosophy is that the 
guiding principle he employs for determining the boundaries of philosophy is the very 
same criterion that guided his rejection of Enlightenment foundationalism. Philosophy is 
of use to theology so long as it allows theology to remain grounded in God’s self-
revelation. Revelation breaks through to us in a creaturely form bringing us face to face 
with the very Word of God in that creaturely form. Philosophy may not trespass the 
dynamics of revelation by separating or collapsing the form and content—by equating the 
creaturely form with the divine or by suggesting that we can have direct access to the 
divine content without the creaturely form. “The one would be realistic theology, the 
other idealistic theology, and both bad theology.”114 The criterion regulating the use of 
philosophy is therefore the same criterion that regulates theology itself, Jesus Christ the 
Word of God, the Revelation of God, self-revealed to human beings in a creaturely form. 
Conclusion 
Barth saw Feuerbach’s critique of religion as a clarion call to Christian theology. 
Feuerbach exposed the fact that Christian theology, when justifying itself by an analogy 
from the human being to the divine being, grounded God in man. This is precisely why 
there can be no philosophical compromise on the priority of the particularity of God’s 
self-revelation in theological knowing. Barth’s “No” to philosophy is aimed at precluding 
the possibility that the object of theology might become a human invention. Our objective 
in this chapter has been to understand better Barth’s restrictions on philosophy for 
theological knowing. We began with what Barth believes to be the only basis for the 
knowledge of God, God himself in his self-revelation. Barth’s theology of revelation, 
which is itself intended to be a thinking after revelation, motivates Barth’s theological 
epistemology. The way of knowing in theology is initiated by and in God from above to 
below. Human knowers are given clear and unambiguous knowledge of God when they 
are brought by the power of the Spirit into communion with Christ and given a sharing in 
his knowledge. This knowing is transformative and personal but also cognitive. God 
comes to us in a verbal creaturely form, and, without giving himself over as the form, is 
                                                                                                                                                  
könnte,” should be translated, “what I could at most denote as desirable and helpful.” This is far from an 
emphatic endorsement of the superiority of Kant.  
114 CD I/1, 175 (KD I/1, 182, “Das eine wäre realistische, das andere wäre idealistische und beides wäre 
falsche Theologie”). 
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really given to the knower in the form by the miracle and mystery of grace. Revelation is 
not itself propositional statements, but it may be delivered by means of them. It is this 
theological epistemology derived in reflection on from-above revelation that is driving all 
of Barth’s pronouncements against philosophy.115  
I have endeavored to show that these pronouncements are not directed at the language, 
questions and tools of the realm of philosophy—all of which are available to theology and 
with which theologians must work. On the contrary, Barth’s denunciation is leveled 
against philosophy’s presumed competency, based on an ungrounded ontological 
assumption,116 to regulate and establish from below truth about God independent of 
revelation. It was this presumed competency that inveigled the theology of the 19th and 
20th century to accept the demands of Enlightenment foundationalism without notice of 
the cost. And yet, Barth still holds out the possibility for a Christian philosophy or 
philosopher who also works in the light of and strives for obedience to the revelation of 
God. Philosophy can and must be employed in a way that observes the dependence of 
human theological knowing on the grace of the miracle and mystery of God’s self-
revelation. 
With a clarified understanding of Barth’s theological epistemology and its implications 
for the role of philosophy, we will now turn to the Christian philosophy of Alvin 
Plantinga. Plantinga endeavors to challenge philosophical arguments against Christian 
belief on philosophy’s own terms. The question that will guide our investigation is 
whether Plantinga’s approach is amenable to Barth’s guidance. 
                                                 
115 As T. F. Torrance maintains, Barth does not endorse “the rejection of philosophical thinking,” but offers 
instead “the development of a rigorous rational epistemology governed by the nature of the object, 
namely, God in his self-communication to us within the structures of our human and worldly existence” 
(Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990], 122). 
116 The ontological assumption that Barth opposes is “that the Word of God is one of the realities that are 
universally present and ascertainable and therefore created” (CD I/1, 159; KD I/1, 164). 
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Nearly twenty-five years since James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen declared that 
Alvin Plantinga “is widely recognized as the most important philosopher of religion now 
writing,”1 it may still be true. In the analytic tradition his rival is not to be found. 
Plantinga’s contributions include penetrating treatments of questions in modal logic, 
modal metaphysics, agency and causation, philosophy of mind, possible worlds theory, 
and more. What we are most concerned with presently are his celebrated studies in 
epistemology2 and the theological epistemology defended in them.3 The intent of the next 
two chapters is to excogitate Plantinga’s theological epistemology as we have Karl 
Barth’s, looking closely at any positive theological construction alongside his 
assumptions about the right range and role of philosophy in responding to questions of 
theological knowing. We will then be positioned to address the main question of this 
work regarding the compatibility of their thought by considering where Plantinga may 
                                                 
1 Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1985), ix. 
2 What has come to be known as reformed epistemology, though Plantinga himself at one time referred to 
it as ‘Calvinist Epistemology’ (“Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, 55). Particular attention will be given 
to Warranted Christian Belief, the culmination of Plantinga’s Warrant trilogy. 
3 We will continue to use the term ‘theological epistemology’ to designate views about the way and nature 
of human knowledge of God. 
3 
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have exceeded Barth’s boundaries for philosophy and where tensions may exist between 
the theological epistemology Barth is advancing and the one that Plantinga is defending. 
Plantinga and Barth differ greatly in their goals and methods. They are approaching a 
common subject—the knowledge of God—from two different angles of inquiry. We are 
therefore guaranteed a certain degree of descriptive parallax which might be mistaken for 
real variance. What we are most interested in determining is to what degree their thought 
is centrolineal—moving along separate lines from and towards a common midpoint. What 
core assumptions are held in common, and are these shared assumptions enough to keep 
their projects from colliding so that the combined light cast on the center is mutually 
illuminating? 
In this chapter we will focus on Plantinga’s understanding of Christian scholarship and 
the role of Christian philosophy in relation to theology. I will argue that the fundamental 
lineaments of Plantinga’s conceptions of truth and knowledge are clear and broadly 
compatible with Barth’s critique of the philosophical approach to theological knowing, 
while also flagging for later exploration the tensions over natural theology and 
apologetics. In the next chapter we will take up Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian 
belief, tracing first his positive, conditional model for how Christian belief might have 
warrant, and then diving into his defense of Christian belief against overreaching 
atheological arguments. I will argue that Plantinga’s project shares the heart of Barth’s 
concern: that we recognize that the knowledge of God is only secured by God’s self-
revelation—that it “derives and is to be considered only from outside all human 
possibilities, i.e., from the acting of God Himself.”4 
The Concern of the Christian Philosopher 
Plantinga concludes his extraordinarily influential Advice to Christian Philosophers 
with the following charge: “We who are Christians and propose to be philosophers must 
not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians; we 
must strive to be Christian philosophers.”5 Taking a look at Plantinga’s notion of what it 
                                                 
4 CD I/1, 38 (KD I/1, 38, “nur von einem Außerhalb aller menschlichen Möglichkeiten, nämlich von dem 
handelnden Gott her ist und einzusehen ist”). 
5 “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 1, no. 3 (1984): 271. Writing his “self-profile” 
in 1983, right before his move to Notre Dame, Plantinga details his goals for the future and makes the 
following comment: “Finally I hope to continue to think about the question of how Christianity bears on 
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means to be a Christian philosopher is a helpful entry point into his more fundamental 
epistemological convictions. These convictions shape not only his ideas about Christian 
philosophy, but all of Christian scholarship. 
On Christian Scholarship 
Arguably Plantinga’s greatest contribution to the Christian academic community has 
been his defense and championing of the right and responsibility of every Christian 
scholar to approach unapologetically his or her discipline from a Christian perspective. 
We might label this Plantinga’s call for constructive Christian scholarship. 
 
Take a given area of scholarship: philosophy, let’s say, or history, or 
psychology, or anthropology, or economics, or sociology; in working at 
these areas, shouldn’t we take for granted the Christian answer to the large 
questions about God and creation, and then go on from that perspective to 
address the narrower questions of that discipline? Or is that somehow illicit 
or ill-advised?6 
 
For Plantinga, the reasoning is clear: when seeking the right answer to any problem it is 
best to avail oneself of all potentially relevant information.7 Being a Christian involves 
                                                                                                                                                  
philosophy. Although I have devoted considerable thought to these issues, I have much less to show for 
it than I’d like. What difference does being a Christian make to being a philosopher?” (“Self-Profile,” 
94). He fulfills this objective on November 4 of the same year in his inaugural address as John A. 
O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, “Advice to Christian Philosophers.” 
The position he adopts here he maintains consistently and further elaborates in the following: “On 
Christian Scholarship,” in The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University, ed. Theodore Hesburgh 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994); “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 
Stob Lectures,” in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures, 1986–1998 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2001); “Augustinian Christian Philosophy,” The Monist 75, no. 3 (July 1992); and, “Christian 
Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century: Assessment and Perspective, eds. Sander Griffioen and Bert M. Balk (Kampen, Netherlands: 
Uitgeverij Kok, 1995). 
6 “On Christian Scholarship,” 290. 
7 “What we need here is scholarship that takes account of all that we know, and thus takes account of what 
we know as Christians” (“On Christian Scholarship,” 291). “The best way to do these sciences, says the 
Augustinian, is to use all that we know, including what we know by faith or revelation” (“The Twin 
Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 159). 
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assent to some theological presuppositions that, if true, bear significantly on the questions 
scholars wrestle with. Repressing important information leaves unexplored avenues to 
greater clarity, synthesis and depth. This is particularly the case for the sciences and 
humanities when the data in question has broad implications for a general understanding 
of the world and human beings. On Plantinga’s view, Christian belief includes a 
legitimate claim to knowledge which has these broad implications. Christian scholarship 
will therefore not ignore, but begin with those pivotal Christian truth claims.8 In order for 
Christian scholars to forge ahead without abandoning their Christian assumptions, 
however, requires that they allow themselves greater independence from the arbitrary 
prohibitions of the academic establishment against what is permitted to serve as grounds 
for scholarly judgments.9 The greatest threat to constructive Christian scholarship is an 
acceptance of dominant cultural assumptions that are fundamentally at odds with 
Christian belief. For this reason, in addition to the constructive task there is an important 
critical work to be done; this we could call critical Christian scholarship.10 If the focus of 
the constructive task is to clarify, deepen and systematize Christian thought, the aim of 
the critical task is to analyze and engage with alternative projects “so that their 
relationship to Christian ways of thought is made evident.”11 The constructive task seeks 
to build inwardly, while the critical focus is to engage externally. Plantinga encourages 
Christian scholars to see that the dominant cultural perspectives are not neutral 
alternatives to the Christian position but actively opposed to Christian belief. He 
identifies perennial naturalism and creative anti-realism as two currently dominant 
strands of thought antithetic to Christian belief and demanding critical attention.12 So, 
                                                 
8 “The Christian philosopher has a perfect right to the point of view and prephilosophical assumptions he 
brings to philosophic work; the fact that these are not widely shared outside the Christian or theistic 
community is interesting but fundamentally irrelevant” (“Advice to Christian Philosophers,” 258). 
9 Addressing Christian philosophy in particular, Plantinga writes, “my plea is for the Christian 
philosopher, the Christian philosophical community, to display, first, more independence and autonomy: 
we needn’t take as our research projects just those projects that currently enjoy widespread popularity; 
we have our own questions to think about” (“Advice to Christian Philosophers,” 269). 
10 Plantinga refers to the constructive task as “positive Christian science” or simply “Christian 
scholarship,” while calling the critical task “Christian cultural criticism.” See “On Christian 
Scholarship,” 291; and, “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 160. 
11 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 45. 
12 Plantinga consistently identifies naturalism and creative anti-realism as the primary contemporary rivals 
to Christian thought, though sometimes giving more emphasis to the offspring of creative anti-realism: 
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Christian scholarship of every type ought to attend to both its constructive and critical 
tasks; in this regard Christian philosophy is not different from other disciplines. 
Theology and Christian Scholarship 
It is worth asking whether Plantinga considers Christian theology itself to be a 
scholarly discipline with this same two-fold task. Barth, it would appear, is loath to accept 
a definition of theology’s task as a particular instantiation of a more general academic 
principle. But there is little reason to doubt that both Barth and Plantinga would regard 
theology, along with the rest of Christian scholarship, as having both constructive and 
critical responsibilities. Barth frames the very definition of Christian theology in terms of 
its critical dogmatic task—that of the church criticizing its own talk about God.13 And as 
for the unique constructive task of Christian theology, Barth affirms Anselm’s fides 
quaerens intellectum.14 Theology’s positive scientific work is one of reflecting on God’s 
address to us in faith. The crucial point for Barth is that theology remain autonomously 
theo-foundational. This means that theology is done in obedience to the object of 
theology—God made known by God’s own self-revelation. The starting point does not 
require the impossibility of an external prolegomenous validation. The concern for 
autonomy and the defense of the presumption of Christian faith are shared by Plantinga. 
                                                                                                                                                  
“relativism and anti-commitment” (“On Christian Scholarship,” 291). In his charge to Calvin College 
graduates he simply mentions naturalism and relativism. “There are at present three main spiritual 
responses to the world, three main pictures of the world or perspectives on it, three main ways of 
thinking about the world and what the world is really like and what we ourselves are really like, and 
what we must do to live the good life. One of these, of course, is Christianity, and I needn’t say much 
about that to this audience. In addition to the Christian perspective, however, there are fundamentally 
two others. The first is what I’ll call naturalism. . . . There is another rival to Christian ways of thinking, 
another perspective, and I’ll call it relativism” (“Our Vision”: Calvin College Commencement Address, 
May 20, 2000 [Grand Rapids: Calvin College, 2000], DVD Video). 
13 “Theology as a science, in distinction from the ‘theology’ of the simple testimony of faith and life and 
the ‘theology’ of the service of God, is a measure taken by the Church in relation to the vulnerability and 
responsibility of its utterance” (CD I/1, 4; KD I/1, 2). 
14 Anselm, Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his 
Theological Scheme (London: SCM Press, 1960), 16-18 (Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselms Beweis 
der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang Seines Theologischen Programms, Forschungen zur Geschichte 
und Lehre des Protestantismus, Reihe 4, Bd. 3 [München: C. Kaiser, 1931], 6-8). 
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The rightful autonomy, not just of theology, but of all Christian scholarship is a main 
plank of Plantinga’s platform. 
It should be clear, therefore, that Barth and Plantinga agree that theology and all of 
Christian scholarship are free to start, and must start, with a given. A crucial question, 
however, remains: Do Barth and Plantinga agree about just what this given is, and 
whether it is the same for theology and the rest of Christian scholarship? This is a 
question about epistemological foundations, however, and must therefore be deferred 
until we have taken a closer look at Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. For 
now, a few provisional comments on Plantinga’s understanding of the relationship 
between faith and reason will help to sharpen the question.  
For Plantinga, Christian scholarship is done by appeal both to the deliverances of faith 
and to the deliverances of reason. The deliverances of reason are employed in the service 
of “explicating the bearing of the faith on some part of the discipline in question.”15 The 
given for Christian scholarship appears therefore to be the content of the deliverances of 
faith. What then is delivered by the deliverances of faith? One suggestion is that the 
deliverances of faith deliver particular expressed propositions that are fundamental to 
Christian belief. “It is crucial to Christian belief to suppose that such propositions as God 
created the world and Christ’s suffering and death are an atonement for human sin are 
true.”16 But this view comes dangerously close to the conclusion that the gift of faith 
involves the clean transfer of truth about God into propositional statements in human 
language, an idea that Barth, as we have seen, strongly rejects. Plantinga and Barth agree 
that the gift of faith is a gift of knowledge. Barth however is very clear that this 
knowledge is the self-revelation of the person of God in Christ by the Spirit, and not a 
collection of stand-alone propositions. Revelation is cognitive and verbal, but the form of 
human language is never adequate to the content of the knowledge of God outside of the 
gracious work of the Spirit who gives us a participation in Christ’s knowing of the Father. 
Plantinga moves much more quickly to propositions. He appeals to Calvin’s definition of 
faith, which “involves an explicitly cognitive element; it is, says Calvin, knowledge—
knowledge of the availability of redemption and salvation through the person and work of 
Jesus Christ—and it is revealed to our minds.”17 There certainly seems to be a tension 
                                                 
15 “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 159. 
16 WCB, 425. 
17 WCB, 244. 
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here between Barth and Plantinga at a foundational level regarding the nature of the 
knowledge of God, with Barth emphasizing the personal, and Plantinga the propositional. 
There are good reasons to suspect that the tension is not as severe as it may seem; 
however, due to the importance and complexity of the issue, we will leave off here and 
return to it again in greater detail in chapter 6. Before leaving it altogether, however, let 
us make one observation that moves in the direction of concord. 
We mentioned above that while Barth might agree with Plantinga that theology, like 
the rest of Christian scholarship, has a critical and constructive task, the particularities of 
that task for theology are quite unique. That task has to do with measuring the church’s 
talk about God by the church’s very being, Jesus Christ, the personal revelation of God. 
The pronouncements of theology are therefore second order reflections, faith seeking 
understanding, derivative and dependent on the actual knowing relation.18 Plantinga 
concurs with Barth in two important ways. First, for Plantinga, theology has a role unique 
from and pivotal to the rest of Christian scholarship (including Christian philosophy). 
Theology tells us what we know by faith. It tells us just what are the deliverances of faith. 
The rest of Christian scholarship works from this theological foundation, employing 
reason to determine the implications of this theological foundation for each discipline. 
Plantinga, like Barth, reserves a special and primary place for the theological task;19 
moreover, he seems to affirm theology as a second-order reflection on faith.20 If the 
knowledge of faith comes pre-packaged in propositional statements such that the 
deliverances of faith are self-evident to all Christian scholars, then the theological task 
would involve no interpretive reflection, only a reiterating of these statements and an 
unpacking of their logical entailments. In an illuminating comment, however, Plantinga 
affirms that “theology is both important and necessary” because we need “to know what 
we know by faith.”21 If there is work to be done in order to know what we know by faith, 
then there must be a distinction between first order knowing of faith itself and the second 
                                                 
18 Barth affirms what he takes to be Anselm’s view that, for theology, intellectus is always intellectus fidei, 
“das im Credo vorgesagte nachdenken” (Fides Quaerens Intellectum, 37). 
19 For Barth, it is not necessary that the theological task be performed as an independent discipline, but that 
detracts in no way from the uniqueness and importance of the theological task (CD I/1, 5; KD I/1, 3). 
20 Paul Helm includes Plantinga’s project in his treatment of the faith seeking understanding tradition (Paul 
Helm, Faith and Understanding, Reason and Religion [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997], 
182–203). 
21 “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 157. 
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order reflection of theology. It is safe to say that there is more going on than a simplified, 
direct, propositional transfer of knowledge in Plantinga’s view of faith and revelation. But 
this still leaves a number of pressing questions that will be given greater consideration in 
chapter 6. 
Christian Philosophy 
We have outlined Plantinga’s views on the constructive and critical task of all 
Christian scholarship; a task which begins unapologetically with central theological 
convictions, seeking the implications of those convictions for each discipline, by the light 
of reason. Now it is time to return to the main question of this section: what is the task of 
the Christian philosopher? For our purposes we also want to pay particular attention to 
how Plantinga conceives of the difference between philosophy and theology. 
To begin with, we have already established that Christian philosophy shares with other 
disciplines in the two-fold task of Christian scholarship. We have also touched on 
Plantinga’s distinction between theology and all the other disciplines, including 
philosophy. What then is Christian philosophy’s special function? Plantinga’s main 
answer to this question is simply that Christian philosophy is to address itself to the 
particular questions of its discipline from a Christian perspective. His Advice to Christian 
Philosophers is devoted to challenging Christian philosophers to have the courage, 
independence and integrity to allow Christian theological convictions to set the agenda 
for their work.22 This has direct implications for the relationship between philosophy and 
theology. Philosophy is not the beginning of the road—faith is. “The Christian 
philosophical community, quite properly starts, in philosophy, from what it believes.”23 
Plantinga is in complete agreement with Barth that theological knowledge does not 
require the grounding of a philosophical argument. This does not mean, however, that 
there is no role in Plantinga’s thought for philosophy marshaled in the defense and 
clarification of Christian belief. In fact, much of what Plantinga does as a Christian 
philosopher is to employ philosophical reasoning to just these ends. Consistent with this, 
Plantinga highlights two roles for philosophy, which are in addition to its two-fold task; 
                                                 
22 “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” 269. 
23 “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” 269. 
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these are the important functions of apologetics and philosophical theology.24 Here we 
face another potential contrast with Karl Barth. 
Barth maintains that if Christian theological convictions are really properly held 
independent of philosophical grounding, there is no need for a philosophical defense of 
them (i.e., apologetics). For Barth, we need not even enter into debate about the basis of 
our theological knowing or questions about God’s existence.25 Furthermore, “all planned 
apologetics and polemics have obviously been irresponsible, irrelevant and therefore 
ineffective.”26 It is difficult indeed to reconcile Barth’s views here with Plantinga’s. 
Despite the fact that Plantinga has been charged with dismissing Christian apologetics 
altogether, he clearly maintains that apologetics, both in its negative and positive forms, is 
a notably valuable and important endeavor.27 Even though philosophical arguments do 
not provide justification or warrant for Christian belief, they still have an important role 
to play.28 He appeals to Calvin, and suggests that philosophical arguments can be helpful 
in the process of coming to belief and in the believer’s struggle with doubt.29 Sorting out 
just where Plantinga and Barth agree and disagree on the questions of natural theology 
and apologetics is complicated by two factors. The first difficulty is that it is not at all 
clear that even the most basic terms are being used in the same way by Barth and 
Plantinga. And second, their approach vectors to these issues are so different that the 
                                                 
24 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 37. 
25 CD I/1, 30 (KD I/1, 28, “daß es sich über die Begründung seines Grundes, über Fragen wie: ob Gott ist, 
ob es eine Offenbarung gibt usw. in keine Diskussion einläßt”). We should not understand Barth here to 
forbid consideration, reflection on or speaking about the ground of theological knowing. It is rather that 
the ground of the knowledge of God is not up for discussion, uncertain and in need of defense. The 
knowledge of God is self-grounded in God’s self-revealing act—end of discussion. 
26 CD I/1, 30 (KD I/1, 29, “Alle gewollte Apologetik und Polemik dagegen ist . . . notorisch noch immer 
ein unverantwortliches und ungegenwärtiges und darum auch unwirksames Tun gewesen”).  
27 In Plantinga’s reply to the critique of R. Douglas Geivett and Greg Jesson he clarifies that while 
apologetical arguments “are not necessary for rational faith . . . of course it doesn’t follow for a moment 
that such apologetical work is inconsequential. It can be of use in many different and important ways: for 
example, in moving someone closer to the great things of the gospel. Such arguments can also provide 
confirmations, what John Calvin calls ‘helps’” (“Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For 
Christian Belief,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 [2001]: 384–385). For similar affirmations see “Christian 
Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 217; and, “Rationality and Public Evidence: a Reply to 
Richard Swinburne,” Religious Studies 37 (2001). 
28 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 39. 
29 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 40. 
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parallax mentioned earlier is nearly unavoidable. I will argue that there is a defensible 
way of interpreting Barth and Plantinga such that they are in fundamental continuity with 
each other and the Reformed tradition to which they belong.30 Nevertheless, due to the 
complexity involved and given the acuteness and importance of the disagreement, a 
separate chapter, chapter 5, will be devoted to this subject.  
Along with apologetics, Plantinga mentions philosophical theology as an important 
division of Christian philosophy. The very mention of philosophical theology raises 
important questions for the relationship between philosophy and theology. Plantinga 
defines philosophical theology as: “a matter of thinking about the central doctrines of the 
Christian faith from a philosophical perspective; it is a matter of employing the resources 
of philosophy to deepen our grasp and understanding of them.”31 We have noted that, for 
Barth, theology cannot but engage with the tools, resources and language of philosophy, 
for theology is done “within the framework of philosophy.”32 This raises the question: 
what theology is not philosophical theology? Is the Christian philosopher practicing 
philosophical theology really doing theology? If so, is theology properly understood as a 
branch of Christian philosophy? 
A few observations will help to clarify where Plantinga and Barth stand with respect to 
these questions. Beginning with Plantinga, it is significant that he sees philosophical 
theology as important work for both Christian philosophers and theologians, adding that it 
would benefit from the coordinated involvement of both.33 It also seems reasonable to 
conclude that, for Plantinga, as the name suggests, philosophical theology is theology. 
Plantinga, again, sees theology as the working out of what we know from the deliverances 
of faith, while Christian philosophy, in its constructive task, is working on the 
implications of what we know from the deliverances of faith for the questions in 
philosophy. Philosophical theology seen as theology, therefore, would be employing the 
                                                 
30 See RGB, 72, where Plantinga points out the fundamental agreement between Barth, Calvin, Kuyper and 
Bavinck, a text to which we will return to in chapter 5. 
31 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 41. 
32 SITet, 27 (SIT, 57). 
33 Regarding philosophical theology undertaken by Christian philosophers, Plantinga states: “no doubt 
some of this work could profit from closer contact with what theologians know” (“Christian Philosophy 
at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 42). The study we are conducting here could be characterized as 
an effort in philosophical theology endeavoring to bring closer contact between Christian philosophy and 
theology. 
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resources of philosophy in the task of working out what we know from the deliverances 
of faith. Plantinga, however, describes philosophical theology as helping to clarify the 
central doctrines of the Christian faith. It is possible, therefore, that he understands 
philosophical theology to be one step removed from theology, clarifying what theology 
means in its clarifications of what we know from the deliverances of faith.34 Philosophical 
theology viewed in this way would be a third-order reflection on a second-order reflection 
(theology) on the first-order knowledge of God given in faith. In either case, it seems 
clear that Plantinga does not think that all theology must be philosophical theology. 
Plantinga might agree with Barth that using the language and concepts of philosophy is 
unavoidable for the theologian, but he seems to have in mind here a particularly self-
conscious, explicit and formal engagement with philosophical thought. 
Turning to Barth, it is helpful to remember that his primary objection to philosophy is 
an objection to any attempt to replace theology’s particular, intractable, God-given 
ground and starting point, with a general pseudo-ground established on human reason. 
Here, Barth and Plantinga are in complete agreement. Barth also agrees with Plantinga 
that theology and Christian philosophy may overlap and mutually inform.35 He leaves the 
door open to the possibility of a philosophy that respects its boundaries and does not 
“subordinate theology to its own nexus of problems.”36 Nevertheless, it must be granted 
that the emphasis of Barth’s thinking with respect to philosophical theology, like 
apologetics, is overwhelmingly negative. History teaches that going down this path nearly 
always results in a much too optimistic view of the capacity of human language, concepts 
and reason to grasp and independently convey divine truth. He worries that any positive 
assessment of the contribution of philosophy to theology may cause one to forget that, 
                                                 
34 Just how this ‘clarifying’ proceeds is of critical importance. Does philosophy actively shape content and 
meaning on the basis of its own independent criteria, or simply explore the implications and inner 
coherence of theology? 
35 Recall here Barth’s observation of the “common difficult tasks” of philosophy and theology, and his 
suggestion that “the existence of the philosopher may be helpful to him [the theologian]” (PTet, 80, 93; 
PT, 94, 105). 
36 CD I/1, 39 (KD I/1, 39, “Also kann und will hier die Philosophie die Dogmatik nicht ihrem eigenen 
Problem-zusammenhang ein- und unterordnen”). This is from Barth’s assessment of his brother Heinrich 
Barth’s philosophy of existence, which—while he found it lamentably incautious at points—he praised 
saying: “We are given a philosophical scheme in which there is no place for an anthropological prius of 
faith and therefore for the patronizing and conditioning of theology which are not overcome in 
Heidegger or Bultmann.” 
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“the intractability of faith and its object guarantees that divine certainty cannot become 
human security.”37 Plantinga would no doubt disagree about just how negative history’s 
lessons are regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology. At no point, 
however, is Plantinga in disagreement with Barth about the proper ordering or the 
potential trespasses of philosophy in the service of theology. In fact, Plantinga’s work on 
the nature of Christian scholarship (as we have seen) and the epistemology of Christian 
belief (as we shall see) is aimed at undercutting the Cartesian/Lockean quest for a 
general, anthropological, and theologically neutral epistemic basis.38 
The Nature of Truth and the Nature of Knowledge 
What has been given so far is a rather condensed account of Plantinga’s views on 
Christian scholarship, but this should be sufficient to support a few key observations 
about Plantinga’s thought. Plantinga’s position on Christian scholarship is motivated by at 
least two commitments which are of fundamental importance to understanding his 
epistemology of Christian belief, one about the nature of truth and the other about the 
nature of knowledge. Regarding truth, Plantinga asserts that the Christian perspective 
entails a commitment to the unitary, universal and objective nature of truth. We can 
distinguish this view from two confused though popular rivals. The first rival is a version 
of the Ritschlian dualism that Barth rejected. Plantinga would find no reason to accept a 
Natur/Geist disjunction of the realms of faith and reason. It is difficult to see whether the 
Ritschlian split is really a rival view of truth or simply the more popular notion that 
Christianity makes only ethical, and not metaphysical claims.39 In either case Plantinga 
                                                 
37 CD I/1, 13 (KD I/1, 11, “Die Unverfügbarkeit des Glaubens und seines Gegenstandes soll und wird dafür 
sorgen, daß aus der göttlichen Gewißheit keine menschliche Sicherheit werden kann”). This is precisely 
the concern which motivates him to reject “a philosophical theology or theological philosophy in which 
the attempt would be made to reason ‘theonomously.’” “All that men may here and now undertake is 
human theology. . . . theologia ektypa viatorum, theology typical not of God but of man” (Karl Barth, 
Evangelical Theology: an Introduction [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963], 113–114). See also 
CD I/1, 269 (KD I/1, 285). 
38 D. Z. Phillips attacks Plantinga’s position on just this point, noting that Plantinga has abandoned the 
modern ideal of “disinterested enquiry” (“Advice to Philosophers who are Christians,” New Blackfriars 
69, no. 820 [1988]: 426–430). 
39 One way to understand the Ritschlian split is as a kind of factual dualism where spiritual truths and 
natural truths both apply simultaneously. It is spiritually or ethically true that God created the world, 
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does not countenance this division, Christian truth claims have implications for the 
natural sciences as well as ethical theory. The second rival view of truth is subjective 
relativism, where truth is multiple, individual and subjectively determined. Plantinga 
excoriates relativism in his critiques of creative anti-realism. Creative anti-realism 
suggests that there is no reality per se independent of the thinking human subject. Human 
thought is what creates and determines reality.40 Like Barth, Plantinga rejects any 
thorough-going idealism41 of this kind, as “incompatible with Christianity.”42 If the 
existence of all things is dependent on our noetic activity then “in a stunning reversal of 
roles, [God] would owe his existence to us.”43 Plantinga also considers this view to suffer 
from “deep problems with self-referential incoherence.”44 However, it is significant that 
his critique aimed at its logical inadequacy appears to be secondary to his concern that 
creative anti-realism is not a neutral option, but rather wholly inimical to the Christian 
view.45 In a statement that resonates with Barth’s affirmation of an essential realism, 
Plantinga reasons: 
  
Clearly one of the deepest impulses in Christian thought is the idea that 
there really is such a person as God, who has established the world a 
                                                                                                                                                  
while it is naturally true that the world is uncreated. Under this view, truth is not necessarily subjective, 
but it is nevertheless a form of relativism if we suppose that there can be a real contradiction of meaning 
in two true propositions. The more popular interpretation is just to reduce Christian truth claims to 
merely ethical propositions, but this then shifts us to a question about the nature of Christian truth claims 
and not about the nature of truth and reality itself. 
40 Plantinga does allow, however, for a divine creative anti-realism. See his “How to be an Anti-Realist,” 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 56, no. 1 (1982): 68-70. 
41 Plantinga traces creative anti-realism back to the ancients, but credits its popularity and influence with a 
particular understanding of Kantian idealism. Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of Kant is 
beside the point. Plantinga gladly concedes that, “Kant himself did not take creative anti-realism globally 
and neat. . . . No doubt there are restrictions of Kantian creative anti-realism that are compatible with 
Christianity, and ought to be explored as among the possibilities as to how things are” (“Christian 
Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 33). Plantinga also explores alternative interpretations 
of Kant in the first chapter of WCB. 
42 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 32. 
43 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 33. 
44 “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 131. 
45 “The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship: 1989 Stob Lectures,” 132. 
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certain way: there really is a correct or right way of looking at things; this 
is the way God looks at things.46 
 
There is, therefore, no room on Plantinga’s view for the possibility that propositions 
about God and the world might be personally true for the Christian, but not publicly true 
for the scholar. Often popular postmodern thought embraces this kind of personal 
relativism.47 But postmodern intuitions are not all wrong in Plantinga’s judgment. After 
all, central to postmodernism is a critique of Enlightenment modernism’s commitment to 
classical foundationalism with all of the requirements discussed in the second chapter, 
including the accessibility requirement. This is the welcome critique of the possibility of 
autonomous, neutral human objectivity. This is also the critical aspect of Barth’s critical 
realism, namely, the chastening of idealism which highlights the limits of independent 
human knowing from-below. Plantinga, with his powerful critique of classical 
foundationalism, seems wholeheartedly to agree.48 
By encouraging Christian academics to approach their disciplines with the assumption 
of the truth of Christian belief, Plantinga is allied with Barth and shares the intolerant 
chastisements which Barth receives from Harnack and Pannenberg. Presuming the 
Christian point of view, it is alleged, is a baleful transgression of the foundational 
principle of academic neutrality upon which the progress of universal human knowledge 
depends. Such a retreat to Christian ghettos, amounts to a blind fideism, a hopeless 
subjectivism and, worst of all, as Peter van Ness worries, “raise[s] specters of Christian 
                                                 
46 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 35. 
47 It is worth noting that the kind of postmodernism embraced by the likes of Walter Lowe, Graham Ward 
and William Stacy Johnson is skeptical not of the notion that there really is a way that things are and an 
objective truth about it, but rather about the possibility of human access to that truth. Grenz and Franke 
remind us that “the wholesale identification of the term postmodern with radical relativism . . . is simply 
too narrow to do justice to the actual breadth of the phenomenon” (Stanley Grenz and John R. Franke, 
Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context, 1st ed. [Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001], 19). 
48 Plantinga points out that a critical recognition of the Enlightenment’s mistaken optimism in human 
objectivity is hardly news to his own theological tradition. This critique “would of course have received 
the enthusiastic support of Kuyper and Dooyeweerd” (“Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth 
Century,” 35). Wolterstorff makes the observation that long before Barth, Kuyper arrived at postmodern 
views regarding autonomous human objectivity (“What New Haven and Grand Rapids Have to Say to 
Each Other: 1992 Stob Lectures,” in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures, 1986–1998 [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 278).  
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triumphalism.”49 Plantinga’s response is also similar to Barth’s, just as it is aligned with 
Plantinga’s Dutch ascendants Bavink and Kuyper.50 Human knowers occupy a stance of 
epistemic dependence. There simply is no privileged, neutral point of view, as this 
critique with all its resonating hopefulness invariably assumes. However, it quite 
obviously does not follow from the fact that humans have no independent objective 
access to the truth, that truth must therefore be a subjective human construction.51 Nor 
does it follow that a lack of guaranteed and demonstrable certainty about the truth we 
believe we know undermines the validity of our natural conviction that we do indeed have 
at least approximate knowledge of the objective truth. 
This last observation provides a nice bridge into the second motivating conviction for 
Plantinga’s charge to Christian scholars, one having to do with the nature of knowing. But 
before plunging head-first into his epistemology of Christian belief, let us take brief stock 
of what has been observed so far. Already in Plantinga’s views on Christian scholarship 
there is a strong indication that he agrees with Barth’s rejection of the three 
interconnected facets of Enlightenment modernism discussed in the second chapter. Like 
Barth, Plantinga’s view is properly understood as a kind of critical realism.52 He begins 
his defense of this view arguing first from the implications of what is known by Christian 
faith. He in no way accepts the obligation assumption, which would require the scholar to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of Christian knowledge claims, nor does he grant the general 
starting-point assumption, with its stipulation that one may only proceed from knowledge 
claims that are generally accepted within the broader academy.53 He critiques classical 
                                                 
49 Peter H. van Ness, “Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers,” review 
of Philosophers Who Believe, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 4 (1996): 889. 
50 This is especially true for our knowledge of God, where, as Kuyper advises, “man no longer stands 
above, but beneath the object of his investigation, and over against this object he finds himself in a 
position of entire dependence” (Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles 
[London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1899], 248). 
51 Plantinga quips, “As you have no doubt noticed, this is a whopping non sequitur; that hasn’t curbed its 
popularity in the least” (“Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 34). 
52 Which affirms both the underlying reality of the object of knowing, and recognizes the active and 
constitutive role of noetic processes in the shaping of knowledge. 
53 Worthy of particular note for our interests is Plantinga’s conclusion that Christian biblical scholars 
should not be limited by only what can be known through “ordinary scientific investigation” (“Sheehan’s 
Shenanigans: How Theology Becomes Tomfoolery,” The Reformed Journal April [1987]: 25). See also 
his arguments against the stipulations of Troeltschian historical biblical criticism, in WCB, 412–421. 
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foundationalism’s accessibility requirement, which sought truth-validation of belief from 
an independent human epistemic footing. He therefore recognizes the validity of critical 
idealism’s critique of objective human certainty;54 but does so without abandoning 
realism’s commitment to a unitary, universal and objective reality—a reality that is only 
known with objective certainty by God. What Plantinga also does, that Barth does not do, 
is point out the logical inconsistency in the creative anti-realist and relativist positions.  
Plantinga takes a fundamentally realist stance, affirming that there is a truth to be 
known about the world and about God. This truth is objective in that it is “the way God 
looks at things.” The impossibility of independent human objectivity does not count 
against the possibility of a genuine human knowledge of that truth. While Plantinga never 
says as much, the implication of his position is that genuine human knowledge of God is 
in some way a participation in the way God looks at himself. The task before us as we 
move into a consideration of Plantinga’s epistemology is to discern just how compatible it 
is with Barth’s from-above theo-foundationalism where the security of the gift of faith 
rests in the Giver and not in the earthen vessel such that our theological knowing remains 
theologia ektypa viatorum. 
                                                 
54 Certainty is a notion with two senses that can be quite unhelpfully ambiguous if not properly 
distinguished. In the sense of confidence or credence, certainty indicates maximal credence in or 
commitment to a particular belief. In the sense of clarity or infallibility, certainty indicates that one could 
not be mistaken. It is this ambiguity and the inadequacy of infallibility as an epistemic ideal that leads 
Esther Meek to commend confidence over certainty (Esther L. Meek, Longing to Know [Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Brazos Press, 2003], 137–140). It is important to see that it is possible to have an undoubting 
confidence in one’s belief, without pretending to see how it is impossible that one’s belief could fail to 
be true. In other words, it is possible to rightly believe without doubt that a belief is true, without being 
able to demonstrate how it could not be false. The possibility that all knowledge is infected with error 
(uncertain), does not necessarily invalidate the propriety of being maximally convinced (certain) that 
something we believe we know is true. Christian belief is consistent with doubt about all human 
knowing while affirming the power of God to affirm to us the truth of our belief, despite our noetic 
fallibility. As we will soon see from Plantinga, the key question with respect to propriety is what 
warrants our belief. I will argue that for both Barth and Plantinga, maximal conviction in our theological 
beliefs is always only warranted by the top-down action of divine revelation. For more on believing and 
knowing what we know is true, see Plantinga, “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For 
Christian Belief,” 386–387. 
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Plantinga’s Epistemology and Warrant 
It might be considered foolhardy to attempt a condensed summary of Plantinga’s work 
in epistemology, not only because of its breadth and depth, but also because, in general, 
epistemology is so conceptually challenging.55 My aim here will need to be the more 
modest undertaking of clarifying for our particular question the central pivot points and 
the cumulative import of a thousand deft, nimble, and cogent moves. We are helped 
immensely in this thanks to the painstaking clarity of Plantinga’s writing. But the warning 
remains that these are deeply troubled waters; and despite Plantinga’s best efforts, 
many—even of his admirer’s—have found it easy to misunderstand him at points. We 
will begin with an exploration of Plantinga’s general account of how our beliefs might 
have warrant. Here we will highlight Plantinga’s recognition that the possibility of 
human knowledge requires the purposive arrangement of elements both external and 
internal to our own noetic equipment. For Plantinga, knowledge, which is more than mere 
true belief, cannot originate from below. 
Why Warrant 
Possibly the most significant distinction that Plantinga draws in his epistemological 
work is between the notions of warrant, justification and rationality. Failure to appreciate 
the importance of the differences in Plantinga’s employment of these notions for 
understanding his contributions to epistemology is one of the most common mistakes 
made by Plantinga critics.56 Internalist and evidentialist critics, for instance, are inclined 
                                                 
55 As Plantinga notes: “Epistemology is extremely difficult, in many ways more difficult than, say, the 
metaphysics of modality. The latter requires a fair amount of logical acumen; but it is reasonably easy to 
see what the basic concepts are and how they are related. Not so for epistemology. Warrant, justification, 
evidence, epistemic normativity, probability, rationality—these are all extremely difficult notions. 
Indeed, each of those terms is really associated with a whole class of difficult and analogically related 
notions, where a big part of the difficulty is discerning how the members of each class are related to each 
other and to the members of the other classes. Coming to clarity on them and their relatives and 
discerning the relations among them is strenuous and demanding; yet it is the only way to progress in 
epistemology” (WCD, vi). 
56 See Evan Fales, review of Warranted Christian Belief, Noûs 37, no. 2 (2003); Richard Feldman, “Proper 
Functionalism,” Noûs 27, no. 1 (1993); R. Douglas Geivett and Greg Jesson, “Plantinga’s Externalism 
and the Terminus of Warrant-Based Epistemology,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001); Timothy 
McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “On the Historical Argument: A Rejoinder to Plantinga,” Philosophia 
Chapter 3: Plantinga’s Christian Philosophizing and Warrant 
 
71
to reduce the question of warrant to the question of justification conceived of in terms of 
fulfilling one’s duty vis-à-vis accessible public or private evidence. A chief aim of 
Plantinga’s Warrant trilogy, however, is to challenge the assumption that justification so 
conceived is either sufficient or even necessary for one’s beliefs to have warrant.57 He 
argues, in addition, that Christian belief cannot be challenged as irrational or unjustified.58 
Everything hinges on whether or not Christian belief has warrant, which ultimately hinges 
on whether or not Christian belief is true.59 Consequently, a successful argument against 
the adequacy of Christian belief in general would have to target the truth of the belief 
itself. 
What then is warrant in Plantingian parlance? The oft repeated definition in fullest 
form: “warrant is a normative, possibly complex quantity that comes in degrees, enough 
of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.”60 A near consensus in 
epistemology, though largely implicit until Gettier,61 is that in order for a belief to count 
                                                                                                                                                  
Christi 8, no. 1 (2006); Philip Quinn, “In Search of the Foundations of Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 2, 
no. 4 (1985); and, Richard G. Swinburne, “Plantinga on Warrant,” review of Warranted Christian Belief, 
Religious Studies 37 (2001). What is often missing in these critiques is real engagement with Plantinga’s 
argument against accepting internalist justification as necessary and sufficient for warrant. 
57 This is dealt with most comprehensively in WCD. See especially chapter 2: “Classical Chisholmian 
Internalism.” 
58 Rationality for Plantinga has to do with the proper functioning of our reason in the apprehension of 
experience, the formation of belief, etc. (WCB, 110–112), while justification is taken to refer to the 
epistemic duties we must fulfill to be within our epistemic rights to hold a belief (WCB, 99–102). 
59 WCB, 187–189. 
60 WCD, 4. Plantinga traces the distinction between the notions of warrant and justification back to Locke. 
This emerges in his “Justification in the 20th Century,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, 
Supplement (1990): 52. 
61 In three pages, Edmund Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Analysis 23 (1963), both made 
explicit the justified true belief theory of knowledge and cast serious doubt upon it. “It is almost as if a 
distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it” (WCD, 6). Gettier was one of 
Plantinga’s most influential colleagues in the Wayne State philosophy department, given special mention 
in the original preface to God and Other Minds (xvii). Plantinga has often commented on the uniqueness 
of Gettier’s three page piece in the ratio of its pages to the number of pages it has provoked. See 
especially “Self-Profile,” 28–29. Although Gettier’s work has been pressed by Plantinga into the service 
of philosophical arguments that defend the possibility that Christian belief has warrant, Gettier himself 
strongly rejected Christian belief. Plantinga notes that, while at Wayne State, Gettier attacked his 
Christianity “with great verve and power” (“A Christian Life Partly Lived,” in Philosophers Who 
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as genuine knowledge it must fulfill three essential requirements. It must of course be 
believed, it must in fact be true, and thirdly, there must be some connection between the 
way in which the belief arises and the truth of what is being believed—you can’t just get 
lucky. This third requirement, which connects belief formation to truth is commonly 
expressed as justification. Putting all three requirements together we arrive at the 
justified-true-belief theory of knowledge. Plantinga, however, after a long hard look at the 
range of what epistemologists tend to mean by justification, argues that justification does 
not adequately address the concern for the connectedness of belief formation and truth. In 
other words, justification in its common construals does not adequately distinguish 
knowledge from mere true belief.62 An alternative to justification is needed and Plantinga 
calls it warrant.63 In order to appreciate the need for a new term and an alternative to 
traditional notions of justification in knowledge, we would do well to peel back another 
layer and look a bit closer at Plantinga’s critique. 
Where Plantinga and the vast majority of epistemologists throughout history are in 
agreement is that knowledge requires something more than belief and a belief’s 
happening to be true. If the truth of belief candidates were absolutely transparent, obvious 
and somehow guaranteed, then a third requirement might not be necessary. To know 
something implies that there is some non-accidental connection between belief formation 
and truth—something in the process that generates belief so that it is the truth of what is 
being believed and not something else that is motivating the believing.64 This, therefore, 
is what we are after in our search for a proper third requirement for knowledge, a 
dependable, non-accidental connection between belief formation and truth. Where 
Plantinga takes exception with the diverse tradition is in his contention that most notions 
of justification do not provide either what is sufficient or what is necessary for a 
dependable, non-accidental connection between belief formation and truth—i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, ed. Kelly James Clark [Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 1993], 64). 
62 We shall see below that Plantinga uses justification primarily to refer to the rights and duties of belief, 
i.e. deontology. 
63 Plantinga originally opted for Roderick Chisholm’s expression calling it ‘positive epistemic status,’ but 
later explains that that was just too cumbersome a term. He also mentions Earnest Sosa’s ‘epistemic 
aptness’ as a synonym for warrant that has less deontological baggage (WCD, 4–5). 
64 Plantinga helpfully points out that often the aim of belief in a case of knowledge is better understood as 
verisimilitude rather than truth. The aim may not be the production of a veridical proposition, but rather 
the generation of conceptions that are accurate depictions of reality (WPF, 43). 
Chapter 3: Plantinga’s Christian Philosophizing and Warrant 
 
73
warrant.65 Plantinga takes a penetrating look at the notions of justification on offer and 
consistently comes back to two key problems. 
The Failure of Epistemic Justification 
Warrant: The Current Debate is the place to find Plantinga’s most sustained treatment 
of the various proposals made to address the elusive third requirement in knowledge. He 
takes a systematic look at various notions of the importance of and relationship between: 
justification, rationality, evidence, epistemic duty, coherence, etc. Informed by attention 
to its origins in Descartes and Locke, Plantinga undertakes a percipient examination of 
epistemic internalism. Internalism affirms what we have called the accessibility 
requirement.66 “The basic thrust of internalism in epistemology . . . is that the properties 
that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some sort of 
special epistemic access.”67 Plantinga’s ad fontes argument is that internalism is 
motivated by an underlying commitment to a deontological conception of justification—
where justification consists in doing one’s epistemic duty, variously construed. In terms 
of our discussion with Karl Barth, it is appropriate to note that justification so construed is 
a decidedly from below approach to knowing. As Plantinga suggests, “here our destiny is 
entirely in our own hands.”68 As an account of warrant, it is a veritable epistemic works 
                                                 
65 Plantinga’s analysis of warrant is approached inductively, by taking largely agreed instances of 
knowledge, and critically, by highlighting the weaknesses in alternative accounts. In Plantinga’s view, it 
is simply a matter of the way things are that a concise definition of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for warrant is not possible. “This is a way in which philosophy differs from mathematics; . . . Our 
concept of warrant is too complex to yield to analysis by way of a couple of austerely elegant clauses” 
(WPF, ix). The inductive approach is also his tact in the analysis of proper basicality. See Plantinga, “Is 
Belief in God Properly Basic?,” Noûs 15 (1981): 50. 
66 Paul Moser expresses this internalist requirement as being “capable of calling to attention evidence 
which justifies the proposition” being believed. He, therefore, determines that “externalism falls short of 
capturing the primary sense of ‘justified belief’” (Paul K. Moser, Empirical Justification, Philosophical 
Studies Series in Philosophy; V. 34 [Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1985], 246, 248). It is the 
appropriateness of this sense of justification as a criteria for knowledge that Plantinga critiques. 
67 WCD, 6. Paul Helm mistakenly argues that Plantinga’s externalism is “logically parasitic on some form 
of internalism.” This conclusion only follows because Helm places internalist constraints on what could 
serve to warrant externalism when this is exactly what the debate itself hinges on (review of Warrant: 
The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Religious Studies 31 [1995]: 133). 
68 WCD, 15. 
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righteousness, where what principally matters is the conscientious discharge of duty. In 
the case of evidentialism, this is the duty to proportion belief to the evidence. Plantinga 
characterizes the attitude this way: “I may be wholly and hopelessly deceived. Even so, I 
can still do my epistemic duty; I can still do my best; I can still be above reproach.”69 The 
duty of the internalist, however, is to do everything possible not to be deceived. A 
thoroughgoing internalist, therefore, might only count as knowledge a belief that is based 
on evidence, the grounding truth of which is directly, internally apprehended or 
apprehensible.70 Plantinga maintains, that it is the notion of duty undergirding 
internalism, that is its chief motivator—without which internalism of any variety loses its 
drive.71 From this root, he goes on to trace the development of various alternative 
construals of justification, some internalist, others externalist.72 In each case he explains 
that the proposals fail to serve as adequate accounts of how our beliefs could have 
warrant. He employs a number of criticisms and counterexamples to cast doubt on each of 
the warrant candidates. In almost every case, however, he returns to one or more of the 
following three problems. First, there are counterexamples which point out that the 
proposal in question does not give us enough to distinguish knowledge from mere true 
belief. Then, there are counterexamples in which the proposed requirement would not 
even be necessary for warrant. And finally, Plantinga notes that many of the proposals 
misconstrue the relationship between warrant and belief, and cannot account for the 
important fact that warrant comes in degrees. We will examine each of these briefly, 
giving us an opportunity to illuminate Plantinga’s alternative in the light of his critiques. 
The Failure of Epistemic Justification: Degrees of Warrant 
Starting with the last first, some versions of justification fail to grasp that what is 
conferred is a “quantity that comes in degrees.”73 Warrant is not an all-or-nothing, 
                                                 
69 WCD, 15. 
70 The representatives of evidentialist internalism highlighted by Plantinga are Earl Conee and Richard 
Feldman. See especially Earl Conee, “The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification,” Monist 71, no. 3 
(1988); and, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48, no. 1 (1985).  
71 “Internalism flows from deontology and is unmotivated without it” WCD, 29. 
72 A nice summary of the various combinations and permutations of the warrant candidates Plantinga has 
considered is found in the opening to WPF, 3.  
73 WCD, 4. 
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Boolean value; it can be acquired at varying strengths.74 There is a threshold, though not 
quantitatively defined, at which warrant becomes strong enough to serve, with belief and 
truth, as the third criteria for knowledge. The notion that warrant comes in degrees is, for 
Plantinga, an obvious fact, one related to the observation that our beliefs come in degrees 
of strength.75 Part of the significance of Plantinga’s observation about gradations of 
warrant is the relationship between warrant and belief. While Plantinga offers no precise 
account of this relationship he does affirm that when things are working properly, “in the 
typical case, the degree to which I believe a given proposition will be proportional to the 
degree it has of warrant.” 76 So close is the link that Plantinga can assert: “the degree of 
warrant [a belief] enjoys depends on the strength of the belief.”77 Such an assertion, 
however, could easily be misinterpreted. Is Plantinga really suggesting that we control the 
warrant for our beliefs by regulating the strength of our convictions? And, if not, then is 
warrant something that we independently perceive, to which we accordingly adjust the 
firmness of our beliefs? Either interpretation is ruled out by Plantinga’s views on the 
nature of belief formation, seen particularly in his notion of the operation of internal 
rationality and his rejection of strict doxastic voluntarism.  
Internal rationality is concerned with forming the right beliefs on the basis of 
experience. In many cases, however, the function of internal rationality does not involve 
deliberation—reflecting on the nature of the experience and deciding on that basis what to 
believe and how firmly. Often times, as when reflecting on our memories, we simply find 
ourselves in possession of a belief. The belief “seems right, acceptable, natural; it forces 
itself upon you; it seems somehow inevitable.”78 Theories of justification must be able to 
account for the phenomenology of belief—for the fact that our beliefs and their relative 
strengths are not (at least not entirely) in our control. Plantinga recognizes this, and, 
therefore, rejects the notion that our beliefs are determined by deliberative choice. This 
rejection of strict doxastic voluntarism has led some to conclude that Plantinga’s 
                                                 
74 The inability to deal adequately with this phenomenon of warrant is part of Plantinga’s critiques of 
Laurence BonJour’s coherentism, John Pollock’s epistemic norms and Alvin Goldman’s reliabilism 
(WCD, 109–111, 169, 198–199, 209). 
75 WCD, 109; WPF, 9; WCB, 114. 
76 WPF, 9. 
77 WCB, 156. 
78 WCB, 110–112. 
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epistemology is ‘nonvoluntarist’ to the extreme.79 On this view, one’s beliefs are entirely 
determined by external factors, such that warrant becomes a matter of luck. These 
critiques miss their mark quite simply because Plantinga does maintain a place for 
deliberative choice in belief formation. The role of deliberative choice, however, is not 
primary for warrant. It is perfectly consistent with Plantinga’s model that a person 
willfully resist the formation of right belief and thereby sabotage the proper functioning 
of their own cognitive processes.80 While willful resistance may undermine warrant, 
however, choosing to believe does not convey warrant.  
Pressing Plantinga on the nature of belief formation with respect to the transfer of 
warrant raises interesting questions. Where does warrant ultimately come from and what 
explains its gradation? In many of Plantinga’s examples we are clearly in a position of 
epistemic dependence with regard to warrant. Warrant appears to be somehow given. He 
maintains that these examples are an indication that we neither do nor could provide the 
grounds or conditions for the warrant for our own beliefs. Instead he proposes that there 
must be an ultimate external grounding that provides a purposive connection between 
belief formation and truth—“a design plan successfully aimed at truth.” What warrants 
our beliefs is that they are formed properly according to this designed connection to 
truth.81 We are dependent on both an environment and cognitive faculties oriented toward 
and functioning in accordance with this plan. This means that there are a number of 
different factors that could impact the degree of warrant enjoyed by a belief. On the one 
hand, degree of warrant can be affected by malfunction. In the case of malfunction, of 
course, the actual degree of warrant could only be reduced, not increased. It might be the 
case that, due to some defect in my internal rationality, I fail to believe with the 
                                                 
79 See Laura L. Garcia, “Natural Theology and the Reformed Objection,” in Christian Perspectives on 
Religious Knowledge, eds. C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 
121–122; Linda Zagzebski, “Religious Knowledge and the Virtues of the Mind,” in Rational Faith: 
Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, ed. Linda Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1993), 202; and, Keith A. Mascord, Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics (Milton 
Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 181–182, 198. 
80 Plantinga notes that proper function may be “impeded and overridden by lust, ambition, greed, 
selfishness. . .” (WCB, 151). 
81 The specification of a design plan aimed at truth meets John Pollock’s concern for ‘reason-guiding’ 
epistemic norms and thereby refutes Pollock’s argument against externalism (John L. Pollock, 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield Texts in Philosophy [Totowa, N.J.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1986], 124–126). 
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appropriate strength.82 This would, in effect, diminish the warrant transferred to the 
belief. If, however, I believed with more strength than was in fact proportionate to the 
warrant being transferred, I would not thereby increase the warrant of the belief. 
So there is an important link between the strength of belief and the degree of warrant. 
To clarify further, the regulation of the strength of our belief is not a response to the 
warrant transferred, but part (maybe the last part) of the process of warrant transfer in the 
formation of the belief. Consider the question of whether maximal warrant for a belief 
could be transferred to us and, nevertheless, we find ourselves with a low degree of 
confidence in it? This is technically not possible in Plantinga’s conceptuality of warrant 
and belief formation, because warrant is not transferred to us but to our beliefs. Part of the 
transfer of warrant is allocating the appropriate strength of belief. The basis for that 
strength may have to do with the clarity and/or proper functioning of our apprehension of 
experience;83 but, the destination of warrant is the belief itself. Depending on the 
suitability of environment and cognitive function oriented toward and functioning 
according to the designed connection between belief formation and truth—if everything is 
properly oriented and functioning—the full degree of warrant being transferred will, 
without attenuation or intensification, be reflected in and finally established by the proper 
proportionate strength of belief.84 If that degree of warrant is high enough then the belief 
qualifies as knowledge.85 As far as other theories of justification go, they are deficient to 
                                                 
82 Plantinga distinguishes different propositional attitudes which amount to varying degrees of confidence 
that a proposition is true. If confidence is strong enough we call it belief (WPF, 166). See also his 
discussion on Chisholm’s “terms of epistemic appraisal” (WCD, 31). 
83 This is what Plantinga calls external rationality, referring to our part in the formation of experience, both 
sensuous experience upon which perceptual beliefs are based and doxastic experience upon which beliefs 
from the likes of memory and a priori reason are based. 
84 In a parallel discussion on the objective conditional probability of a proposition, Plantinga maintains that 
a successful design plan would aim to match our propositional attitude with objective probability (WPF, 
166). 
85 It is worth noting here that one of the particularities of Plantinga’s warrant alternative to traditional 
notions of justification is that warrant as a third criteria actually subsumes the other two, belief and truth. 
It is impossible for a belief to have a high degree of warrant and not be believed, and indeed believed 
strongly. Also, given the necessity for warrant of environmentally suited and properly functioning 
processes operating according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth, it is impossible for a belief to 
have a high degree of warrant and be false. Therefore, in Plantinga’s scheme, a high degree of warrant is 
the sufficient condition for knowledge. For a dissenting view, see Richard Greene and N. A. Balmert, 
“Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga’s Solution to the Gettier Problem,” Analysis 57, no. 2 (1997). 
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the extent that they cannot accommodate the fact that warrant is a quantity that comes in 
degrees. 
The Failure of Epistemic Justification: Insufficient Criteria 
We now turn to the two most significant reasons Plantinga gives for re-thinking what 
might give our beliefs positive epistemic status, beginning with the problem of the 
insufficiency of the criteria for justification. The insufficiency of most construals of 
justification for warrant is highlighted in situations where, despite fulfilling (by most 
accounts) one’s epistemic duties, there occurs some kind of deception, mistake or 
malfunction in the process. A favorite sub-group of such counterexamples are Gettier 
problems.86 In every Gettier-like example87 there is an instance of belief that happens to 
be true for which there appears to be justification, and yet the belief clearly fails to be an 
instance of knowledge.88 The justified true belief is enabled by a justified false belief.89 
The belief happens to be true even though the work done by the justification has failed; 
and, the fact that the belief is true is actually against all odds.90 One popular Gettier-like 
situation, found prior to Gettier, is Bertrand Russell’s clock: “If you look at a clock which 
you believe to be going, but which in fact has stopped, and you happen to look at it at a 
moment when it is right, you will acquire a true belief as to the time of day, but you 
cannot be correctly said to have knowledge.”91 Russell was not pressing the point of 
justification, but his example has been used to show that a true belief, justified by the 
available evidence is not sufficient for knowledge. The supposed justification has failed, 
and the fact that the belief is nevertheless true is a felix culpa. Gettier, by way of 
                                                 
86 “What Gettier points out, of course, is that belief, truth and justification are not sufficient for knowledge” 
(WPF, 32). 
87 The credit here goes largely to Gettier, though Plantinga appeals to several Gettier-like examples that 
come from others. Plantinga specifically mentions examples taken from Keith Lehrer, Carl Ginet and 
Bertrand Russell. 
88 In Linda Zagzebski’s analysis of Gettier examples, “what generates the problem for JTB, then, is that an 
accident of bad luck is cancelled out by an accident of good luck” (“The Inescapability of Gettier 
Problems,” The Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 [1994]: 66). 
89 WPF, 32. 
90 As Plantinga puts it, “these beliefs could much better have been false” (WPF, 33). 
91 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1948), 113, 
cf. 170–171. 
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counterexample, shows that what we have called the accessibility requirement is not 
sufficient for knowledge. As Plantinga puts it, “the essence of the Gettier problem is that 
it shows internalist epistemologies to be wanting.”92 Gettier problems are for Plantinga a 
decisive blow to typical accounts of knowledge and justification, but they point to an 
even larger looming problem for such accounts. Gettier examples turn on a minor 
mistake, so minor that the common internalist proposal might comfortably allow a bit of 
Gettier-slippage or, with a Gettier exception clause, rest content that the internalist 
approach is nearly correct. But, instead of a minor mistake, what about the possibility of 
large-scale epistemic deception or malfunction? 
Internalism, in its various forms, makes justification dependent on the likes of doing 
one’s duty,93 maintaining a coherent set of beliefs,94 satisfying the constraints of 
Bayesianism,95 having the right epistemic norms,96 etc. But these criteria are quite plainly 
inadequate in cognitive environments that are massively misleading, or in situations 
where one’s own cognitive equipment is not functioning properly. We might either be 
subject to some kind of imperceptible external deception, as in the case of the Cartesian 
                                                 
92 WPF, 36. 
93 WCD, 15–25. Descartes and Locke are given as the progenitors. 
94 WCD, 87–113. See especially Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1985). Kvanvig argues against the view that in coherentism 
all beliefs are basic, but fails to challenge the problems Plantinga raises with respect to proper function 
and truth (Jonathan L. Kvanvig, “In Defense of Coherentism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 22 
[1997]: 299–306). Shogenji considers the problem of the possibility of malfunction or a misleading 
cognitive environment where coherent beliefs are less likely to be true. He concludes that coherence may 
play a significant role in the transfer of warrant (what he calls ‘channeling of justification’); however, he 
agrees with Plantinga that coherence among beliefs does not provide warrant (Tomoji Shogenji, “The 
Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 1 [2001]). 
95 WCD, 114–131. Plantinga finds the term ‘probabilistic coherentism’ to be the best description of 
Bayesianism. Plantinga entertains Bayesian Coherentism, but Bayesian probability theory is also the 
staple of some foundationalist evidentialists. E.g., Timothy and Lydia McGrew, “Strong 
Foundationalism and Bayesianism” (paper presented at the Formal Epistemology Workshop, UC-
Berkeley, May 25–28, 2006); and, Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 102–110. 
96 WCD, 162–181. Pollock is particularly in mind. 
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demon or any variant of the brain-in-a-vat scenario;97 or alternatively, we might have an 
undetectable defect in our cognitive faculties, as in the case of the Cartesian madman or 
Plantinga’s Epistemically Inflexible Climber.98 In all of these cases there is an impact 
either to the formation of the experience that presents itself to us or there is an impact to 
the production of belief on the basis of that experience.99 Unlike Gettier problems, what 
challenges justification in these situations is not the possibility of an unlucky mistake, but 
the possibility of wholesale epistemic unreliability that is entirely beyond our ability to 
detect or manage. While the examples Plantinga gives are imaginative, colorful and 
humorous, the epistemic blind-spots they expose are to be taken quite seriously. They 
reveal, not merely a potential for deception or malfunction but a situation of radical 
epistemic dependence, where the justification-criteria for knowledge—that which 
connects the way in which a belief arises and the truth of what is being believed—is 
finally outside of our control. The affinity with Barth on epistemic dependence should be 
clear; our theory of warrant cannot proceed unilaterally from below. In Warrant: the 
Current Debate Plantinga finds that the positive contemporary proposals for what 
warrants belief fail to recognize the prominent role of proper function,100 an essential 
element of warrant that is outside of our control. Warrant and Proper Function is given 
primarily to developing this notion. 
The Failure of Epistemic Justification: Unnecessary Criteria 
So, one of the major problems with contemporary views of justification is that, by 
ignoring our epistemic dependence on the aptness of our cognitive environments and 
function, they do not provide sufficient conditions for warrant. But, in addition to being 
insufficiently prescriptive, they can also be seen to be unnecessarily proscriptive. There 
are after all several everyday cases of belief that we would all agree are instances of 
knowing for which most notions of justification are entirely irrelevant. In the 
                                                 
97 A favorite BIV scenario for Plantinga is of Alpha Centaurian cognitive superscientists who have the 
power to manipulate our cognitive faculties so that our beliefs are aimed not at truth but some other end. 
See WCD, 111–112, 129–131; WPF, 24, 28, 52, 58; WCB, 237.  
98 WCD, 82. 
99 Plantinga distinguishes between external rationality, which has to do with the formation of the right kind 
of experience, and internal rationality, which has to do with the production of the right beliefs on the 
basis of that experience (WCB, 110–112, 255–256). 
100 WCD, 212. 
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development of Plantinga’s thought this takes us back to his first book devoted to a 
defense of Christian belief: God and Other Minds. He begins with an appraisal of the 
classical arguments of natural theology and natural atheology. He concludes that there are 
no non-circular arguments or evidence to support belief either for or against God. Under 
the common conception of justification, however, in the absence of a reason to support 
belief, belief must be withheld. At this stage Plantinga had not yet revived the lost 
distinction between warrant and justification. Nevertheless, the move he makes strikes at 
the reigning evidentialist, classical foundationalist criteria for justification. Plantinga 
suggests that our common and mostly uncontested belief in other minds is “in the same 
epistemological boat”101 as belief in God. There is no non-circular argument or evidence 
to which we can appeal in support of our belief that there are other thinking beings. 
Therefore, if belief in other minds is rational, belief in God may be also.102 In the 1960s 
Plantinga had not yet formulated his penetrating objections to classical 
foundationalism,103 evidentialism and internalism’s accessibility requirement; but he was 
already raising all of the questions.104 The conclusion remains the same: fulfilling 
contemporary criteria for justification is in some cases unnecessary for a belief to count as 
knowledge. This led to his famous defenses of the proper basicality of belief in God,105 to 
his dismantling of the evidentialist objection106 and finally to his analysis and constructive 
                                                 
101 GOM, xvi. 
102 GOM, 271. This has been referred to as a ‘permissive parity argument’ (Terence Penelhum, God and 
Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism, Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol. 28 
[Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983], 150). It is important to see that Plantinga is not arguing that belief in God 
is true because it is like belief in other minds, only that there is no reason to disqualify its being accepted 
in the basic way if we allow that it is rational to accept belief in other minds in the basic way.  
103 As I point out in chapter 2, there is a dangerous ambiguity in our use of the term foundation. With 
respect to foundationalism, foundation refers to that set of our beliefs which is properly basic. When I 
use the term in the sense of theo-foundationalism, however, I mean to refer to the foundation underneath 
our foundational beliefs, to the undemonstrable anchor that secures the truth of our beliefs, that is—what 
ultimately serves to warrant our beliefs. 
104 Ironically, after raising these questions, Plantinga interjects, “These are obviously some of the most 
difficult and persistent problems of epistemology. A direct assault on them would be bold indeed, not to 
say foolhardy” (GOM, 188). Of course a direct assault is exactly what Plantinga went on to mount in “Is 
Belief in God Rational?,” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1979). 
105 “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” (1981). 
106 RBG, (1983). 
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work on warrant. The list of counterexamples excluded under the criteria of deontological 
justification grew from belief in other minds, to also include: memory beliefs, perceptual 
judgments, a-priori intuitions and beliefs based on introspection, sympathy, moral sense, 
etc. Plantinga prefers to think of these beliefs as being generated by rational powers or 
faculties.107 They are properly basic with respect to the foundations of our knowledge 
structures in that they are not based on inferences from other beliefs. Plantinga does not 
reject foundationalism per se.108 He rejects classical varieties of foundationalism with 
their overly restrictive legitimizing criteria for basicality and failure to account for what 
warrants those beliefs.109 In his constructive model for how Christian belief might have 
warrant, the means by which we receive the knowledge of God, are treated as analogous 
processes that deliver properly basic warranted belief independent of argument or 
evidence. The counterexamples of memory, introspection, etc. indicate that knowledge 
formed in this way is not necessarily deficient.110 In many cases, for belief to have 
warrant, it is simply not required that—prior to assent—one fulfill epistemic obligations 
stipulated by a criteria of justification. What does, however, emerge on Plantinga’s 
account is that the proper functioning of these faculties or processes is necessary (though 
not in and of itself sufficient) for warranting the beliefs they produce. This brings us back 
once again to the priority of our epistemic dependence on the aptness of environments 
and processes beyond our scope of management or direct perception. What we are 
specifically dependent on is the purposeful alignment of the contingent elements of our 
                                                 
107 See WPF, chapters 3–9; WCB, 145–148. 
108 Plantinga is often classed as a modest foundationalist, e.g. David K. Clark, “Faith and Foundationalism,” 
in The Rationality of Theism, eds. Paul K. Moser and Paul Copan (London: Routledge, 2003), 41. 
Though Plantinga demolishes strong foundationalism, Kevin Vanhoozer and Bruce Marshall are 
incorrect to assume that Plantinga is not still rightly considered a foundationalist in his view of the 
structure of knowledge with respect to basic beliefs. See Bruce Marshall, Trinity and Truth, Cambridge 
Studies in Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 87; and, Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1998), 288. 
109 RBG, 55–63. 
110 When it comes to the knowledge of God, Plantinga argues that belief formed in the properly basic way is 
stronger than belief that depends upon inference (WCB, 304–306). 
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epistemic environments and processes such that they are, in Plantinga’s words, 
“successfully aimed at truth.”111 Foremostly, we are dependent on a design plan. 
The Design Plan 
I have characterized the place of the design plan in Plantinga’s notion of warrant as the 
ultimate external grounding that provides a purposive connection between belief 
formation and truth. Warrant is dependent first on this plan and next on cognitive 
environments and function aligned to it. Design may appear to be a theologically loaded 
term, one that directly implies God or a least a designer agent. Plantinga advises, 
however, that while design typically connotes “conscious design or purpose,” it need not 
initially rule out the possibility that a design plan governing the proper operation of our 
cognitive faculties was generated by evolution without an origin in active, conscious, 
agency.112 In other words, the fundamental account of warrant that Plantinga presents is 
not a particularly Christian account of warrant, nor does it even require theism. This fact 
alone should raise enormous suspicion about the compatibility of Plantinga’s approach 
with that of Karl Barth. For Barth, we will recall, there is no movement that builds from a 
general epistemology to a Christian epistemology,113 there is no clarity gained by 
standing outside of belief.114 Earlier in this chapter, however, we concluded that Plantinga 
also rejects the general starting-point assumption. An oft made mistake in Plantinga 
interpretation is to assume that he is building a traditional-style deductive argument to the 
                                                 
111 E.g., one of Plantinga’s earliest formulations of his warrant proposal, when he was still using Chisholm’s 
term, positive epistemic status: “what confers positive epistemic status is one’s cognitive faculties 
working properly or working as designed to work insofar as that segment of design is aimed at 
producing true beliefs” (“Justification and Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 4 [1987], 414). In a 
more mature form: “a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive 
faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate 
for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth” (WCB, 
156). 
112 WPF, 20–21; WCB, 146. For a detailed analysis of design plan see WPF, 11–64. 
113 CD I/1, 190 (KD I/1, 198). See the discussion in chapter 2 on Barth’s rejection of the general staring-
point assumption. 
114 CD I/1, 30 (KD I/1, 29). 
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ultimate conclusion that Christian belief has warrant.115 What Plantinga is doing is nearly 
the reverse. He is arguing, often inductively, that it is fallacious to require that Christian 
belief be built on deductive arguments from generally accessible grounds in order for it to 
have warrant. This does of course make a contribution to philosophy in general as it is an 
attack against a general philosophical presumption against Christian belief taken in the 
basic way. It should be clear, however, that Plantinga is not arguing that Christian belief 
has warrant on the basis of his theory of warrant. It is quite the opposite. As we will 
encounter in the next chapter Plantinga goes on to offer a specific Christian model for 
how Christian belief might have warrant on the account of warrant we have already 
discussed. Plantinga argues that if Christian belief has warrant, then something like his 
Christian model of how Christian belief might have warrant is correct.116 The source of 
warrant is not an argument given by Plantinga; that would clearly be a circular 
argument.117 So too, the fact that Plantinga does not build his Christian model until he has 
cleared the justification deck and established a new outlook on warrant, does not mean 
that he is arguing from a general principle to a theological one. His Christian model is not 
deduced from his general model any more than Plantinga’s belief that Christian belief has 
warrant (i.e. is true) is deduced from his Christian model of warrant. The argument flows 
the other direction. Another way to put this is that Plantinga believes that if he is 
warranted in believing that he is correct about his general account of warrant itself, it will 
be because in arriving at that belief the relevant cognitive capacities were operating in a 
propitious environment according to a design plan—of the God made known in Jesus 
Christ—which is successfully aimed at truth. While Plantinga is obliged to point out that 
                                                 
115 This is a misinterpretation of Plantinga that befalls Richard Swinburne. He believes that the question 
Plantinga should be tackling is whether or not Christian belief does in fact have warrant, and he is 
convinced that the most sensible approach to this question is to argue from the evidence. So when 
Plantinga speaks of proper function and design, Swinburne seems inclined to understand Plantinga to be 
treating them as evidence supporting his claims. It is no wonder that Swinburne is unimpressed with the 
results and misses much of what Plantinga has to offer. See especially, Swinburne, “Plantinga on 
Warrant,” 2; and, Plantinga, “Rationality and Public Evidence: a Reply to Richard Swinburne.” 
116 WCB, 351. 
117 “If the source of the warrant of my Christian belief were this argument, then indeed the project would 
suffer from vicious circularity. But it isn’t, and it doesn’t” (WCB, 352). 
Chapter 3: Plantinga’s Christian Philosophizing and Warrant 
 
85
his general model does not mandate theistic design, it is clear that on his view, the original 
warrant generating impetus for all our knowledge is a design of the Christian God.118 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have established the key features of Plantinga’s solution to the 
problem of the illusive third criteria for knowledge, resolving the severally necessary and 
jointly sufficient criteria for beliefs to have warrant. Following Plantinga, we have 
presented his constructive case as an alternative to the particular inadequacies of 
traditional views of justification. In so doing we have determined that Plantinga is aligned 
with Barth in rejecting specific assumptions of Enlightenment modernism, and in 
confirming the radical epistemic dependence of the human knower.119 Plantinga has, 
furthermore, achieved something that Barth’s approach cannot do and might prefer to 
avoid.120 As an undertaking in negative apologetics, Plantinga has undercut a host of 
potential defeaters for Christian belief, those which argue that acceptable Christian belief 
must meet some traditional version of justification with respect to public evidence or 
duty.121 In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga stakes out two projects. The first he calls 
“an exercise in apologetics and the philosophy of religion.” Our concern thus far has been 
confined mostly to this first project.122 In chapter 4 we will turn to Plantinga’s second 
                                                 
118 As a bonus, Plantinga gives an argument against the major alternative to his Christian model, namely 
naturalistic evolution. The argument here is that if evolution were somehow responsible for our design 
plan there would be no reason to have any confidence that the design plan is aimed at truth rather than 
evolution’s chief motivation the promotion of survival, adaptive behavior or reproductive fitness (WCB, 
227–239). 
119 David Brown also briefly connects Barth and Plantinga in their “rejection of Enlightenment 
assumptions” (Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999], 10). 
120 The question of the compatibility between Barth and Plantinga on the nature and acceptability of 
apologetics will be taken up in chapter 5. 
121 “Might I not be perfectly responsible even if I did not always require a reason for belief. . .” (WCD, 98). 
For Plantinga’s own assessment of this contribution see “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and 
Arguments For Christian Belief,” 399; and, “Rationality and Public Evidence: a Reply to Richard 
Swinburne,” 222. 
122 The broader apologetical argument that runs throughout WCB is that there is no viable objection to the 
acceptability of Christian belief that does not depend on a refutation of the truth of Christian belief. 
Plantinga challenges the notion that one may remain agnostic about the truth of Christian belief while 
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task, which he calls “an exercise in Christian philosophy,” offering “a good way for 
Christians to think about the epistemology of Christian belief.”123 With respect to the 
knowledge of God, our chief concern, Barth has pronounced that it “derives and is to be 
considered only from outside all human possibilities, i.e., from the acting of God 
Himself.”124 So far we have seen that Plantinga’s externalism suggests that the warrant 
for all human knowing ultimately derives “from outside.” The linchpin of Plantinga’s 
epistemology is the design plan, tailored to suitable environments, successfully aiming at 
truth. In Plantinga’s view it is this divine design, from “outside all human possibilities,” 
that enables the possibility of human knowing. It is now time to look at whether and in 
what way Plantinga sees the knowledge of God to be divinely initiated self-revelation—
“from the acting of God Himself.” 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
seeing that there is no acceptable way to arrive at that belief—the idea that, true or not, Christian belief is 
irrational, unjustified or lacks warrant. Plantinga undermines this position by showing that the only 
viable option for such an alethically neutral argument would be in the area of warrant. On the model 
Plantinga defends, however, the only way to show that Christian belief lacks warrant is to argue against 
the truth of the belief itself (WCB, viii–xiii). 
123 WCB, xiii. 
124 CD I/1, 38 (KD I/1, 38). 
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The discussion of Plantinga’s constructive proposal with respect to acquiring theistic 
and specifically Christian belief will be limited to the scope of our chief concern—that of 
understanding its relationship to Barth’s theology of revelation. For this reason, I will 
present its primary components with minimal treatment of the numerous debates it has 
spawned and conclude with an evaluation in light of the synopsis of Barth’s theological 
epistemology from the first two chapters. We begin with two important cautions for 
approaching Plantinga’s theological proposal; the first applies to the proposal itself; the 
second regards the wider philosophical argument within which the proposal is situated. 
Following these comments we will briefly consider what latitude Plantinga allows 
philosophy in challenging Christian belief, before finally moving into a discussion of his 
positive theological proposal. 
Preliminary Cautions 
Caution 1: An Intentionally Under-Specified Proposal 
What Plantinga gives us in chapters 6-9 of Warranted Christian Belief is a theological 
account of how theistic or Christian belief is formed in believers. Theologians in 
4 
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particular, however, should be warned that Plantinga is nowhere attempting to present a 
thoroughgoing, fully nuanced theological system. In order to understand Plantinga and 
conduct a judicious assessment of the compatibility of his work with Barth’s theology of 
revelation, it is important to note just what Plantinga is and is not intending to do. Far 
from a detailed theology of revelation, all Plantinga needs for his purposes is a rough 
model of how things might go—just enough to show how a theistic or Christian belief 
could meet his general criteria for warrant. He does give us, in fact, quite a bit more than 
this. To begin with, he provides not just a model, but two models. The first is intended to 
show how generally theistic belief might have warrant. This model is then extended into a 
second model, giving an account of how explicitly Christian belief could have warrant.1 
Although some have complained about the minimalist character of Plantinga’s models,2 
Plantinga could have held himself to a far more generic account, or no model at all.3 It 
would have been sufficient for Plantinga’s core argument simply to have suggested that 
there may be special cognitive faculties and processes divinely designed to impart true 
beliefs about God and central Christian teachings. If this is so, then warrant for theistic 
and Christian belief may be transferred by the proper function of these special cognitive 
operations, in the basic way. 
Plantinga, nevertheless, chooses to give a model, where these special, divinely 
designed, cognitive operations are named and described. He paints in broad brush the 
contours of an inclusive though Reformed-leaning theological proposal, noting 
particularly the contributions of Aquinas and Calvin. As an exercise in Christian 
philosophy, Plantinga is attempting to show that his account of how beliefs have warrant 
is not only philosophically defensible, but fits with the way in which the warranting 
operations for Christian belief proceed according to standard Christian teaching. 
Providing a model has the advantage of giving not merely principles, but a tangible way 
                                                 
1 From the perspective of Christian theology these two models represent the classical though often 
distorting division between general and special revelation—the Book of Nature and the Book of 
Scripture. 
2 E.g., James K. Beilby, Epistemology as Theology: an Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga’s Religious 
Epistemology (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 135–136. 
3 Plantinga reminds those who criticize his model for not defining the relationship between divine action 
and human freedom, that “the fewer such stands it takes the better; for the fewer such stands it takes the 
weaker the main premises of my argument are; and the weaker the premises are (provided they do in fact 
warrant the conclusion) the stronger the argument is” (“Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and 
Arguments For Christian Belief,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 [2001]: 395). 
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to think Christianly about how Christian beliefs might legitimately be taken as 
knowledge; and, as one might expect, the model outlines Plantinga’s own theological 
views on the matter. For this reason, it seems fair to include Plantinga’s proposal in our 
theological discussion and assessment, while recognizing that it is intentionally under-
specified. We should certainly not expect that Plantinga’s theological proposal would be 
as comprehensive as Barth’s. Consequently, our line of questioning will focus on the 
conformity of Plantinga’s affirmations with Barth’s main concerns and an overall 
evaluation of the compatibility and contribution of Plantinga’s approach. Plantinga’s 
theological proposal is intentionally under-specified because of the role it plays in his 
wider philosophical argument. This may have the ring of theology being pressed into the 
service of philosophy. Whether or not this violates a Barthian anathema, however, will 
depend on whether the shape of the philosophical argument grants the appropriate 
freedom and priority to theology. We move now to our second caution. 
Caution 2: What the Argument Is 
In what immediately follows I will only be referring to Plantinga’s argument with 
respect to his extended model for how specifically Christian belief may have warrant. 
What I say, however, also applies mutatis mutandis to Plantinga’s model for merely 
theistic belief. In our discussion of the place of the design plan as fundamental to warrant, 
we noted that it is sometimes mistakenly assumed that Plantinga is building a deductive 
argument that would provide persuasive reasons to conclude that Christian belief is in fact 
warranted. It is worth repeating here that the flow and intent of the argument is quite 
unlike a traditional, evidentialist apologetic.4 Plantinga’s chief aim is not to present a 
case, or provide an argument for why it is we should favor his specific theological 
proposal over other alternatives. As we have seen, Plantinga has done a good deal of 
precise philosophical work to develop a rigorous general account of warrant. He is in a 
position now to consider whether or not specifically Christian belief could be warranted 
                                                 
4 Plantinga’s approach could be construed as a kind of externalist evidentialism, if the notion of evidence 
is allowed a wider sense than merely propositional evidence, such that memory, sense perception and 
faith might all be warrant transferring cognitive operations that make the truth of the mater evident, the 
deliverances of which could therefore be considered evidence. Evidence understood in this way refers 
generally to the grounds for one’s belief. See “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” Noûs 15 (1981): 44–
45. 
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on this account, and warranted in the basic way. Again the argument here is inductive in 
shape. Plantinga is not starting from outside belief in an attempt to show the skeptic that 
Christian belief does in fact have warrant. This would be to show how Christian belief 
can be accepted on the basis of a warrant transferring inference from some generally 
accepted starting point. Plantinga frankly admits that he knows of no such arguments the 
strength of which would warrant Christian belief.5 “Of course this is nothing against 
either their truth or their warrant; very little of what we believe can be ‘demonstrated’ or 
‘shown’.”6 The tactic Plantinga adopts, therefore, is to give a hypothetical account of how 
it could be that Christian belief might arise from cognitive processes operating in the right 
kind of environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. The power of 
the hypothetical model Plantinga chooses is that, being itself a piece of Christian 
theology, the premise entails the truth of Christian belief. What this achieves for 
Plantinga is loosely to tie premise and conclusion together, such that if—independent of 
the argument—Christian belief is true, then it follows that Christian belief likely does 
have warrant either in the way described, or in some similar way.7 As suggested earlier, 
this is not a circular argument, because the argument itself is not trying to provide the 
warrant for Christian belief.8 On the contrary, the argument is aiming to reveal how it 
could be that no argument is required for Christian belief to have warrant. Plantinga’s 
argument is that if warrant for Christian belief were in fact transferred in the way 
suggested in standard Christian teaching, then the believer would be warranted to believe 
in the basic way and not as the conclusion of some chain of inference. 
The notion of holding Christian beliefs in the basic way strikes many Christian 
philosophers as a rather weak position to take. They presume that Christian belief, like 
any belief, would have a stronger footing if it were supported by reasons in the form of a 
                                                 
5 WCB, 170, 201, 499. “Any argument for its warrant, therefore, would also be an argument for its truth. 
But I don’t know of good philosophical arguments for the claim that Christian belief is true (and I don’t 
know of conclusive philosophical arguments for the claim that theism is true); hence I can’t sensibly 
argue that Christian belief is in fact warranted. Of course my not knowing of any such arguments is 
wholly compatible with my knowing that both Christian and theistic belief are, in fact true, and in my 
better moments, I think, I do know that they are” (“Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments 
For Christian Belief,” 387). 
6 WCB, 170. 
7 WCB, 285. 
8 WCB, 351–352. 
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good argument.9 To these detractors, Plantinga’s project appears to be a trivial diversion 
from the more important task of providing reasons to think that Christian belief is true. 
Swinburne complains that the real question is whether Christian beliefs actually do have 
warrant. “[Plantinga] has shown that they do, if they are true; so we might hope for 
discussion of whether they are true.”10 James Beilby is similarly troubled that while 
Plantinga argues that Christian belief is a viable epistemic option, “he does not address 
the reasons to think that the Christian worldview is not only permitted but true, 
persuasive, compelling.”11 Still others regret that Plantinga’s approach leaves him unable 
to affirm the truth of Christian belief, or the possibility of knowing that one knows that it 
is true.12 These are important objections, all of which fail adequately to appreciate the 
nature of Christian belief whose warrant derives from God’s revealing action. Briefly 
responding to these objections will help to underscore our point of caution with respect to 
Plantinga’s argument and reinforce the compatibility here between Barth and Plantinga. 
Plantinga nowhere claims that arguments or evidence cannot provide some support for 
Christian belief.13 His chief objection is to the requirement that it must be supported by 
ulterior propositional inference in order to have warrant sufficient for knowledge.14 As we 
have already noted, Plantinga’s pronouncements against natural theology are more 
modest than Barth’s.15 But Plantinga does clearly take exception to the presumption that 
Christian beliefs would have a stronger footing if they were accepted on the basis of 
inference from propositional evidence rather than in the basic way. Unless one were 
                                                 
9 Deane-Peter Baker develops this criticism of Plantinga as the ‘Inadequacy Thesis’ (Deane-Peter Baker, 
“Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 57 [2005]: 77–103). 
10 Richard G. Swinburne, “Plantinga on Warrant,” review of Warranted Christian Belief, Religious Studies 
37 (2001): 206. 
11 Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, 141–142. 
12 R. Douglas Geivett and Greg Jesson, “Plantinga’s Externalism and the Terminus of Warrant-Based 
Epistemology,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001): 331. In the same volume we find Richard 
Fumerton’s dissatisfaction with Plantinga’s approach in its failing to give some “assurance of truth” 
(“Plantinga, Warrant, and Christian Belief,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 [2001]: 351). See note below on 
the ‘KK-thesis.’ 
13 “Of course they could be accepted on the basis of other propositions, and perhaps in some cases are” 
(WCB, 250). 
14 WCB, 93. 
15 We have reserved chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of this tension. 
Chapter 4: Plantinga’s Epistemology of Christian Belief 
 
92
operating under coherentist assumptions,16 it seems unlikely that ulterior inferential 
support could in every case enhance the strength of a belief. If this were so then non-basic 
beliefs would be stronger than the basic beliefs from which they derive their strength by 
inference. In fact, in the process of inference, to the degree that some probability calculus 
is in operation, non-basic beliefs will be weaker than the beliefs supporting them.17 
Plantinga argues that if Christian beliefs can be properly basic, then the “most satisfactory 
way to hold them will not be as the conclusions of argument.”18 When warrant is 
transferred by a divinely designed and intended doxastic experience whereby the truth of 
Christian propositions becomes apparent without inference from other propositions, there 
is an analogy to direct perception.19 The warrant for the belief is conferred by a process 
wherein the believer is enabled immediately to apprehend the truth of the belief. Because 
this kind of belief is more direct20 than one that is mediated by inference, it is arguably a 
firmer and more satisfactory way to believe, in the same way that seeing for oneself is 
superior to depending on external testimony.21 So for Plantinga, believing in the basic 
way is superior, though he does not deny that some basic beliefs could receive additional 
warrant by means of an argument from inference. Plantinga appeals to Calvin’s notion 
that arguments might serve as secondary confirmations or aids.22 Historical evidence for 
                                                 
16 The coherentist would not make this claim to begin with. On this view coherence itself and not 
inferential support is crucial to the degree of warrant a belief enjoys. See WCD, 79–80, where Plantinga 
also explains that Coherentism is, in fact, a special case of foundationalism, “the variety according to 
which the only source of warrant is coherence.” 
17 Plantinga takes this further in noting that arguments from historical evidence depend on a chain of 
‘dwindling’ probabilities (WCB, 271–280). 
18 WCB, 210. Plantinga seems to agree with Calvin’s view that, as Plantinga puts it, “the Christian ought 
not to believe on the basis of argument; if he does, his faith is likely to be unstable and wavering” (“The 
Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Philosophical Knowledge [Washington, DC: American 
Catholic Philosophical Assoc, 1980], 53). 
19 Unlike perception in its phenomenal imagery, but analogically related to perception in being a direct 
apprehension (WCB, 181, 286–289). 
20 WCB, 259, 262. 
21 This position is strengthened further by Plantinga’s treatment of the affective aspect of the gift of faith, 
which we have not yet discussed. Here it is not merely the truth of the proposition that is made evident, 
but also its loveliness, beauty, and desirability. This affective component is also more satisfactorily 
arrived at in the immediate, basic way, rather than on the basis of argument. See WCB, 304–306. 
22 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in Christian Philosophy at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century: Assessment and Perspective, eds. Sander Griffioen and Bert M. Balk (Kampen, 
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the resurrection, for instance, could boost the warrant one has for believing it.23 But in 
Plantinga’s view, while such arguments could play a supporting and secondary role, they 
would in no way be sufficient on their own to deliver the kind of warrant necessary for 
knowledge and ‘paradigmatic’ Christian belief. An argument from public evidence might 
show that Christian belief is somewhat more probable than not, but this “is insufficient 
for its being warrantedly believed with any degree of firmness.”24 In summary, 
Plantinga’s argument is that Christian belief can be properly held on grounds that are in 
fact firmer than the insufficient though not insignificant warrant delivered by 
propositional or historical evidence. 
Returning now to Plantinga’s detractors, Swinburne, Beilby, Geivett, Fumerton and 
others chide Plantinga for giving insufficient attention to the question of the truth of 
Christian belief. For Plantinga along with Barth, however, the truth of the matter is 
paramount. As Plantinga affirms, “this is the really important question.”25 Plantinga’s 
whole program is designed to move the question of the truth of Christianity back to center 
stage, by undercutting the objections to the knowability of that truth. One of the leading 
objections to knowability is the imposed requirement that knowledge requires a 
supporting reason in the form of a good argument. Beneath the charge that Plantinga has 
skirted the question of truth is the underlying assumption that without a good argument 
the grounds for a belief are less than satisfactory. But this is just what Plantinga is arguing 
against.26 And this brings us nicely back to the main point of caution. We cannot confuse 
‘believing without propositional evidence’ with ‘believing without any grounds 
whatsoever.’ Here the notion of a reason can be employed misleadingly. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Netherlands: Uitgeverij Kok, 1995), 39–40; “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For 
Christian Belief,” 385; and, “Reply,” Philosophical Books 43, no. 2 (2002): 127 n4. 
23 In his response to Stephen Wykstra, Plantinga writes, “So suppose I’m a beneficiary of the IIHS, but the 
warrant enjoyed by my belief in the resurrection doesn’t come up to the standard for knowledge: learning 
of the historical evidence could bring it up to that standard” (“Reply,” 128). 
24 “Rationality and Public Evidence: a Reply to Richard Swinburne,” Religious Studies 37 (2001): 220. See 
also WCB, 271, 274, 280, 379. 
25 WCB, 499 (italics mine). 
26 This central point is somehow missed for those like Thomas McHugh Reed who fail to grasp one of 
Plantinga’s most fundamental assertions—that there may be non-propositional grounds for belief. See 
Thomas McHugh Reed, “Christianity and Agnosticism,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 52 (2002). See also, John Zeis, “A Critique of Plantinga’s Theological Foundationalism,” 
Philosophy of Religion 28 (1990). 
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If we take an R1-reason to mean a propositional argument, then it is correct to say that 
Plantinga is arguing that we can know that Christian belief is true without an R1-reason. 
But taken in this sense, as Plantinga notes in his response to Fumerton, God’s own beliefs 
are not based on R1-reasons.27 Instead God’s knowledge is grounded in his very nature, 
which leads us to the other sense in which a reason may be taken, R2-reason: the 
grounding or warranting connection between our beliefs and the truth of the matter. 
Taken in this way, it is not at all the case that believers are without a reason for believing 
as they do. The R2-reason for belief, according to Plantinga’s theological proposal, is 
grounded in cognitive operations designed by God to deliver true belief. When operating 
without impedance, this R2-reason is far better than the R1-reason any argument could 
supply.28 The implication is, of course, that the demonstration of the truth of Christian 
belief is something we receive and not something we could supply ourselves. It is not that 
Plantinga does not himself know that Christian belief is true, or even know that he 
knows.29 It is rather that Plantinga believes that the grounds for his knowledge of the truth 
                                                 
27 “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For Christian Belief,” 390. 
28 In Paul Helm’s discussion of Plantinga’s deployment of Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, he seems to miss the 
significance of this distinction between R1 and R2 reasons—which in his discussion features as the 
distinction between grounds and evidence. Neither Plantinga nor Calvin suggest that belief may be 
reasonless. Furthermore, Plantinga’s appeal to Calvin is not to prove the factual existence of a divinely 
designed faculty as Helm worries, but to indicate precedence in the Christian theological tradition for the 
possibility of noetic equipment designed to yield properly basic belief in God. The fact that Calvin does 
not theorize about rationality does not prevent Plantinga from drawing the epistemological implications 
out of an ontological claim. See Paul Helm, Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997), 188–189, 197–201. 
29 Plantinga need not accept the suggestion made by Geivett and Jesson (330–331) that his externalism 
limits him from being able to know that he knows that Christian belief is true. Notice how a typically 
evidentialist conception of knowing is smuggled into this charge. The question seems reasonable: ‘how 
do you know that you know that what you believe is true?’ But what kind of answer do we think we 
need? Why should an R1-reason be required for knowledge about knowledge. Clearly if first-order 
knowledge can be warranted for the externalist in the basic way then so could all other reflection on the 
status of that knowledge. The externalist can know that without knowing how and without having an R1-
reason. This applies equally as well to knowing that one knows in Hintikka’s famous ‘KK-thesis.’ See 
Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Contemporary 
Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 28; and, Risto Hilpinen, “Knowing that One 
Knows and the Classical Definition of Knowledge,” Synthese 21, no. 2 (1970): 109–132. Plantinga does 
in fact provide a way in which one might have an R1-reason for thinking that a warrant-basic belief has 
warrant (WCB, 347–348). The premise from which the inference flows is itself taken in the basic way 
Chapter 4: Plantinga’s Epistemology of Christian Belief 
 
95
of Christian belief are, to use his phrase, “beyond the competence of philosophy.”30 He 
claims that (at least in his ‘better moments’31) he knows the truth of Christian belief in the 
basic way, and he claims to show how his beliefs could have sufficient warrant for 
knowledge. What he does not claim to show is that his beliefs are true.32 And so it is in 
fact in deference to the importance of the truth of the matter that Plantinga holds that a 
sufficient human demonstration of its truth is not possible. Using the resources of the 
historic Christian tradition to support his theological proposal, Plantinga’s argument 
shows that the answer to the key question about the truth of Christian belief, vainly 
sought in the weak demonstrations of human argument, is properly received from God 
above—exactly as Barth would have it. 
Our cautions amount to a reminder that the warrant for Plantinga’s model and 
Plantinga’s wider argument ultimately derives from the action of God himself. This 
recognition yields another significant intersection between Barth and Plantinga. In the 
second chapter we noted that while Barth concedes a priority to the epistemic question, in 
seeking its answer he remains committed to the fundamental ontological priority of the 
object of theological knowing. Plantinga draws the same conclusion. As we have seen, his 
argument has value, whether or not one is prepared to accept the truth of the premises. 
The possibility that Christian belief could have warrant in the way described undercuts 
the de jure objection. The stronger conclusion, that Christian belief does indeed have 
warrant, depends on whether or not one is willing to accept the truth of the premises. 
Since warrant for the premise is transferred in the basic way and not by argument, it is the 
case, as Plantinga says, that “the dispute as to whether theistic belief is rational 
                                                                                                                                                  
and provides by inference the R1-reason for the belief that one knows that one knows. Furthermore, this 
is exactly how Plantinga himself is arguing. Nevertheless, since the premise of the argument—which is 
the theological model—is taken in the basic way, the whole argument rests on whether or not the 
premise is the divinely given truth of the matter. Truth, which only God can demonstrate, is back at 
center stage. Similarly Barth notes that dogmatics “realises that all its knowledge, even its knowledge of 
the correctness of its knowledge, can only be an event, and cannot therefore be guaranteed as correct 
knowledge from any place apart from or above this event” (CD I/1, 42; KD I/1, 42). 
30 WCB, 499. 
31 “Of course my not knowing of any such arguments is wholly compatible with my knowing that both 
Christian and theistic belief are, in fact true, and in my better moments, I think, I do know that they are” 
(“Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For Christian Belief,” 387). 
32 WCB, 169. 
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(warranted) can’t be settled just by attending to epistemological considerations.”33 And so 
he concludes that, “it is at bottom not merely an epistemological dispute, but an 
ontological or theological dispute.” One’s theological, metaphysical commitments will 
determine what one will accept to be legitimate warrant conferring conditions. The 
priority of ontology is what motivates Plantinga’s argument and supports the conclusion 
that any successful objection to Christian belief must be aimed at the truth of the belief 
and not the epistemic inadequacy of its formation.34 
Plantinga’s A/C Model of Theistic Belief 
Plantinga’s theological proposal comes, as I have said, in two parts. The first part is a 
model, the Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model, intended to explain how belief in God, broadly 
conceived, might have warrant. The second part is said to be an extension of this first 
model, the extended A/C model, describing how explicitly Christian belief could be 
warranted. As the name implies, the extended A/C model bears a relation to the A/C 
model, though it is clearly a different model altogether. It is correct to view Plantinga’s 
proposal not as one model with two parts, but two discrete models the second having an 
impact on the first. We will treat the A/C model and the extended A/C model separately, 
bearing in mind that all Plantinga hopes to achieve is an account that grows out of 
Christian teaching itself which would explain the possibility that a given basic belief is 
the result of truth-oriented, environmentally-suited, belief-producing operations35 
working according to plan. 
                                                 
33 WCB, 190. “So if we trace the epistemological question back we find (with apologies to John Austin) an 
ontological question grinning residually up at us from the bottom of the mug” (“The Prospects for 
Natural Theology,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 [1991]: 309). 
34 Cf. WCB, 191. See also William Alston’s discussion of the relationship between metaphysics and 
epistemology in Plantinga’s model (“Epistemology and Metaphysics,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays 
in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, eds. Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson and David Vander Laan [Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2006], 81–87). 
35 The word ‘operations’ is chosen here to be more general than Plantinga’s terms ‘faculty’ and ‘process’ 
which are associated each with the A/C and extended A/C model respectively.  
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The A/C Model: Overview 
The key feature of Plantinga’s A/C model is what Aquinas refers to as a general 
though confused knowledge of God “implanted in us by nature,”36 and what Calvin calls 
a “sense of divinity” (sensus divinitatis) which is “engraved upon men’s minds.”37 
Neither Aquinas nor Calvin gives a detailed epistemological account of how this 
implanted knowledge arises in the human knower. It is as Calvin says, “naturally inborn 
in all.” Plantinga seems a bit unsatisfied with this notion of immediate implantation.38 
Instead he originally refers to the sensus divinitatis as a “strong tendency or inclination 
toward belief”39 and, in his exposition of the A/C model, as a “kind of faculty or a 
cognitive mechanism . . . which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs 
about God.”40 Rather than interpreting sensus divinitatis merely to be a generally 
“numinous awareness of God”41 implanted as a seed of religion, Plantinga conceives of a 
faculty that is similar to our senses, in that it operates under certain triggering conditions. 
These conditions might range widely from an encounter with the wonders of creation to 
an experience of guilt or spontaneous thanksgiving.42 Unlike a faculty of empirical 
sensation, Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis does not give us a perception of God.43 The 
triggering experience is only the occasion for the formation of true beliefs about God, 
beliefs that of course entail God’s existence. Another way to put this is that, while “the 
operation of the sensus divinitatis will always involve the presence of experience of some 
kind,”44 the dictates of our external rationality with respect to the sensus divinitatis does 
not regard the proper formation of phenomenal experience but only the proper formation 
                                                 
36 For Aquinas, by this implanted knowledge we know of God’s existence without being clear on exactly 
who God is (Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province [New York: Benziger 
Bros., 1947], I. ii. 1). 
37 Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library 
of Christian Classics (London: S.C.M. Press, 1961), I. iii. 3. 
38 Immediate knowledge does not mean an unmediated experience of God, but may refer to an implanted 
knowing that is not dependent on triggering conditions. What Plantinga has in mind does involve 
triggering conditions. 
39 RBG, 66. 
40 WCB, 172. 
41 From the translator’s note on “divinitatis sensum,” Institutes, I. iii. 3. footnote 189. 
42 WCB, 174. 
43 WCB, 180–84 
44 WCB, 183. 
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of doxastic experience occasioned by it. What is delivered by the sensus divinitatis, 
triggered as it is by various experiences, is not a perception of God but of some truth 
about God. 
Plantinga claims that the sensus divinitatis in his A/C model does the work that he 
needs done. It details a cognitive faculty that is part of God’s design for human beings 
that, when functioning properly under certain conditions, produces warranted belief in the 
existence of God.45 Plantinga concedes, as do Calvin and Aquinas, that there is one major 
problem with the sensus divinitatis, namely, that the human fall into sin has rendered this 
way of knowing largely if not completely inoperative.46 Hopes for restoring this cognitive 
faculty to proper function are dependent on work done in the extended A/C model by the 
Holy Spirit. Given the possibility that the noetic effects of sin may be sufficiently 
overcome to allow the adequate function of the sensus divinitatis, the A/C model is 
successful in explaining how it is that a general belief in God might be warranted. There 
remains, however, a number of important questions to ask about the A/C model. We will 
begin with a look at Plantinga’s requirement for triggering conditions, then turn to 
reservations about the success of the A/C model, and finally note the tensions in the A/C 
model with Barth’s theology of revelation. 
The A/C Model: Acquired not Implanted Knowledge 
Why is it that Plantinga seems to show an aversion to the notion of a merely implanted 
or inborn knowledge of God, preferring instead a faculty operating on the occasion of 
certain experiences? He appears to combine affirmations that in Aquinas and Calvin are 
kept separate.47 Aquinas reasons that our being led to desire a happiness that can only be 
                                                 
45 WCB, 179, 186. 
46 WCB, 184–186. 
47 Plantinga has been roundly criticized for misinterpreting Calvin on exactly this point; thus, Moreland 
and Craig charge that Plantinga “seriously misrepresents Calvin on this score” (James P. Moreland and 
William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview [Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 2003], 168). Michael Sudduth’s critiques Plantinga for failing to observe a distinction 
between the implanted knowledge Calvin speaks of in Chapter 3 of book I of the Institutes, from the 
acquired knowledge of God in Chapter 5 (Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth, “Plantinga’s Revision of the 
Reformed Tradition: Rethinking our Natural Knowledge of God,” Philosophical Books 42, no. 2 [2002]: 
83–84). 
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fulfilled in God implies an implanted form of the knowledge of God.48 This implanted 
knowledge is different from the general knowledge of God that is acquired as a function 
of natural reason in consideration of the ways in which God is evidenced by his effects.49 
Likewise, for Calvin, there is a distinction between a knowledge of God which is a 
“deposit in our minds,” and the manifestation of “his perfections in the whole structure of 
the universe.”50 Plantinga’s move to combine these two elements into one capacity, while 
possibly obscuring Calvin’s distinction,51 helps to avoid a potential misinterpretation of 
Calvin on general revelation. Calvin nowhere suggests that unaided human reason by 
inference from the data of experience can demonstrate the truth of propositions about 
God. If the capacity of the sensus divinitatis is not operative in beholding the 
manifestations of God in creation, it would tend to promote the conclusion that the 
warrant for such beliefs as are triggered by experience comes by way of inference rather 
than the operation of a divine gift. This would not only misrepresent Calvin (and 
Aquinas) but it would be entirely unhelpful to Plantinga’s contention that arguments for 
God’s existence are not strong enough alone to support full-fledged Christian belief.52 
The price of placing Calvin’s two notions under one heading appears to be the loss of a 
sensus divinitatis that might operate without triggering conditions. As already noted, 
Michael Sudduth challenges Plantinga on just this point with the suggestion that Plantinga 
ignores Calvin’s notion of implanted knowledge, replacing it with an innate capacity. But 
is an implanted knowledge wholly without conditions really possible? 
                                                 
48 “To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God 
is man’s beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be 
naturally known to him” (Summa Theologica, I. ii. 1). See also Summa Contra Gentiles, I. v. 1. 
49 “The existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His 
effects which are known to us” (Summa Theologica, I. ii. 2). It is this non-implanted knowledge which is 
in view in the passage Plantinga cites (WCB, 170n3., 176–177), Summa Contra Gentiles, III. xxxviii. 
50 Institutes, I. v. 1.  
51 Plantinga’s chief aim is not Calvin exegesis; “whatever Calvin thinks, however, it’s our model” (WCB, 
173). Nevertheless, Plantinga defends his interpretation against Sudduth’s critique: “I’m no Calvin 
scholar, but I doubt that he intended a distinction between the knowledge of God as proposed in Chapter 
3 and that affirmed in Chapter 5” (“Reply,” 134). 
52 Plantinga is willing to countenance variations on his model that might involve a ‘quick inference’ or a 
further boost in warrant from argument; but, in each case, inference alone is not sufficient (WCB, 176; 
“Reply,” 128). 
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Consider how the notion of implanted knowledge might fit into Plantinga’s own highly 
nuanced, general account of knowledge. In Plantinga’s view, knowledge and belief are 
inextricably linked. It is impossible that one could know something without believing it. 
Aquinas and Calvin employ the term knowledge without honed epistemological 
constraints, such that an innate knowledge can be present without belief.53 This is not a 
knowledge such as the demons may have which involves assent but fails to have the 
appropriate affective response. It is a knowledge that coincides with an utter lack of 
cognitive assent, a lack of assent that is described as a denial or suppression of what is 
known.54 Implanted knowledge of this kind is not implanted belief. What Calvin seems to 
have in mind at points would not be called knowledge in Plantinga’s system, but rather 
something more like access to, or an intuitive grasp of, the truthfulness of some 
propositions about God. In other words, a given capacity. As Calvin describes it, even 
those in unbelief, “occasionally feel the truth which they are desirous not to know.” 
Furthermore, as Plantinga points out, it is “a bit far-fetched” to suggest that this capacity 
is producing belief from the moment of birth.55 If what we are really talking about is an 
implanted capacity to grasp the truthfulness of some propositions about God, then 
environmental conditions do apply after all. Beliefs would not issue at some arbitrary 
stage, but arise as one begins to grasp the meaning of the propositions whose truthfulness 
the sensus divinitatis enables one to “feel.” In order to grasp the meaning of propositions 
about God, it could be argued, requires having experiences, maybe even the kinds of 
experiences which in Plantinga’s model operate as triggers for belief.56 So while 
                                                 
53 “In the present day not a few are found who deny the being of a God, yet, whether they will or not, they 
occasionally feel the truth which they are desirous not to know” (Institutes, I. iii. 2). 
54 On either view it is agreed that, the failure of the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis to result in belief 
is due to a disruption in proper function caused by sin, impairing the formation of the right doxastic 
experience and disrupting the correct formation of belief on the basis of it. Plantinga discusses these two 
impairments as the damage done to the sensus divinitatis on the one hand, and a resistance to its 
deliverances on the other (WCB, 205). 
55  “Reply,” 134. Also see WCB, 173. 
56 If this is correct then the beliefs formed by Calvin’s sensus divinitatis would be more like the 
deliverances of reason, a priori beliefs which are formed “independently of experience” (WPF, 103). In 
an early exchange with Peter Losin, Plantinga withholds from the suggestion that belief in God’s 
existence might be on the basis of seeing the truth of the proposition as with a priori beliefs. Instead he 
offers the knowledge we have by way of memory as a more favorable analogue (“Reformed 
Epistemology Again,” The Reformed Journal 32 [1982]: 8). In WCB, 173, however, Plantinga makes the 
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Plantinga’s A/C model may somewhat obscure a distinction in Calvin, there is no impact 
to the thrust of Calvin on general revelation, affirming an indispensable, though merely 
indirect role for experience in the operation of a divinely designed, innate capacity.57 This 
leaves open, of course, the question of the extent of the damage done by sin which we 
will touch on next. 
The A/C Model: Is It Successful? 
We now turn to the question of whether the A/C model is sufficient for the purposes of 
Plantinga’s wider argument. The most apparent weakness of the A/C model is one that is 
only exposed by the extended A/C model, for specifically Christian belief, where the 
noetic effects of sin are detailed. Sin has “damaged and deformed” the sensus divinitatis 
and twisted us to resist its deliverances.58 Some Calvin scholars suggest that Calvin saw 
no role for the sensus divinitatis in a postlapsarian knowledge of God.59 Plantinga does 
not see it this way. For Plantinga it is merely that because of sin and its noetic effects, the 
A/C model is “incomplete.”60 In order for the sensus divinitatis to yield some true belief 
about God first requires healing from this damage, which is a work of the Holy Spirit. 
Because of sin the A/C model cannot stand alone, but is dependent on components of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
analogy to our capacity for arithmetical knowledge. In the Reply to Sudduth, Plantinga calls attention to 
the resemblance the question bears to the debate between Locke and Leibniz over innate ideas; and, 
registers a preference for an interpretation of Leibniz where knowledge emerges in response to 
experience. What appears to be least appealing to Plantinga about implantation is the lack of explanation 
for the emergence of beliefs from it. This, I believe, is addressed if we understand Calvin’s Chapter 3 
sensus divinitatis to refer to a capacity to grasp the truth of some propositions about God, which requires 
cognitive development to the point of understanding the meaning of those propositions.  
57 At least on this point, Sudduth’s charge that Plantinga has revised the Reformed position on the natural 
knowledge of God fails to convince. We will encounter the reformed position again vis-à-vis natural 
theology in the following chapter. 
58 WCB, 205.  
59 These scholars suggest that the impact of the noetic effects of sin on the sensus divinitatis is total (John 
Beversluis, “Reforming the “Reformed” Objection to Natural theology,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 2 
[1995]: 193–194; and, Derek S. Jeffreys, “How Reformed is Reformed Epistemology? Alvin Plantinga 
and Calvin’s ‘Sensus Divinitatis’,” Religious Studies 33 [1997]: 428–430). 
60 WCB, 186. 
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extended A/C model to function.61 This is, however, not the most common objection to 
the success of the A/C model. The most common objection is that the A/C model fails to 
yield precisely what it must yield to serve Plantinga’s argument: properly basic belief. 
This objection comes in many varieties, all of which suggest that on the A/C model 
beliefs about God may still involve some kind of evidential support, and are therefore, by 
definition, not basic. This objection, in most cases, is meant to apply to the extended A/C 
model as well. The most common formulations are as follows. First, some worry that 
unlike those beliefs arising directly from the proposed analogues—memory, sense 
perception and a priori intuition—beliefs arising from the sensus divinitatis are indirect, 
being grounded in some kind of perceptual or doxastic experience.62 This objection does 
not suggest that an inference is involved, but points to a dependence which is allegedly 
unfitting for a basic belief.63 Plantinga, however, has made it clear that he is not arguing 
for a notion of basicality that requires properly basic beliefs to be without ground,64 it is 
rather that they are not grounded by evidence or inference from other beliefs. This 
objection, therefore, is no threat to the notion of basicality that Plantinga wishes to 
defend.  
Second, it is noted that Plantinga is open to a variant of the A/C model that involves a 
‘quick inference,’ where what is actually basic is assent to a premise in an argument the 
                                                 
61 John Beversluis argues that, for Calvin, salvation does not involve a repairing of the sensus divinitatis. 
Knowledge of God is by faith alone. 
62 Versions of this can be found in: Robert Audi, “Direct Justification, Evidential Dependence, and Theistic 
Belief,” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, eds. Robert Audi and William J. 
Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Paul Helm, review of Warranted Christian 
Belief, Mind 110, no. 440 (2001): 1113; and, Philip Quinn, “The Foundations of Theism Again: A 
Rejoinder to Plantinga,” in Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, ed. Linda 
Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 28–29. 
63 Richard Grigg advances a related objection also targeting analogies to more mundane basic beliefs, but 
suggests that these beliefs actually rest on evidentially supported beliefs in the credibility of the faculties 
delivering them. What Grigg does not seem to see is that beliefs generated by these faculties are not 
derived by inference from a belief in the credibility of the faculty. The belief in the credibility of the 
faculty enables the unobstructed flow of warrant in the same way a defeater-defeater might operate (see 
below). See Richard Grigg, “The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in 
God,” Religious Studies 26 (1990). 
64 RBG, 78–82; “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” 44–48. 
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conclusion of which is a theistic belief.65 On this variation, phenomenal experience would 
not be the occasion for theistic belief but rather the occasion for seeing the truth of a 
crucial premise in a quick argument to a theistic belief.66 This openness is not a threat to 
the success of the model because, on the one hand it is not required and is resisted by 
Plantinga,67 and on the other hand, even if it is granted that the theistic belief is itself 
technically inferred, it remains the case that the real work of the argument is done not by 
human reason but by the gift of the deliverances of the A/C model.  
Third, some hold that Plantinga gives space for natural theology to play an essential 
role in supporting some theistic belief. Although the arguments of natural theology would 
never be sufficient on their own, it is imagined that, in cases where revelation by means 
of the sensus divinitatis is somewhat muted, these arguments might provide the additional 
warrant needed to boost warrant to the level required for knowledge.68 We have reserved 
the next chapter to look at tensions between Barth and Plantinga on natural theology. It is 
sufficient here to say that, while Plantinga does indeed seem open to this possibility, the 
objection fails as natural theology is categorically excluded from the A/C model.  
Fourth, it has been argued that Plantinga’s no-defeater condition leaves belief in need 
of support from arguments thereby undermining its basicality. We will look at defeaters 
in more detail at the end of this chapter. For the purpose of understanding this objection it 
is enough to see that Plantinga grants that warrant can be disrupted if one finds oneself 
convinced by an argument that refutes or entails the refutation of the belief in question. In 
these situations warrant can only again flow unobstructed if the defeating argument is 
itself defeated to the satisfaction of the knower by a defeater-defeater. Since it is the case 
that most sophisticated adults do have defeaters, Some argue that the A/C model depends 
                                                 
65 The example Plantinga gives is the premise, “the heavens can be gloriously beautiful only if God has 
created them” (WCB, 176; see also 304). 
66 See Laura L. Garcia, “Natural Theology and the Reformed Objection,” 118–120; and, Keith Mascord, 
Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics, 130–135. 
67 “On that model, it is not that one notes the experiences, whatever exactly they are, connected with the 
operation of the sensus divinitatis, and then makes a quick inference to the existence of God” (WCB, 
330). 
68 Quinn, “The Foundations of Theism Again,” 35–45; Sudduth, “Plantinga’s Revision of the Reformed 
Tradition,” 89; and, Stephen J. Wykstra, “‘Not Done in a Corner’: How To Be a Sensible Evidentialist 
About Jesus,” Philosophical Books 42, no. 2 (2002): 106. Plantinga’s response grants this possibility 
(“Reply,” 127–128). 
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on the support of defeater-defeaters to warrant theistic belief.69 As Beilby puts it, “the 
presence of defeaters for Christian belief often causes Christians to seek to support their 
religious beliefs by developing defeater-defeaters.”70 If belief requires the support of 
arguments it is no longer strictly basic. Hoitenga asks, “If the proper basicality of theistic 
belief makes the arguments of natural theology unnecessary and inappropriate to its 
justification, why does that proper basicality not make apologetic defenses of that belief 
equally unnecessary and inappropriate to its justification?”71 The problem with this 
objection is that even in cases where a defeater-defeater is operative, the defeater-defeater 
is not supporting or supplying warrant for belief in God.72 The defeater-defeater is 
rebutting or undercutting another belief that is obstructing the flow of warrant. Far from 
being a challenge to the proper basicality of belief, the defeater-defeater allows belief to 
form in the properly basic way. Plantinga clearly allows that in some cases a defeater-
defeater is needed to safeguard epistemically responsible belief. But in these instances the 
belief in no way derives by inference from the defeater-defeater—it is not in some way 
based on an argument.73 
                                                 
69 “Religious belief that systematically requires the neutralization of defeaters largely or even completely 
loses its basicality” (Christoph Jäger, “Warrant, Defeaters, and the Epistemic Basis of Religious Belief,” 
in Scientific Explanation and Religious Belief, eds. Michael Parker and Thomas Schmidt [Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2005], 97). “The defeater-defeater requirement suggests that the rationality of theistic 
belief, even construed in an externalist manner, sometimes demands a degree of internalist reflective 
rationality whereby we acquire reasons for supposing that theistic belief has some epistemic excellence” 
(Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth, “The Internalist Character and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian 
Defeaters,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 [1999]: 182–183). 
70 Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, 197 (emphasis mine).  
71 Dewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: an Introduction to Reformed 
Epistemology (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991), 209. 
72 Though disagreeing, Beilby recognizes that for Plantinga, “theistic belief is not based (epistemically) on 
the defeater-defeater. Rather, the belief continues to be grounded by the experience which occasioned the 
belief” (Epistemology as Theology, 58). 
73 Plantinga has always been clear that negative apologetics does not provide a basis for belief. For 
instance, when employing the free-will defense to defeat Democritus’ objection to belief in God, 
Plantinga remarks, “Of course if this happens, my original belief may still be basic; I do not now accept 
it on the basis of my belief that Democritus’ argument is unsuccessful” (RGB, 84). Plantinga later 
distinguishes proper basicality with respect to justification from proper basicality with respect to warrant. 
In the case where a defeater-defeater is required for epistemically responsible belief, it is still proper 
with respect to one’s epistemic responsibilities (justification) that the belief be held without its being 
based on another belief. Likewise, and more clearly with warrant, the need for a defeater-defeater in no 
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The A/C Model: Tensions with Barth’s Theology of Revelation 
While the A/C model raises some serious questions for compatibility with Barth there 
is nothing new here that we have not flagged earlier. We have again encountered the 
apparent disagreement over natural theology, which will occupy our attention in the next 
chapter. Other questions arise primarily around Barth’s emphatic insistence that 
knowledge of God is a human possibility only by the self-revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ. In contrast, it may seem that there is nothing particularly Christian about 
Plantinga’s A/C model—that it is proposing a knowledge of God outside of the work of 
the Spirit ministering Christ. On Barth’s account there is no avenue to the knowledge of 
God that begins with generic theism or originates from an innate human capacity. As we 
will see, however, in our treatment of the extended A/C model, due to the noetic effects of 
sin,74 it is only by the gracious redemptive work of the Spirit that there is any hope for the 
gradual repair of the sensus divinitatis. Moreover, in Plantinga’s view, because of the 
damage done by sin, “These beliefs do not come to the Christian just by way of . . . the 
sensus divinitatis, or any other of the cognitive faculties with which we human beings 
were originally created; they come instead by way of the work of the Holy Spirit.”75 
Plantinga agrees that post lapsus Christian belief does not and could not originate from an 
innate human capacity. Furthermore, there is no room in Plantinga’s model at any point 
for a knowledge of God that arises from innate ideas remembered.76 
                                                                                                                                                  
way impacts the fact that belief may be properly (warrantedly) taken in the basic way. See WCB, 177–
178. 
74 Derek Jeffereys charges that Plantinga, “obscures Calvin’s insightful analysis of the noetic effect of sin,” 
and therefore “ignores Calvin’s harsh negative assessment of the sensus divinitatis.” In WCB Plantinga 
has clarified his position helpfully so that it is clear that the only adequate knowledge of God delivered 
by the postlapsarian sensus divinitatis is due to its regeneration by the Spirit as part of the gift of faith. 
“Our original knowledge of God and his glory is muffled and impaired; it has been replaced by stupidity, 
dullness, blindness, inability to perceive God or to perceive him in his handiwork” (WCB, 214–215). 
75 WCB, 245 (emphasis added). 
76 It is assumed by some in dialogue with RBG that, “Plantinga’s epistemology is innatist in the tradition of 
Augustinian Platonism” (J. Wesley Robbins, “Belief in God, Proper Basicality, and Rationality,” Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion 61, no. 2 [1993]: 339–340), and that Plantinga embraces a Platonic 
doctrine of innate ideas rather than a Thomistic or Aristotelian notion of an innate capacity (Thomas A. 
Russman, “‘Reformed’ Epistemology,” in Thomistic Papers, vol. iv, ed. Leonard A. Kennedy [Houston, 
Texas: The Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988], 195–200). Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis, however, is 
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As for the concern about building from a generic theism, we have already discussed 
Plantinga’s rejection of the general starting-point assumption and cautioned about 
misunderstanding the flow of his argument. The A/C model is not a premise in an 
argument for theistic belief. And since, due to sin, the A/C model is dependent on and 
largely replaced by the extended A/C model, it is in fact the case that defending any role 
for the sensus divinitatis is unnecessary to Plantinga’s wider argument. If Plantinga is 
right, there cannot be a warranted theistic belief that is not the work of the Spirit’s giving 
birth to faith in Jesus Christ.77 It is to this extended A/C model that we now turn. 
Plantinga’s Extended A/C Model of Christian Belief 
The Extended A/C Model: Overview 
The focus of Plantinga’s model for warranted Christian belief is a “three-tiered 
cognitive process.”78 The three elements in the process are Christian scripture, the Holy 
Spirit and faith. Christian scripture is a collection of human texts with human authors 
which God has specially chosen and inspired to use as a means for his own 
communication. This action of God unifies the human texts into a grand narrative with a 
central theme, “the gospel, the stunning good news of the way of salvation God has 
graciously offered.”79 The second and driving element of the process is the internal 
instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS). Whereas the A/C model treated a human cognitive 
faculty that is part of our “natural epistemic equipment,”80 the extended A/C model 
involves a supernatural work of the Spirit. According to the model, the context of the 
IIHS is the reading or hearing of the message of Scripture. The IIHS enables a kind of 
perception whereby a person comes to grasp the truth of that primary gospel narrative. In 
other words, the experience of the work of the IIHS is a doxastic experience 
                                                                                                                                                  
not a maieutic faculty. The knowledge of God is not something that by nature resides unborn in human 
beings. See also Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga, xii, 238–240. 
77 This is not to say that other theistic religions could not leverage some of Plantinga’s work in the creation 
of their own models for how their beliefs might have warrant (WCB, 350). But it does mean that 
according to Plantinga the model for human knowledge of God is irreducibly Christian. We will return to 
this in greater detail in chapter 6. 
78 WCB, 243–244 
79 WCB, 243. 
80 WCB, 256. 
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recommending to us belief in the truth of the “main lines of the Christian gospel.’81 The 
IIHS makes the truth evident, not on the basis of propositional evidence, but with the 
immediacy that characterizes self-evident truths or the deliverances of our memory.82 The 
evidentiality of the truth made known does not have the kind of phenomenology attending 
sense experience, but is nevertheless rightly considered a real perceiving. The belief to 
which the IIHS gives birth is the third element of the process, faith. We have already 
mentioned that Plantinga appeals to Calvin’s definition of faith, recognizing its essential 
cognitive content. The gift of faith is a gift of knowledge—that is, a gift of warranted true 
belief. Plantinga also treats faith’s vital affective component as well, and even notes the 
affective parallels to warrant.83 And, because faith is the end product of this special Spirit-
driven three-tiered cognitive process, Plantinga typically refers to the whole process as 
the cognitive process of faith.  
As a cognitive process, in most respects, the cognitive process of faith is like our other 
natural cognitive faculties; it is a cognitive endowment designed by God to yield true 
belief, subject to similar functional and environmental conditions. If one is fully proper 
functional with respect to external rationality, then the doxastic experience delivered by 
the IIHS will be a strong and clear perceiving endorsement of the truth of the gospel. If 
one is fully internally rational and operating in an appropriate environment, then the full 
degree of warrant being transferred by the testimony of the Holy Spirit will be reflected in 
the strength of the belief produced, and overall coherence with one’s wider set of beliefs 
will be pursued.84 What is unique about the cognitive process of faith is that the beliefs it 
produces are the direct result of a donum supernaturalis; but, this is no slight difference. 
For while the supernatural character of the input to this process does not change the 
humanness of the knowing produced nor alter the essential criteria for warranted belief, 
the fact that the cognitive process of faith involves a direct encounter with God the Spirit 
                                                 
81 WCB, 248. 
82 WCB, 262, 265. 
83 See WCB, 309–311. This renders curious the denouncement of Harriet Harris that, “Plantinga confines 
his attention to faith as a cognitive activity and does not expand his notion of cognitive activity in a way 
that recognizes the constitutive roles of affections or the intelligence of emotions” (Harriet A. Harris, 
“Does Analytical Philosophy Clip our Wings? Reformed Theology as a Test Case,” in Faith and 
Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion [Aldershot, 
Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005], 115). 
84 Plantinga details how the cognitive process of faith meets the four essential criteria in his warrant 
formula, in other words, the four essential criteria for knowledge. See WCB, 246, 256–257. 
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means that this cognitive process entails the very remedies needed to ensure warranted 
believing. The part of Plantinga’s Christian model that we have already treated in some 
detail is its recognition of devastating noetic effects of sin. Wrapped up with the gift of 
faith is a transformational work of the Spirit whereby, “the ravages of sin (including the 
cognitive damage) are repaired, gradually or suddenly, to a greater or lesser extent.”85 
Here the question of proper function cuts both ways. The cognitive impact of sin has a 
distorting and attenuating effect on the doxastic experiences of faith, while at the same 
time the very presence of the Spirit drawing us to Christ begins to rehabilitate and restore 
proper function.86 Consequently, until a human knower is completely renewed there will 
be varying interference in the deliverances of faith which will reduce warrant and weaken 
belief.87 In keeping with Plantinga’s general account of warrant we find that the 
deliverances of faith are also open to the possibility of defeat; and, good doxastic practice 
will require, for some, investigating arguments against belief as part of remaining 
internally rational.  
Many of the same questions raised for Plantinga’s A/C model may also be raised for 
his extended model. Is it successful as an account of Christian belief taken in the basic 
way which fulfills Plantinga’s general account of warrant? What issues does the extended 
model raise for the question of Plantinga’s congruity with Barth? In some cases of 
parallel concern nothing new needs to be said than has already been said; but, in other 
cases new issues are raised that require clarification. We will confine ourselves to what 
seem to be the three issues of greatest concern and treat them in conversation with Barth. 
                                                 
85 WCB, 244. 
86 Why the restoring work of the Spirit is evidenced in some and resisted in others is not a question 
Plantinga seeks to resolve with his model. 
87 Surprisingly, Plantinga has been criticized for giving an ‘ideal’ account of faith, and, in so doing, failing 
to “describe the actual epistemic situation of typical believers” (Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, 139). 
But, Plantinga is fully aware that typical cases of faith remain troubled by doubt to some degree (WCB, 
260 n35, 264 n43). Does this undermine the model as an account of how typical Christian belief can 
have warrant? The fact is that for many Christian’s faith fluctuates and with it so does the degree of 
warrant for Christian belief, exactly as Plantinga’s model describes. We will meet this objection again in 
our discussion of whether defeater-defeaters or natural theology might preserve or boost warrant. For 
similar complaints see Keith A. Mascord, Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics (Milton Keynes: 
Paternoster, 2006), 199; and, Andrew Chignell, “Epistemology for Saints,” Books & Culture 8, no. 2 
(2002). 
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The Extended A/C Model: Authentic Human Christian Belief 
At one point in Plantinga’s explanation the cognitive process of faith he describes the 
Holy Spirit as one “who gets us to accept, causes us to believe, the great truths of the 
gospel.”88 Facilitating acceptance and causing belief, however, seem to be two rather 
different notions; and, possibly Plantinga is offering them as just this, two alternative 
conceptions both of which are compatible with the model. Though some have raised the 
concern that Plantinga’s model may be endangered by this tension. Paul Helm suggests 
that if there is a role for human acceptance or rejection of the gift of faith, that such a 
“metaphysically independent act of the will” would “threaten the proper basicality of 
faith.”89 Morland and Craig worry that if beliefs are formed in the believer by someone 
other than the believer, that this may not be a case of authentic human believing.90 If we 
combine Helm’s concern with Moreland and Craig’s the question becomes: is Plantinga’s 
model an account of authentic human Christian belief, and if so, does this compromise its 
warrant basicality? A brief consideration of Barth’s perspective on authentic human 
knowing will be helpful here both to advance our primary objective and to focus the issue 
with respect to Plantinga. 
Barth is more emphatic than Plantinga that the agent who is entirely responsible for the 
possibility of human knowledge of God is God alone. “The Word of God becomes 
knowable by making itself known.”91 Both Plantinga and Barth see that revelation and 
redemption are inextricably linked, part of a unified movement of grace by the Spirit 
ministering Christ in the miracle of faith. Neither redemption nor revelation, therefore, is 
a human work, though it enlivens and enables human response.92 Should we then 
conclude that Moreland and Craig have a legitimate complaint? If God is the active agent 
                                                 
88 WCB, 245. 
89 Helm, review of Warranted Christian Belief, 1112. 
90 “Certainly, the belief is formed in me, but I am not the one who formed it, and, therefore, I have not truly 
believed” (Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 169). Morvan 
and Radcliffe express a similar concern that distinct human personhood is violated if “the Holy Spirit 
performs this activity as part of the person’s cognitive system and so as a part of the person herself” 
(Pierre Le Morvan and Dana Radcliffe, “Notes on Warranted Christian Belief,” Heythrop Journal 44, no. 
3 [2003]: 348). 
91 CD I/1, 246 (KD I/1, 260, “Das Wort Gottes wird erkennbar, indem es sich erkennbar macht”). 
92 Appealing to Calvin, Plantinga notes the importance in coming to faith of the “renewal and redirection of 
affections,” for which the Holy Spirit is responsible (WCB, 292). 
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in the generation of knowledge and belief, is this an obstruction to real human knowing 
and believing? Barth does not think so. He denies that God’s activity implies any human 
passivity. “If God is seriously involved in experience of the Word of God, then man is 
just as seriously involved too. The very man who stands in real knowledge of the Word of 
God also knows himself as existing in the act of his life, as existing in his self-
determination.”93 The concern at the bottom of this debate seems to be that of human 
freedom in Christian belief. While Barth utterly denies the efficacy of human work in 
revelation, he clearly does not deny human activity, life and freedom. Human freedom, 
however, is improperly conceived when understood as human autonomy or choice made 
independently from God. In Barth’s view, we are designed for dependence on God, so 
that the fullest and freest expression of being human is a living and choosing in 
fellowship with the will and act of God. He writes: 
Where God is truly served . . . the willing and doing of God is not just 
present as a first or second co-operating factor; it is present as the first and 
decisive thing as befits God the Creator and Lord. Without depriving the 
human element of its freedom, its earthly substance, its humanity, without 
obliterating the human subject, or making its activity a purely mechanical 
event…94 
Barth acknowledges that there will and must be a human response, but that the power and 
enabling for this response is also the Spirit’s gift. Plantinga’s extended A/C model 
corresponds in most ways to Barth’s theology of revelation. Clearly the power to 
overcome the stifling noetic effects of sin is the work of God in Christ. The knowledge of 
God is enabled by a spirit-driven process whereby we are given faith. But Plantinga does 
seem to remain open, in a way that Barth is not, to the possibility of an independent 
human response serving as a kind of necessary human contribution to the process.95 There 
                                                 
93 CD I/1, 200 (KD I/1, 209, “So gewiß es sich in der Erfahrung vom Worte Gottes ernstlich um Gott 
handelt, so gewiß handelt es sich darin auch ernstlich um den Menschen. Gerade der in der wirklichen 
Erkenntnis des Wortes Gottes stehende Mensch erkennt aber sich selbst durchaus als existierend in der 
Tat seines Lebens, als existierend in seiner Seblstbestimmung”). 
94 CD I/1, 94 (KD I/1, 96–97). 
95 See WCB, 212, where Plantinga agonizes over the problem of evil and the fall, attempting to come to 
grips with the fact of sin’s origination. See also WCB, 257, where Plantinga is clear that his model “need 
take no stand” on the questions of sovereignty and human freedom; though, he is expressly open to the 
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is agreement, nevertheless, that the primary agency and enabling of the Spirit does not 
conflict with the full, active and free human engagement.96 
A related concern could and has been raised with respect to the freedom of the Spirit in 
the cognitive process of faith.97 Plantinga is happy to describe the work of the Spirit as an 
“extraordinary cognitive process or belief-producing mechanism.”98 This manner of 
speaking might give the impression that the Spirit himself is conceived to operate 
impersonally, mechanistically and with predictable necessity. Nothing could of course be 
further from Barth’s conception, where the hallmark of revelation is the freedom of God 
in his self-revelation.99 Knowing is left open to the freedom of the object of knowing.100 
Plantinga fully agrees. “Faith doesn’t go just by natural laws or regularities, working 
instead by way of the free cooperation of a person—God himself—whose speaking in 
Scripture is, of course, free....”101 The IIHS like the great things of the gospel is 
understood by Plantinga to be “a result of God’s free and gracious action.”102 The choice 
of the language of process or mechanism is strictly with a view to the way in which a 
freely Spirit-driven enabling of belief might addresses the conditions for warrant. The 
parallel Plantinga wishes to highlight between the cognitive process of faith and our other 
cognitive faculties is with the mechanics of warrant, not a ‘mechanism’ of origin. With 
respect to origin, Plantinga is clear that the work of the Spirit is “extraordinary.” 
For both Plantinga and Barth, therefore, Christian belief is free and authentic human 
knowing made possible by the free decision of God. What then of Helm’s concern, that 
                                                                                                                                                  
possibility that, “There is a contribution to this process that I myself must make, a contribution that I can 
withhold.” 
96 The implication of this conclusion is that Laura Garcia, Linda Zagzebski and Keith Mascord are 
incorrect in charging Plantinga with extreme nonvoluntarism regarding belief formation (Garcia, 
“Natural Theology and the Reformed Objection,” 121–122; Zagzebski, “Religious Knowledge and the 
Virtues of the Mind,” 202; and, Mascord, Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics, 181–182, 198). 
Mascord concludes that, for Plantinga, unbelievers “are not the beneficiaries of the internal instigation of 
the Holy Spirit” (182)—a claim that Plantinga never makes. 
97 Morvan and Radcliffe, “Notes on Warranted Christian Belief,” 347–348. 
98 WCB, 256. 
99 CD I/1, 206 (KD I/I, 215). Barth declares, “Revelation is simply the freedom of God’s grace” (CD I/1, 
117; KD I/1, 120). 
100 CD I/1, 190 (KD I/I, 197–198). 
101 WCB, 258. 
102 WCB, 261. 
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the integration of the cognitive process of faith with human noetic equipment, occasioned 
as it is by a reading or hearing of the human testimony of Scripture, serves to threaten the 
suggestion that Christian belief is being held in the basic way? For Helm, it seems that a 
thoroughgoing monergism of the Spirit which ruled out human participation might 
safeguard proper basicality. But this objection possesses the same defect encountered in 
the objections to proper basicality in Plantinga’s A/C model. It is sufficient for basicality 
that what grounds one’s belief is not inference from other beliefs. It is sufficient for the 
properness of basicality if the beliefs so held have sufficient warrant. It is not required for 
basicality that a belief originate ex nihilo and without any connection to the rest of human 
thinking, willing and believing. As for warrant, it seems to me that Plantinga’s model 
clearly conforms to the conditions for warrant he earlier develops. 
The Extended A/C Model: Individualism and the Community of Believers 
Another common objection to Plantinga’s extended A/C model is that it is “radically 
individualist”103 and fails to appreciate the nurturing role of believing communities.104 If 
the driving component of Plantinga’s model is the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, 
acting upon the individual, is it fair to suggest that the role of the church in shaping 
Christian belief has been neglected? For Barth, a strictly individualist knowledge of God 
would be inconceivable.105 The subject of the knowledge of God is never people in 
general or the isolated individual but always the “man in the Church.”106 But, it is 
important to note that this being in the church does not, for Barth, become a ground or 
basis for our knowledge of God, anymore than association with the Christian community 
provides warrant in Plantinga’s scheme. Barth maintains that the church is not an 
independent entity any more than the individual. The church to whom the knowledge of 
                                                 
103 Terrence W. Tilley, “Warranted Christian Belief,” review of Warranted Christian Belief, Theological 
Studies 62 (2001): 389. 
104 Harris, “Does Analytical Philosophy Clip our Wings?,” 100–118. These critiques are indicative of a 
wider trend which largely dismisses the value of the analytic approach as “(white western) masculinist: 
individualist, cut off from the body, from emotion, from humour, from collaboration, and from creative 
imagination” (Grace M. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion 
[Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998], 69). 
105 The revelation of God is given to the church, such that “there is no possibility of dogmatics at all outside 
the Church” (CD I/1, 17; KD I/1, 16, “Dogmatik außerhalb der Kirche ist keine Möglichkeit”). 
106 CD I/1, 189, emphasis added (KD I/1, 197, “den Menschen in der Kirche”). 
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God is given is always the church of Jesus Christ.107 Revelation in Christ given to the 
church by the Spirit is the only possible basis for knowledge of God. 
Where does this leave Plantinga’s model? Do the charges of individualism and 
ecclesial neglect stick? The short answer is, no; but, to see why we need to disentangle 
two assertions easily confused in the critique. The first assertion is about proper function 
for fundamentally relational beings, where the nurturing koinonia of the community of 
faith is seen to be decisive for Christian belief formation. The second assertion is drawn 
from reflection on the social construction of belief, and asseverates that the community of 
faith itself provides at least part of the warrant for Christian belief. I contend that Barth 
and Plantinga each affirm the first and deny the second. 
Starting with the second assertion, we should recognize that, despite his detractors, 
Plantinga does acknowledge the importance of Christian community as the context within 
which properly basic belief develops.108 “It is the church or community that proclaims the 
gospel, guides the neophyte into it, and supports, instructs, encourages, and edifies 
believers of all sorts and conditions.”109 But this does not mean that the community 
somehow anchors the warrant for their own belief. If it did there might be some truth to 
the unexpected conclusion of Harriet Harris that “Plantinga tends toward the view, though 
he does not state it, that the degree to which a belief is warranted depends on how many 
people hold it.”110 We can also easily rule out the suggestion that Plantinga’s defense of 
the privileged epistemic status of the beliefs of the Christian community is in the 
neighborhood of “epistemological behaviorism.”111 What warrants these beliefs is not 
their being believed, but the truth of what they confess regarding the redemptive and 
revelatory purposes of God. Denying that the church is the primary source of warrant for 
Christian belief, does not imply a denial of a vital role for the church in the formation of 
Christian belief. 
                                                 
107 CD I/1, 257 (KD I/1, 197, “Ist ihr als der Kirche Jesu Christi das Wort Gottes nicht übergeben”). 
108 RBG, 33–34; WCB, 202. Beilby seems to overstate Plantinga’s silence on the role of the Christian 
community, though draws the right conclusion that Plantinga’s model does not undercut such a role 
(Epistemology as Theology, 184–185; and, “Plantinga’s Model of Warranted Christian Belief,” in Alvin 
Plantinga, ed. Deane-Peter Baker [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 140–141). 
109 WCB, 244 n8. 
110 “Does Analytical Philosophy Clip our Wings?,” 112.  
111 J. Wesley Robbins, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
14, no. 4 (1983): 246. 
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Another way of approaching this question is to ask whether openness to a role for the 
church in shaping Christian belief threatens the propriety of accepting Christian belief in 
the basic way. Some critics who want to see from Plantinga more acknowledgement of 
the social constructedness of knowledge assume that this would inevitably undermine 
basicality. Terrence Tilley declares that if an account of belief formation were to include 
the “social practices which trigger those beliefs . . . then our basic beliefs will be shown to 
be based on others’ beliefs and the practices we share with them.”112 This is, however, 
either a non-sequitur or fundamentally confused about the nature of basicality with 
respect to belief. A belief that is based on the received testimony of another person, may 
not be based on some other belief in ones belief structure. For this reason Plantinga 
counts credulity as one of our distinct rational powers “whereby we learn from others.”113 
It is not as though belief in testimony must pass through an intermediating inference from 
the belief that the witness is trustworthy. One may in fact hold a belief in the general 
trustworthiness of a witness without that belief serving as a basis for accepting the truth 
of the testimony conveyed. It is perhaps better to think of beliefs generated by the 
acceptance of testimony as conditional on the lack of a defeater for the truthfulness of the 
testimony. Credulity implies a default position of trust that requires no further inferential 
propping up.114 Therefore, even if it were true that on Plantinga’s model warrant for 
Christian belief is transferred from human testimony, this would not threaten the 
basicality of that belief. The fact is, however, that Plantinga’s model does not posit 
human testimony as the source of warrant for Christian belief. Instead, human testimony 
becomes an essential occasioning condition in the process whereby we are given a view 
                                                 
112 Terrence W Tilley, “Reformed Epistemology and Religious Fundamentalism: How Basic are our Basic 
Beliefs,” Modern Theology 6, no. 3 (1990): 254. Similarly, Frank Schubert argues that to the extent that 
belief depends on ancestral testimony it is “belief which is not properly basic” (Frank Schubert, “Is 
Ancestral Testimony Foundational Evidence for God’s Existence?,” Religious Studies 27 [1991], 499–
500). 
113 WCB, 147. Because of Swinburne’s acceptance of a “Principle of Credulity,” Plantinga does not consider 
him an evidentialist (WCB, 91 n43). 
114 What further confuses the notion of basicality when considering beliefs based on testimony is that while 
the beliefs may be properly accepted in the basic way, there is an additional dependency in the transfer of 
warrant such that “belief on the part of the testifiee has warrant only if that belief has warrant for the 
testifier” (WPF, 86). 
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of the truth115 by the power of the Holy Spirit.116 The importance of Scripture and the 
church are not diminished, but they do not function as the ultimate warranting basis for 
Christian belief. 
The significance of the community of believers to the formation of Christian belief is, 
of course, not exhausted by its service in the process of relaying the message of the 
gospel. It also serves as the arena of personal relationship within which believers 
encounter and live out the transforming truth of that gospel. If this is true, then the church 
is used by God in the restoration of proper function and in the creation of suitable 
environments for growth in faith. Admittedly, Plantinga does not spend a great deal of 
time on the role of the community of faith in the facilitation and restoration of proper 
function. But, with reference to our earlier caution, it is important to understand what 
Plantinga is and is not intending to achieve in his volumes on Christian epistemology. He 
is not attempting a comprehensive account of all aspects involved in a thick description of 
Christian belief formation. He is sketching an intentionally minimalist structure to give 
account of the principle way in which Christian belief receives warrant. In this account 
Plantinga mentions the importance of the gradual repairing of proper function and the 
criticality of suitable environment without becoming entrenched in the details. In 
agreement with Barth, Plantinga affirms that the principle means of restoration and 
revelation is the work of Spirit applying the redemption of Christ. This does not nullify 
the fact that one chief way in which the Spirit works is in and through communities of 
faith, as Plantinga himself notes: “Presented in this brief and undeveloped way, this 
model can seem unduly individualistic. But of course it doesn’t at all preclude the 
importance of the Christian community and the church to the belief of the individual 
Christian.”117 Leaving this aspect of Christian belief formation undeveloped does not, 
mean that there is something deficient in Plantinga’s account of warrant. There is no 
                                                 
115 Plantinga frequently refers to the work of the IIHS as enabling the human knower to have some kind of 
direct apprehension of the truth (e.g. WCB, 83, 256, 281, 302, 340). It is a great distortion, however, to 
thereby conclude as Christopher Insole does that this being afforded a view for oneself implies a 
“rational self-sufficiency” (Christopher J. Insole, “Political Liberalism, Analytical Philosophy of 
Religion and the Forgetting of History,” in Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical 
Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion [Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005], 160). 
116 In Plantinga’s model Christian belief is based on an extraordinary kind of testimony, the testimony of the 
Holy Spirit, which uniquely includes our being enabled to grasp the truth of the testimony. See WCB, 
252. 
117 WCB, 244 n8. 
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deficiency because, on Plantinga’s model, warrant does not originate from the Christian 
community wherein it arises. This also answers Beilby’s concern that “if most of the 
interesting and efficacious work is being done by the sensus divinitatis and the internal 
testimony of the Holy Spirit, what of importance is left for the Christian community to 
do?”118 Although the Christian community does not itself ground the connection between 
belief formation and the truth of what is being believed, it may still be critical to suitable 
cognitive environment and proper function. Rather than lament Plantinga’s lack of detail 
here we should appreciate the openness of his theologically oriented structure for 
developing fuller accounts of the formation of warranted Christian belief.119 
Constructively these critiques are helpful in pointing out the connectedness of cognitive 
environment and proper function. Part of the restoration of proper function, facilitating 
the fluid transfer of warrant, driven by the self-revelation of God, is the Spirit’s work to 
engender conducive ecclesial cognitive environments. 
The Extended A/C Model: Can Human Arguments Defeat Christian Belief?  
Theological knowledge of the kind most central to Christian belief is not established 
by philosophical argument on Plantinga’s account. But this leaves open the possibility of 
a negative role for philosophical arguments. Does Plantinga grant to philosophy the 
power to undercut or diminish the warrant for Christian belief? Does a human argument 
have the power to torpedo the work of the IIHS in the cognitive process of faith? In our 
earlier discussion of defeaters we clarified that an argument that refutes and argument 
against belief (a defeater-defeater) does not supply warrant for a belief, but removes 
obstructions to warrant. For this reason defeater-defeaters, while sometimes crucial to 
warrant transfer, do not alter the proper basicality of a belief. The question we are raising 
now is not about the role of defeater-defeaters, but the nature of the possibility of 
defeaters in the extended A/C model. Though human arguments are not needed for belief 
to have warrant according to the model, is it possible that human arguments could inhibit 
specifically the warrant for Christian belief instigated by the Holy Spirit? And, if so, how 
                                                 
118 Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, 185. 
119 Areas for expansion might include, detailing what inter-personal structures are essential to a favorable 
cognitive environment, and unpacking the significance for proper function of properly functioning 
communities of faith. 
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does this not clearly constitute what Barth would deem a gross violation on the part of 
philosophy? 
The issues surrounding this question are easily confused, as we saw in our earlier 
discussion of defeater-defeaters; therefore, it will serve us well to briefly highlight the 
salient features of Plantinga’s understanding of the nature of defeaters. A defeater is a 
belief that is rationally in tension with another belief which it either fully or partially 
defeats, thus requiring the suspension or attenuation of the defeated belief.120 But this 
definition really only applies to the most commonly discussed kind of defeater, what 
Plantinga calls a rationality defeater. Rationality defeasibility understood to result from 
beliefs in conflict is a concern of the proper function of internal rationality. Earlier we 
saw that internal rationality has to do with forming the right beliefs on the basis of 
experience. But, for Plantinga, this also requires conducting some epistemic due 
diligence, such as ensuring the sufficient coherence of one’s beliefs, looking for defeaters 
and considering objections.121 We may recall, however, that in Plantinga’s system internal 
rationality is only one aspect of the delivery of warrant. It is possible to have what 
Plantinga calls a warrant defeater which is not a belief in conflict with another belief, but 
is instead a failure of some kind in the noetic processes upon which we depend.122 Given 
the facets of warrant elucidated by Plantinga, this could be a failure in the truth 
orientation of our design plan, the appropriateness of our environment with respect to that 
plan, or cognitive function—perhaps in the area of external rationality.  
With respect to the defeasibility of Christian belief, therefore, we can see at least two 
closely related concerns. The first is whether Christian belief might be undermined by 
antagonistic philosophical arguments; the second is whether warrant might be impeded by 
a wider range of epistemic problems. Our primary concern here is with the first of these—
rationality defeaters from philosophical arguments. Warrant defeaters due to epistemic 
                                                 
120 Plantinga follows the penetrative work of John Pollock on defeaters, including his original distinction 
between Type I (rebutting) and Type II (undercutting) defeaters. See John L. Pollock, “The Structure of 
Epistemic Justification,” American Philosophical Quarterly monograph series 4 (1970); and, John L. 
Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Studies in Epistemology and 
Cognitive Theory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 195–202. Plantinga calls 
defeasibility a “crucial but puzzling notion” (WCD, 216). His most involved treatments can be found in 
WCD, 216–221; WCB, 357–367 and “Naturalism Defeated” (unpublished, 1994; available at 
http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/alspaper.htm). 
121 WCB, 112, 255. 
122 WCB, 359–360. 
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problems caused by the noetic effects of sin are fully expected by both Barth and 
Plantinga. The work of the Spirit, repairing the damage of sin, may be done, “gradually or 
suddenly, to a greater or lesser extent.”123 Plantinga speaks of paradigmatic instances of 
faith,124 but full and complete repair of our cognitive faculties and environments is an 
eschatological reality. This suggests a provisional answer to the question of the 
defeasibility of Christian belief in general: the extent to which warrant defeat of the 
deliverances of faith is possible is directly related to the extent that the noetic effects of 
sin distort proper function and render our environments misleading. But does this 
adequately address the specific question of rationality defeat? Maybe so, if all instances 
of the rationality defeat of Christian belief arise from an error stemming from cognitive 
malfunction or a misleading cognitive environment.125 
There is good reason to think that in Plantinga’s view this provisional answer does 
extend to all instances of the defeat of Christian belief including the possibility of the 
defeat of Christian belief by philosophical argument. If this is true, then the possibility of 
the defeat of Christian belief by philosophical argument is not explained by the inherent 
power of human argument, but arises only as a consequence of the impact of human sin. 
The power of reason to undermine faith is a reality created by an underlying epistemic 
distortion which disrupts the service of reason in the formation of true beliefs. This 
understanding of the nature of the rationality defeasibility of Christian belief is the 
inevitable consequence of Plantinga’s other commitments. The nature of defeasibility in 
general obviously depends on a commitment to the principle of non-contradiction. If 
Christian belief is true then any belief which either contradicts or entails a contradiction 
with it must be false; and, no false belief can have warrant. On Plantinga’s general 
scheme, false beliefs can be traced back to problems in the truth orientation of the design 
plan, unsuitable environments and/or improper cognitive function upstream or 
downstream from experience. But if Christian belief is true, there is no problem with the 
truth orientation of the design plan with respect to Christian belief.126 We can conclude, 
                                                 
123 WCB, 244. 
124 WCB, 256, 260, 264. 
125 In this argument I am assuming that anything in our environments which would mislead us with respect 
to the proper deliverances of faith can be understood to be an environmental consequence of sin. 
126 It may be that aspects of the design plan are aimed at things other than true belief or things in addition to 
true belief, but clearly for Plantinga the part of the design plan that governs the formation of Christian 
belief is aimed at true belief. See WPF, 195, as well as WCB, 257.  
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therefore, that all instances of the rationality defeat of Christian belief arise from an error 
stemming from cognitive malfunction or a misleading cognitive environment. In other 
words, any philosophical argument which contradicts Christian belief arises from some 
underlying epistemic problem, is therefore unwarranted and consequently cannot count as 
knowledge. 
Should we conclude, therefore, that according to Plantinga any belief that contradicts 
Christian belief is irrational and unjustified? Not at all. Plantinga’s position is fully 
consistent with the reasonability of philosophical arguments against Christian belief and 
with the justification of accepting their conclusions. This is in fact one of the great 
strengths of the sophistication and nuance of Plantinga’s epistemology. Warrant involves 
a number of considerations wholly external to the human faculty of reason, and the 
fulfillment of epistemic duties. Arguments against Christian belief may be reasonable and 
one may be justified in believing their conclusions—even though the resulting beliefs fail 
to have warrant. Arguments against Christian belief may be valid, while relying on dodgy 
premises. Assessment of probability may be accurate, but background knowledge 
skewed. Plantinga’s system does not suggest that the work of the Spirit makes Christian 
believers smarter than unbelievers in terms of their felicity with logic, their ability to 
avoid incoherence within their network of beliefs, or their capacity to deduce entailment. 
The principal cognitive work of the Spirit, on Plantinga’s model, is to give a perception of 
the truth of Christian belief. This involves an initiation of the repair of the noetic effects 
of sin, but does not necessarily transform believers into brilliant philosophers. Just as 
unbelieving philosophers with high functioning faculties of reason can be justified in 
believing Christianity false without knowing that their beliefs lack warrant, so also the 
warranted beliefs of simple-minded Christian believers are rational and justified without 
any complex reasoning process required to support them.127 
But can the simple-minded Christian really be justified in their belief without defeater-
defeaters for known objections to Christian belief? Is it rational to accept Christian belief 
in the face of known objections for which one has no refutation whatsoever? The answer 
to this depends on what might count as refutation. Plantinga advises that we not narrow 
our notion of refutation to merely that which takes the form of a philosophical counter 
                                                 
127 By ‘reasoning process’ I mean just that work done by the faculty of reason to determine the “deductive 
and probabilistic relations among propositions” (WCB, 78). The wider cognitive process supporting 
belief is the robust cognitive process of faith by the IIHS.  
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argument. Resolution of belief conflict may be conducted purely on the basis of the 
relative strength of warrant of the beliefs themselves. In Plantinga’s parlance, a belief 
which is in a stronger position with respect to warrant may serve as an intrinsic defeater-
defeater for a conflicting belief.128 One may find oneself unconvinced by an argument or 
evidence not on the basis of any deficiency seen in it, but simply because the conclusion 
conflicts with a belief that has a firmer footing.129 Plantinga’s contention here is similar to 
G. E. Moore’s response to Hume on skepticism about the existence of material objects.130 
The move Moore makes has become known as Moore’s shift. Rather than taking on the 
validity of the argument or the truth of the premises, one may simply have a more firmly 
held belief that the conclusion is not true. In this case then the refutation of the objection 
is just to restate the objection as a reductio ad absurdum.131 If it is true that—if the 
argument is valid and the premises are true then the conclusion must follow—then, if we 
are in a stronger position to see that the conclusion is not true, we are safe to conclude 
that the argument has a problem, without needing to identify that problem precisely. For 
Moore on perception, it is perfectly rational to maintain that the direct perceptual 
experience of a material object provides the best refutation of Hume’s potential defeater. 
For Plantinga, the deliverances of faith, if strong enough, may provide the best refutation 
for any particular objection to belief.132 
                                                 
128 “The Foundations of Theism: A Reply,” Faith and Philosophy 3, no. 3 (1986): 311–312. Philip Quinn, to 
whom Plantinga is replying, accepts the possibility of intrinsic defeater-defeaters, but doubts that typical 
believers have enough warrant for their theistic beliefs to operate as intrinsic defeater-defeaters for all the 
potential defeaters typically encountered. See Quinn, “The Foundations of Theism Again,” 39. Similarly, 
see Sudduth, “The Internalist Character and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian Defeaters,” 181–
182. 
129 Plantinga’s classic example pits a person’s memory beliefs against circumstantial evidence. See “The 
Foundations of Theism: A Reply,” 310; or, WCB, 371. Following Chisholm, Plantinga calls this 
approach ‘particularism’ (RBG, 77–78). See Roderick M. Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973), 15. 
130 From a lecture delivered in 1911 at Morley College in London, “Hume’s Theory Examined,” in Some 
Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1953), 108–126. 
131 Or as Plantinga suggests, if your belief in God is firmer than your belief in the premises of an argument 
against that belief, “you would go modus tollens and take it that you had an argument against the 
premises” (from an unpublished letter to Kelly J. Clark, printed in his “Plantinga vs. Oliphint: And the 
Winner Is...” Calvin Theological Journal 33 [1998]: 164n). 
132 This includes the objection that Plantinga must provide an independent reason for believing that there is 
such a thing as the IIHS. The deliverances of the cognitive process of faith themselves provide the 
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According to the extended A/C model there is no inherent tension between faith and 
reason. Where tensions do arise this may suggest no deficiency of reasoning, but rather a 
lingering hindrance in environment or proper function. By distinguishing warrant from 
rationality and justification Plantinga is able to show that one may be both rational and 
justified in accepting the deliverances of faith over the conclusions of philosophical 
argument. The fact that philosophical arguments may swamp weak or fluctuating faith, is 
not because reason is conceived to be a rival or independent source of knowledge, but 
because its exercise in the pursuit of truth is dependent upon broader epistemic conditions 
darkened by sin. It should be clear, therefore, that for Plantinga Christian belief does not 
require the tools of reason for it to be rational and it need not enter the fray of 
philosophical exchange for it to be justified. 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that there is a striking compatibility between Plantinga’s 
approach to Christian epistemology and Barth’s theology of revelation. In chapter 3 we 
looked at Plantinga’s understanding of Christian philosophy and its relationship to 
theology, along with his general account of epistemic warrant. There we found that 
Plantinga not only affirms Barth’s rejection of various potential philosophical 
encroachments on theological knowing but also offers further philosophical argument 
against them. The same set of assumed obligations and human epistemic responsibilities 
that Barth decried as noetic works righteousness, Plantinga also rebuffs as neither 
necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. What is critical for knowledge, that is, warranted 
true belief, is functioning according to the right kind of truth oriented design in a suitable 
environment. This, along with Plantinga’s externalism and inductive procedure, yield an 
epistemology of Christian belief that derives ultimately “from outside all human 
                                                                                                                                                  
grounds for concluding that Plantinga’s model or something like it is correct. Evan Fales fails to grasp 
this when he suggests that “the morally checkered history of Christendom, and the conflicting moral 
testimony of Scripture” count as prima facie defeaters for Plantinga’s model in the absence of some kind 
of independent validation of the IIHS (Evan Fales, review of Warranted Christian Belief, by Alvin 
Plantinga, Noûs 37, no. 2 [2003]: 363–364). For Plantinga, the work of the Spirit produces an intrinsic 
defeater-defeater. 
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possibilities.”133 In this chapter we examined Plantinga’s models for theistic and 
specifically Christian belief, taking special note of key objections and potential tensions 
with Barth’s theology of revelation. It should be evident that Plantinga agrees with Barth 
that what is beyond human possibilities is possible with God. Plantinga sees the 
knowledge of God to be divinely initiated—“from the acting of God Himself.” The gift of 
faith in its paradigmatic forms is the gift of knowing that we know by the special 
instigation of the Holy Spirit. Demonstration of the truth of what is known is neither 
required for knowledge, nor is it even within the competency of philosophy to offer.134 
Despite all the philosophical weaponry Plantinga mobilizes, Herrmann’s expression of a 
knowledge of God “wholly without weapons” still applies in the sense that Barth so 
enthusiastically endorsed. What anchors the warrant for and therefore strength of our 
belief is not the strength of arguments in its favor, but the very content of the truth that is 
believed. Moreover, the priority in origination and formation of Christian belief resides 
with the free action of God, without at any point undermining or overriding its 
thoroughgoing humanness. These are strong alignments between Barth and Plantinga on 
the knowledge of God. 
We also flagged some potentially critical areas of tension between Barth and Plantinga 
on the knowledge of God. These areas are significant enough to require devoted attention 
if we are to answer our primary question on the nature and extent of the compatibility and 
complementarity of their work. What we have seen thus far is that two giants, one in 
Christian theology and the other in Christian philosophy, sharing crucial core 
commitments but taking seemingly antagonistic approach vectors, enjoy an enormous 
amount of agreement about the nature of and means to human knowledge of God. 
Complementarity is found in the unique questions each seeks to answer and the different 
discussions to which each contributes. To press the boundaries of this compatibility we 
                                                 
133 Quoted earlier, Barth maintains that the knowledge of God “derives and is to be considered only from 
outside all human possibilities, i.e., from the acting of God Himself” (CD I/1, 38; KD I/1, 38).  
134 The from above approach means that we are in a position of dependence where our only option is to 
trust. Plantinga points out that this is true of all kinds of human knowing. In his response to Steup’s 
distinction between the use and function of cognitive faculties, Plantinga notes: “at a certain basic level I 
must simply trust my cognitive faculties; I have no alternative. At that basic level, the issue of using 
them well or ill doesn’t arise: how they function and whether they function reliably (a) isn’t up to me, 
and (b) is such that I can’t determine it without assuming it” (“Reliabilism, Analyses and Defeaters,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, no. 2 [1995]: 444).  
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will now enter an exploration of the dissonances that have presented themselves in our 
analysis up to this point. In chapter 5 we will look at Barth’s notorious and unrelenting 
ban on both apologetics and natural theology alongside Plantinga’s endorsement of a 
natural knowledge of God by means of a divinely given human cognitive capacity and his 
openness to a role for apologetics. In chapter 6 we will examine potential differences in 
their conceptions of the fundamental character of faith and what constitutes genuine 
human knowledge of God. 
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If English-speaking philosophers of religion know one thing about Karl Barth it is that 
he emphatically denounces natural theology.1 In theological circles as well, Barth’s 
position on natural theology is considered to be entrenched and uncompromising, or 
“simply preposterous.”2 Anthony Thiselton expresses the widely held view that Barth is 
“the most outspoken opponent of natural theology in modern times.”3 On this basis, it is 
reasonable to suspect that we would find sharp differences between Plantinga and Barth. 
The critical task is to specify where precisely the differences lie and to assess their 
                                                 
1 E.g., Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 9; Nancey Murphy, “Theology and Scientific Methodology,” in Philosophy of Religion: 
Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2001), 514; and, Richard 
Swinburne, “The Value and Christian Roots of Analytical Philosophy of Religion,” in Faith and 
Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Harriet 
A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), 41. 
2 James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: the Gifford Lectures for 1991, Delivered in the 
University of Edinburgh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9. Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests that 
Barth takes Ritschl’s negative view of natural theology to an ‘extreme’ (Offenbarung als Geschichte, ed. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, 3. Aufl. [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965], 7). 
3 Anthony C. Thiselton, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 
196. 
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significance. Since natural theology is one strategy for bridging philosophy and 
theology,4 significant disagreement here could threaten broader conclusions about 
compatibility and complementarity between Barth’s theology of revelation and 
Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. 
Initial impressions are not all bad in this case. Barth and Plantinga share some measure 
of agreement about natural theology—both raise vocal objections to it.5 Though Barth’s 
objection certainly appears to be more categorical than is Plantinga’s. Plantinga, we will 
see, remains open to a limited role for natural theology, which Barth resists. The task of 
penetrating the differences between Barth and Plantinga is made somewhat easier by 
Plantinga’s own consideration of Barth’s position.6 Plantinga agrees with what he 
understands to be Barth’s primary motivation, but withdraws from Barth’s “in toto” 
rejection.7 No doubt this blanket rejection is in mind when Plantinga later cites Barth as 
an ‘extreme example’ of a theological objection to natural theology.8 Plantinga’s 
treatment of Barth, however, does not engage with the full scope of Barth’s concern, and, 
while highly valuable, is for this reason only of limited use. One of our aims, therefore, 
will be to identify those aspects of Barth’s position which Plantinga does not examine and 
evaluate their impact on the debate. 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to pinpointing where Plantinga and 
Barth agree and disagree on the question of natural theology. We will begin with an 
exploration of the driving concerns which motivate Barth’s ‘extreme’ position, and clarify 
just what was the natürliche Theologie he so spurned. We will then take a look at 
                                                 
4 E.g., Brian Hebblethwaite, who considers Barth’s objection to natural theology to be extreme; and, 
therefore, unhelpful to Hebblethwaite’s hopes for a “rapprochement between the philosophers and the 
theologians” (Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine [Oxford: Blackwell, 2005], 5). 
5 Barth’s most famous and forceful objection is, of course, his Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner, (München: 
Kaiser, 1934). Plantinga sees his own views as aligned with a traditional Reformed objection to natural 
theology. See RGB, 63–73; “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Philosophical 
Knowledge (Washington, DC: American Catholic Philosophical Assoc, 1980); “The Reformed Objection 
Revisited,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 12 (1983); and, “The Prospects for Natural Theology,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991). 
6 RGB, 68–72. The only aspect of Barth’s theology that Plantinga has written on is Barth’s rejection of 
natural theology. 
7 “The Reformed Objection Revisited,” Christian Scholar’s Review 12 (1983): 58. 
8 “Natural Theology,” in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995), 347. 
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Plantinga’s engagement with Barth and Plantinga’s explanation of his own position. In 
conclusion, I will assess the significance of our findings and determine if and how we 
might need to revise what has been, up to this point, a positive assessment of the 
compatibility, complementarity and centrolineality of their thought. 
Part I: Barth’s Driving Concerns and the Natural Theology he 
Rejects 
Most of what we need in order to understand Barth’s rejection of natural theology has 
already been unearthed in the first two chapters. What we will attempt here is an 
unpacking of the implications which Barth himself saw for the question of natural 
theology. 
Rejecting the Move from Below 
Barth’s primary motivation for rejecting natural theology is no different than his 
primary concern about the relationship between philosophy and theology. T. F. Torrance 
captures it well when he writes: “what Barth objects to in natural theology is not its 
rational structure as such but its independent character, i.e. the autonomous rational 
structure which it develops on the ground of ‘nature alone’ in abstraction from the active 
self-disclosure of the living God.”9 If it were reason, per se, that Barth was objecting to 
then we might be able to understand him as a thoroughgoing Ritschlian—positing a 
chasm between nature and grace. Instead, for Barth, the fundamental problem with 
natural theology is its presumption of an independently accessible knowledge of God on 
the basis of an innate human capacity. We saw in chapter 2 that, when it comes to 
theological knowing, Barth rejects the general starting-point assumption and the 
accessibility requirement of Enlightenment modernism. In both cases we saw that Barth’s 
underlying conviction is that the knowledge of God cannot be established from below on 
the basis of human thought or capacity, but only from above on the basis of divine self-
revelation. So just as Barth, in rejecting philosophy’s pretension to have access to an 
independent source of the knowledge of God, does not reject philosophy per se—the very 
realm in which theology must inevitably do its business—so also with human reason, he 
                                                 
9 Thomas F. Torrance, “The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,” Religious 
Studies 6 (1970): 128. 
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does not dismiss or reduce its importance and centrality. He is quite clear that the 
knowledge of God by faith in the grace of divine self-revelation is a communication of 
divine reason (Vernunft) with human reason. “The encounter of God and man takes place 
primarily, pre-eminently and characteristically in this sphere of ratio.”10 The problem 
with natural theology is not the importance assigned to human reason but its latent 
presumption that human reason could provide neutral and independent access to the 
knowledge of God apart from encounter with and transformation by God. 
A similarly qualified, positive claim can be made for creation, history, culture and 
humanity. While these all lack an inherent capacity to effect revelation, Barth is still able 
to affirm their role in the activity of divine self-revealing. In a 1926 lecture which has 
proven confusing for some interpreters,11 Barth is content to affirm that there is a “buried 
and forgotten truth of creation,” and that “culture can be a witness.” He even hints that 
there might be an acceptable way of conceiving of natural theology!12 These statements, 
however, can prove rather misleading without the crucial qualification that creation and 
culture are only instruments of revelation by the grace of Jesus Christ in the activity of 
divine self-revealing. Nevertheless, as instruments, the mediums God freely chooses to 
use are not insignificant, arbitrary, or inconsequential.13 Bruce McCormack helpfully 
                                                 
10 CD I/1, 135 (KD I/1, 139, “daß sich die Begegnung von Gott und Mensch . . . zuerst, vorzüglich und 
charakteristisch in dieser Sphäre, der Sphäre der ratio . . . abspielt”). 
11 “Die Kirche und die Kultur,” in Vorträge und Kleinere Arbeiten, 1925–1930, Gesamtausgabe, ed. 
Hermann Schmidt (Zürich: Theologisher Verlag, 1926), ET: “Church and Culture,” trans. Louise 
Pettibone Smith, in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920–1928 (London: SCM, 1926). Hans 
Urs von Balthasar believes that Barth’s rift with Brunner arose because Barth did not stick to his 1926 
position (Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie [Köln: J. Hegner, 1951], 96). I will 
argue that there is no discontinuity between Barth’s objection to Brunner’s natural theology and his 
statements in the 1926 lecture. 
12 “Church and Culture,” 342–343 (“Die Kirche und die Kultur,” 22–24). See also CD I/1, 130–131 (KD 
I/1, 134). 
13 Barth’s notorious comment about the freedom of God to speak through any creaturely medium could 
easily be taken to indicate the arbitrariness of the medium. “God may speak to us through Russian 
Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead dog” (CD I/1, 55; KD I/1, 55–56). To 
conclude this would be to ignore Barth’s warning which immediately follows, that unless we consider 
ourselves to be prophets of a new church our proclamation is to be based on “an exposition of some 
portion of the biblical witness to revelation.” Ignoring the secular form of the word would be the 
hallmark of “idealistic theology” which is for Barth “bad theology” (CD I/1, 175; KD I/1, 182). See also 
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recommends distinguishing between the locus of revelation and the “source (the power) 
by means of which revelation (in the Bible or in nature and history) [is] actualized.”14 It is 
accurate to say that on Barth’s view, Emil Brunner did not adequately grasp this 
distinction. 
The legendary exchange between Barth and Brunner in 1934 is Barth’s most resolute 
statement against natural theology, and is particularly helpful in distinguishing Barth’s 
view from other objections to natural theology. Brunner seems to have heard Barth’s 
positive statements, but failed to comprehend their strict qualifications, thereby 
overestimating Barth’s agreement with his own position.15 Barth perceives that by 
beginning with a human “capacity for revelation” (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit) Brunner 
fails to maintain the absoluteness of human dependence on God for the knowledge of 
God.16 This move inevitably leads to a suppression and distortion of revelation with 
potentially disastrous consequences, like those playing out in Germany at the very time 
Barth was writing. Barth’s acerbic reply to Brunner should be viewed in light of the 
capitulation of German Christians to Nazi national theology and the alarming events 
beginning in 1933 which involved an appeal to German culture as a source of natural 
revelation.17 
                                                                                                                                                  
Trevor Hart’s helpful discussion in Regarding Karl Barth: Essays Toward a Reading of His Theology 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 19-26. 
14 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909–1936 (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995), 306n. 
15 Brunner, Natur und Gnade: Zum Gespräch mit Karl Barth (Tübingen: Mohr, 1934), 6, ET: “Nature and 
Grace,” trans. Peter Fraenkel, in Natural Theology, ed. John Baillie (London: The Centenary Press, 
1934), 18–19. 
16 “No! Answer to Emil Brunner,” trans. Peter Fraenkel, in Natural Theology, ed. John Baillie (London: 
The Centenary Press, 1934), 78 (Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner, 16). 
17 Particularly in mind here is the establishment of the German Evangelical Church, its assimilation with 
the state, and the appointment of the Reichsbischof. In 1933, Barth writes, “Die frage, die die deutsche 
Kirchenreform bisher vor anderen charakterisierte, und alsbald zum wenig schönen Kirchenstreit werden 
ließ, war die Bischofsfrage. Man möchte wohl wissen können, wie sich später die Kirchengeschichte mit 
dem Rätsel auseinandersetzen wird: welche ernsthaften, inneren, theologisch relevanten Gründe dazu 
vorlagen, daß in der kirchlichen Bewegung des Jahres 1933 ausgerechnet diese Frage solche Bedeutung 
bekommen konnte, wie sie sie nun bekommen hat?” (Theologische Existenz heute! 1 [München: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1933], 13–14). 
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Despite Brunner’s protests, Barth contends that by allowing a revelation that issues 
from below, Brunner violates the Reformers’ sola gratia.18 Brunner’s surprise and 
confusion over Barth’s rebuke leads to one of the most illuminating aspects of the debate. 
Brunner assumes that he and Barth are in essential agreement, each rejecting a natural 
theology that begins from below independent of the light of grace. He claims to stand with 
the Reformers in insisting that, “the light of the revelation in Christ must shine into nature 
in order to light up this foundation.”19 He then distinguishes this view from what he 
understands to be the positions of Roman Catholicism and Enlightenment rationalism.20 
This is helpful in that it provides us with at least three alternative positions on natural 
theology that can be contrasted usefully to distinguish Barth’s own position. 
Brunner, Roman Catholicism and Enlightenment Rationalism 
Of the four positions Brunner identifies, Enlightenment rationalism clearly offers the 
most permissive or optimistic attitude toward natural theology. On this view, human 
reason apart from grace becomes the sole and independent organ for arriving at 
knowledge of God. Divine special revelation is subordinated in such a way as to become 
irrelevant or is denied altogether. Barth and Brunner agree that such a positivistic view of 
natural theology must be opposed, and their agreement seems to stem from a shared 
opinion about the limitations of human reason. The optimism of Enlightenment 
rationalism regarding the essential capacities and uncorrupted condition of human reason 
makes it untenable. The limitations of human reason, however, arise from two 
considerations which should be highlighted separately—limitations that obtain as a result 
of human sin, and limitations that obtain merely as a consequence of being human. With 
respect to the noetic effects of sin, it would seem that Barth and Brunner generally agree. 
According to Barth, “the discernment of the creation of man which is also the revelation 
of God, has, however, been taken from us by the fall, at least according to Reformation 
ideas of the extent of sin, and it is restored to us in the Gospel, in revelatio specialis.”21 
                                                 
18 “No!” 80, 85 (Nein!, 17, 22). 
19 “Nature and Grace,” 47 (Natur und Gnade, 33, “das Licht der Christusoffenbarung auch in die Natur 
hineinzünden muß”). 
20 “Nature and Grace,” 45–48 (Natur und Gnade, 32–34). 
21 CD I/1, 130 (KD I/1, 134, “die Einsicht in die Schöpfung des Menschen, die als solche auch 
Offenbarung Gottes ist, ist uns aber durch den Sündenfall jedenfalls nach den reformatoischen 
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But for Brunner, once the blindness of sin is removed by the grace of Jesus Christ there is 
restored a human capacity to grasp a rudimentary knowledge of God “imprinted” on 
creation.22 So, for Brunner, natural theology, rightly construed, is not a “self-sufficient 
rational system.”23 We must begin with the grace of special revelation from above, which 
then enables a proper general revelation from below. For this reason, Brunner can give 
qualifications that appear quite compatible with Barth’s position. For instance, Brunner 
states, “Only the Christian, i.e. the man who stands within the revelation in Christ, has the 
true natural knowledge of God.”24 Moreover, Brunner agrees with Barth that 
philosophical arguments are inadequate to serve as the basis for Christian belief.25 All of 
these qualifications must be made for Brunner because of the limitations imposed by the 
pervasive effects of human sin. 
We move now to a second alternative, Brunner’s characterization of the Roman 
Catholic view. Brunner believes that his assessment of the impact of sin on the powers of 
human reason separates his Reformed position from the Catholic view.26 According to 
Brunner the Roman Catholic position divides the realms of faith and reason cleanly. 
Truths that can be known by the power of human reason are not made any less accessible 
by a noetic impact of sin. Natural theology is independent of revealed theology and may 
even provide the basis for grounding the claims or apparatus of faith. Here again Barth 
and Brunner agree. This view of natural theology must be opposed; though, we will see 
that Barth believes Brunner has misunderstood the Catholic position. They both strongly 
deny that the knowledge of God might have a prior foundation in philosophical argument 
or any other independent human grounding.27 In other words, Brunner agrees with Barth’s 
objections to the general starting-point assumption and the accessibility requirement. 
With so much agreement, what then is the basis for Barth’s scathing disapprobation? The 
                                                                                                                                                  
Voraussetzungen über Tragweite der Sünde gerade genommen und nur im Evangelium, in der revelatio 
specialis wiedergegeben”). 
22 “Nature and Grace,” 25 (Natur und Gnade, 12). 
23 “Nature and Grace,” 46 (Natur und Gnade, 32, “ein Vernunftsystem, das sich selbst genügt”). 
24 “Nature and Grace,” 27 (Natur und Gnade, 15, “die rechte natürliche Gotteserkenntnis hat nur der Christ, 
d. h. der Mensch, der zugleich in der Christusoffenbarung drinsteht”). 
25 “Nature and Grace,” 58 (Natur und Gnade, 43). 
26 “Nature and Grace,” 46 (Natur und Gnade, 32). 
27 Brunner denies that his eristic theology has anything to do with providing an external foundation for 
theology, and objects to what he takes to be the Roman Catholic enterprise of seeking philosophical 
proofs or foundations (“Nature and Grace,” 35 n14, 46; Natur und Gnade, 22 n1, 32). 
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difference between Barth and Brunner is not a difference over the noetic effects of sin, 
but rather a disagreement about wider human limitations with respect to the knowledge of 
God. We will expand on this as we now turn to a third alternative, Brunner’s own 
position. 
Brunner maintained that a genuine and relatively independent natural theology was 
possible, but only in the light of grace, which restores a natural sight once robbed by sin. 
Creation itself is endowed with a natural capacity to reflect the attributes of its Creator; 
and, human beings, as created in the image of God, have a natural capacity to apprehend 
the knowledge of God reflected in creation.28 This human capacity for apprehension is 
obliterated by sin and restored by grace in Christ. But Brunner also stresses the 
importance of maintaining that, while capacities that comprise the material image of God 
are destroyed, the formal image of God is not destroyed by sin. The untouched formal 
image of God must remain intact to provide the “point of contact” for divine grace.29 
Unless sin were to destroy the human completely, it cannot take away the passive 
receptivity to divine address that human beings posses in virtue of being created in the 
image of God. In all of this, there is no material capacity or human contribution, so the 
principle of sola gratia is not violated. Brunner believes that a formal possibility must be 
affirmed if human beings are to remain responsible.30 Furthermore, this formal passive 
receptivity becomes the basis of a qualified negative apologetics Brunner calls eristics.31 
Barth’s sharp disagreement with Brunner is at root an objection to Brunner’s positive 
assessment of human capacity on the basis of the unbroken formal image of God. Barth 
does not dispute the claim that a formal image of God remains intact in sinful humans.32 
But he rejects the suggestion that this entails any form of natural human capacity, 
receptivity or predisposition for revelation. “Man has completely lost the capacity for 
God.”33 No matter how passive, any human predisposition which might function to 
explain the possibility of receiving grace is seen by Barth as a human contribution and 
                                                 
28 “In every creation the spirit of the creator is in some way recognisable. The artist is known by all his 
works” (“Nature and Grace,” 24; Natur und Gnade, 11, “Jedes Werk lobt seinen Meister”). 
29 “Nature and Grace,” 31 (“Anknüpfungspunkt”, Natur und Gnade, 18). 
30 Emil Brunner, “Die Andere Aufgabe der Theologie,” Zwischen den Zeiten 7 (1929): 273. 
31 “Nature and Grace,” 59 (Natur und Gnade, 43, “Eristik”). 
32 “In this formal sense the original image of God in man is not destroyed. Indeed not, we may well say. 
Even as a sinner man is man and not a tortoise” (“No!” 79; Nein!, 16). 
33 CD I.1, 238 (KD I.1, 251, “Das Vermögen für Gott ist dem Menschen . . . wirklich verloren gegangen”). 
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therefore a violation of sola gratia.34 He contends that Brunner’s position is, in fact, much 
closer to the Roman Catholic view. 
Barth correctly sees that Brunner’s caricature of the Catholic conception of natural 
theology is “sadly distorted.”35 Brunner suggests that Roman Catholicism holds that the 
deliverances of human reason with respect to natural theology are unaffected by sin and 
are therefore not in need of a restoring grace. According to Brunner, what sets his 
position apart is its appeal to the prevenience of grace such that while natural theology is 
independent of revealed theology it is nevertheless subordinated to it. But, as Barth 
argues, in Roman Catholic theology “a true knowledge of God derived from reason and 
nature is de facto never attained without prevenient and preparatory grace.”36 The real 
Catholic position is very close to Brunner’s and the outcome is similar as well—two 
sources of the knowledge of God, one delivered by human reason in contemplation of the 
imprint of the Creator on creation, the other delivered by faith, the supernatural self-
revelation of God in Christ and through Scripture. Brunner believed that he had 
sufficiently distinguished his view from the Roman Catholic approach by objecting to 
philosophical proofs and the pursuit of an externally grounded rational basis for 
theology.37 But this seems to assume that Catholic theology accepts the presuppositions 
of Enlightenment rationalism, even prior to the Enlightenment.38 The Roman Catholic 
                                                 
34 This would be, in Trevor Hart’s terms, the “smuggling in of a material sense” (Regarding Karl Barth, 
171). Hart offers a helpful distinction between active and passive capacities, noting that in Barth’s view, 
Brunner’s formal/passive capacity has traces of the material/active sense (167-171). 
35 “No!” 95 (Nein!, 32, “eine arge Verzeichnung sei”). 
36 “No!” 96 (Nein!, 32, “Erkenntnis Gottes aus Vernunft und Natur kommt als auf Grund der 
zuvorkommenden und vorbereitenden Gnade”). 
37 “Nature and Grace,” 58 (Natur und Gnade, 43). 
38 What Brunner gives us here is a common caricature of the Catholic attitude toward fundamental theology 
that has been helpfully questioned not least by Barth himself in his interpretation of Anselm’s 
Proslogion 2–4 (Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang 
Seines Theologischen Programms, Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus, Reihe 4, 
Bd. 3 [München: C. Kaiser, 1931], 76–199). For a clarification of the Catholic view see also Walter 
Kasper, Der Gott Jesu Christi, Glaubensbekenntnis der Kirche 1 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 
1982), ET: The God of Jesus Christ (New York: Crossroad, 1984); Eugene F. Rogers, Thomas Aquinas 
and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995); and, Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Migration of Theistic Arguments: From Natural 
Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics,” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New 
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view agrees to the distinction between natural and revealed theology, but also agrees to 
the priority of revealed theology and the dependence on grace for each. As Walter Kasper 
helpfully clarifies, in Catholic thought, the possibility of natural theology is presupposed 
on the basis of revelation, and there is no natural capacity independent of grace.39 
Barth’s Insistence on the Direct Action of God in All Revelation 
No matter how cautious or humble, any suggestion of a source of the knowledge of 
God outside of God’s own activity of self-revelation cannot be countenanced on Barth’s 
view. In Barth’s view, this is what really separates him from Brunner and the Roman 
Catholic position. The impact of sin was not to disrupt an otherwise neutral and relatively 
independent created capacity either in nature to reflect the knowledge of God or in human 
beings to apprehend this reflection. The impact of sin was not to disrupt a ‘natural’ order 
instituted as an impersonal witness within the order of grace. The impact of sin was to 
disrupt fellowship with God, within which God’s self-disclosure, enabling creatures to 
hear and creation to speak, was always given supernaturally. “Only retrospectively is it 
possible to reflect on the way in which he ‘makes contact’ with man, and this retrospect 
will ever be a retrospect upon a miracle.”40 It is not enough to stipulate that a natural 
knowledge of God is enabled by God indirectly by the ‘infusion’ of a capacity for 
independent discovery.41 All revelation, no matter what its medium, to the extent that it is 
an enabling of a real knowledge of God, is a miraculous, supernatural gift. For this reason 
Barth rejects any strong division between two books or two types of revelation.42 
Geoffrey Bromiley has suggested that Barth’s critique of natural theology should be 
differentiated from an objection to ‘natural revelation.’43 There is, however, every reason 
to think that Barth strongly resists the notion of natural revelation. While Barth may 
allow that it is proper to creation to serve as a witness in the supernatural miracle of 
divine self-revelation, it is not a property of creation so to serve. Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986).  
39 Der Gott Jesu Christi, 70–77. 
40 “No!” 121 (Nein!, 56). 
41 CD I/1, 216 (KD I/1, 226, “eingeflößte Möglichkeit”). 
42 CD III/1, 414 (KD III/1, 476). 
43 Geoffrey Bromiley, “Karl Barth,” in Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology, ed. Philip Edgcumbe 
Hughes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 55. 
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provision of a natural revelation, independent of the domain of supernatural revelation is 
rejected on the same grounds as Barth’s rejection of natural theology. Critical to 
understanding Barth’s objection is seeing that, in his view, revelation cannot be revelation 
unless it is an instance of direct divine self-disclosure.44  
But why is Barth so unflinching about the direct action of God in revelation? Why not 
think that God has endowed human beings with a faculty, we might call it the sensus 
divinitatis, which can operate in relative independence from the direct action of the Holy 
Spirit? Why not think that when this faculty is regenerated and functioning properly it can 
lead us to a real knowledge of God purely from a consideration of creation, which God 
has similarly endowed with a capacity to witness to God in relative independence from 
the work of the Spirit? To get to the heart of what is motivating Barth’s position we need 
only return to what we have already established in the first two chapters regarding Barth’s 
theology of revelation, starting with Barth’s rejection of the general stating-point 
assumption—his resistance to grounding a theology of revelation in any a priori claims 
about revelation. 
Barth intends his dogmatics to be a reflection on the one a priori event of revelation 
itself. Barth’s theo-foundationalism eschews any anthropological bases or foundational 
philosophical assumptions. The only foundation is the one God himself establishes in his 
divine self-disclosure. This is an approach which is quite like Plantinga’s own 
particularism, working inductively from what has already been made known.45 In fact, 
particularism, is the term George Hunsinger adopts to indicate Barth’s strictly inductive 
approach. Hunsinger maintains that Barth’s particularism is a key motivator for Barth’s 
rejection of natural theology.46 This is not to suggest that particularism itself is for Barth 
                                                 
44 Ronald Thiemann worries that Barth’s instance on the disjunction between creaturely medium and divine 
revelation, and “taking refuge in the miracle of grace,” undermines the trustworthiness of the medium. 
“Christian faith demands that once God has claimed a piece of creaturely reality as his own and bound 
himself to it, then we are warranted in accepting the God-forged link between the human and divine” 
(Revelation and Theology, 95). Thiemann fails to grasp Barth’s critical insight. Creaturely mediums are 
unable (non capax) to reveal God on there own. They are, therefore, always inadequate in themselves as 
a basis for grounding belief. There is no authority of Scripture per se, only the secure authority of the 
Word of God communicating through the form—He is the church’s one foundation. 
45 See the discussion in chapter 4. Plantinga does not begin with a general criteria for proper basicality, but 
with instances of knowledge already known and held in the basic way. 
46 Hunsinger also quite rightly finds that natural theology is in conflict with what he has identified as the 
Barthian motifs of actualism and objectivism. In Barth’s eyes, all of these motifs unfold from the 
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an a priori methodological assumption.47 Hunsinger is quite clear that the Barthian motifs 
he identifies are not a priori philosophical principles or foundational commitments, 
rather, they are to be taken as forms of thought arising out of or “implicit in” the event of 
revelation itself.48 In other words, Barth is not guilty of adopting particularism as a 
general principle. Instead, his particularism describes the realization, in the light of divine 
self-revelation, that the creator who is making himself known is truly sui generis, utterly 
transcending the created media of revelation. His particularism is motivated by an 
encounter with the uniqueness of the one doing the self-revealing. He writes: “A result of 
the uniqueness of this object of knowledge might well be that the concept of its 
knowledge cannot be definitively measured by the concept of the knowledge of other 
objects or by a general concept of knowledge but that it can be defined at all only in terms 
of its own object.”49 The uniqueness of God creates a problem for any revelation that 
moves from creation to Creator. In fact, the uniqueness of God is problematic for 
revelation in general.50 
This problem is often discussed as a problem of theological reference,51 or the problem 
of the inadequacy of human language and concepts for the knowledge of God.52 For 
                                                                                                                                                  
foundation that God himself establishes in his self-revelation (George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl 
Barth: The Shape of His Theology [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 96–99). 
47 T. F. Torrance notes the interesting parallels between what we have called Barth’s particularism and 
what he calls “a posteriori science.” We should be careful, however, not to think that an analogy to 
science provides Barth a basis for or a validation of the way in which he proceeds theologically. It is 
potentially misleading, therefore, to conclude that “Barth’s exclusion of natural theology is seen to rest 
on the two-fold ground of theological content and scientific method.” The only ground for the 
knowledge of God, as Torrance thoroughly affirms, is “its objective ground in God himself” (“The 
Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,” 128). 
48 Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 29–30.  
49 CD I/1, 190 (KD I/1, 198, “Es könnte sich ja aus der Eigenart dieses Erkenntnisgegenstandes ergeben, 
daß der Begriff seiner Erkenntnis durchaus nicht ultimativ an dem Begriff der Erkenntnis anderer 
Gegenstände, an einem allgemeinen Erkenntnisbegriff gemessen werden darf, sondern daß er sich 
überhaupt nur von diesem seinem Gegenstand her bestimmen läßt”).  
50 This amplifies the problem Kierkegaard engages at the beginning of the Fragments. If, in ignorance of 
the truth we lack also the condition for recognizing the truth, how can truth be learned? Philosophical 
Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1985), 9–22.  
51 See Aquinas’ famous treatment of the names of God (Summa Theologica, I.13). 
52 Plantinga addresses a version of this problem in the first chapter of WCB. 
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Brunner, the solution seems to be found in the imago Dei as the point of contact for 
human beings.53 Barth believed that the Roman Catholic solution was based on an 
analogia entis.54 In the development of Barth’s own thought he wrestles with the fact that 
the God who makes himself known is known to be so independent and transcendent as to 
cast doubt on a genuine human possibility of knowing him.55 In order to preserve the 
revealed truth of God’s freedom and uniqueness, Barth concludes that not just the 
knowledge of God, but all conditions for the possibility of the knowledge of God must 
come from outside creation, from God alone. God himself provides, indeed is, the 
possibility of his own knowability. “Man must be set aside and God himself presented as 
the original subject, as the primary power, as the creator of the possibility of knowledge 
of God’s Word.”56 More specifically, as we saw in chapter 1, Barth’s solution takes shape 
within his doctrine of the Trinity. The problem of the possibility of human reception of 
divine revelation—the subjective appropriation of revelation—is overcome in that God is 
his own revealedness. God is both the object and, as the Spirit, the subject of his 
revealing. The Revealer and revealing act are one with the success of that act. This does 
not spiritualize revelation in such a way that it ceases to be creaturely knowledge or such 
that creaturely mediation becomes irrelevant. Barth is, instead, insisting that the 
possibility of genuine human knowing is the gift of our participation in Christ by the 
ministry of the Spirit.57 Creaturely mediation remains without a betrayal of God’s radical 
                                                 
53 Brunner, “Nature and Grace,” 31 (Natur und Gnade, 18, “Anknüpfungspunkt”). 
54 CD I/1, xiii (KD I/1, viii). We will take a closer look at the problem of analogical predication in the next 
chapter. 
55 Helpful treatments of Barth’s development from Der Römerbrief on the issue of the possibility of 
revelation include: Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie; McCormack, Karl 
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 241–374; and, Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Die 
Subjectivität Gottes und Die Trinitätslehre: Ein Beitrag zur Beziehen Zwischen Karl Barth und Der 
Philosophie Hegels,” in Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie: Gesammelte Aufsatze (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 96–98. 
56 CD I/1, 247 (KD I/1, 260, “als das ursprüngliche Subjekt, als der primär Mächtige, als der die 
Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis des Wortes Gottes Schaffende der Mensch abzusetzen und Gott selbst 
einzusetzen ist”). 
57 Here once again we should emphasize that while the doctrine of the Trinity is at the heart of Barth’s 
solution to the freedom of God in his revelation, this does not mean that the doctrine of the Trinity is the 
fundamental presupposition upon which Barth deduces his theology of revelation. God is the ground for 
our knowledge of God. It is not that a doctrine or presupposition about God is the ground for Barth’s 
conception of revelation. It is in this light that we should understand Pannenberg’s conclusion that, “die 
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uniqueness.58 Though the power to mediate divine revelation is not a capacity inherent in 
or transferred to creaturely media, nevertheless, through the gift of faith,59 creaturely 
media serve as the vehicles of divine communication. As Barth says, “the power of this 
reference does not lie in itself; it lies in that to which it refers.”60 
We can conclude that Barth’s unflagging insistence on the direct action of God in 
revelation and his resistance to any creaturely capacities for the knowledge of God 
fundamentally stem from two reflections on the event of God’s self-revelation. The first is 
that God is really, genuinely, humanly and cognitively known in his revelation. The 
second reflection is that the God we meet in God’s self-revelation is so utterly unique that 
no creaturely phenomenon could explain the possibility of his being humanly known. The 
only solution which can uncompromisingly maintain both affirmations is one where the 
possibility for real human knowing of God is in no way given over to or implanted in 
creation. This explains Barth’s disagreement with Brunner and his rejection of any form 
of natural theology that might compromise God’s freedom and transcendence by 
implying that the source and power of the revelation of God could be anything other than 
God himself. This also begins to explain the bluntness and urgency of Barth’s response.61 
Barth saw that the consequences of a compromise of God’s freedom and transcendence in 
his revelation would be disastrous. The inevitable outcome of a conceiving of God from 
human ideas rather than from the givenness of revelation was a loss of the knowledge of 
God altogether and a fulfillment of the suspicions of Feuerbach. Such a move would be 
                                                                                                                                                  
immanente Trinität ist somit der Grundstein für Barths Konzeption der Selbständigkeit Gottes in seiner 
Offenbarung” (“Die Subjectivität Gottes und Die Trinitätslehre,” 98.) 
58 See Bruce McCormack’s enlightening exposition of Barth’s discovery of this affirmation with respect to 
the incarnation accomplished in the anhypostatic-enhypostatic Christological dogma (Karl Barth’s 
Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 325–463). 
59 Instead of an analogia entis, Barth suggests an analogia fidei in which our knowledge of God is in our 
being known by God. “It is the divine act of knowledge which takes place on man rather than through 
man that distinguishes those whose knowledge is grounded in love of God and therefore in true 
fellowship with Him, in the presence of God” (CD I/1, 244; KD I/1, 257). We will take a closer look at 
Barth’s analogia fidei in the next chapter.  
60 CD I/1, 197 (KD I/1, 205, “Die Kraft dieses Verweises liegt nicht in ihm selber, sondern in dem, worauf 
er verweist”). 
61 John Webster describes Barth’s response to Brunner as “rude” and “rather savage” (“Introducing Barth,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John B. Webster [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000], 6). 
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“the end of all, yes, all certainty.”62 Granted, the particular historical situation out of 
which Barth was writing highlighted these dire consequences,63 but it is quite unlikely 
that Barth imagined a situation in which opposing this error was anything less than 
imperative for a theologian of the church.64 
Finally, God’s direct action is always essential to revelation because, “revelation in fact 
does not differ from the person of Jesus Christ nor from the reconciliation accomplished 
in Him.”65 God is who he is, and is known to be who he is, in his action of drawing us 
into relationship with him by the person and work of Jesus Christ through the ministry of 
the Spirit.66 There cannot be a knowledge of God that is not incorporated into this activity 
of transforming grace. This is what we find at the heart of Barth’s objection to natural 
theology. It seems that in Barth’s view all natural theology, including Brunner’s qualified 
endorsement, is guilty of conceiving of a knowledge of God derived by human beings 
independent of direct active encounter with the sovereign, triune God who by his own 
revelation overcomes all barriers to revelation. 
                                                 
62 CD I/1, 216 (KD I/1, 226, “das Ende aller, aber auch aller Sicherheit”). 
63 T. F. Torrance maintains that Barth’s contemporary situation “explains why Barth was so angry with 
Emil Brunner’s mediating pamphlet ‘Nature and Grace’, for to those fighting the battle of resistance in 
Germany it appeared to fortify the basis on which the so-called ‘German Christians’ were advocating 
conciliation with the Nazi régime” (“The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,” 
125).  
64 We should not take as a retraction, Barth’s 1966 message to Brunner stating that he no longer felt he 
needed to say ‘No.’ Nor should we see this as an indication that the historical situation no longer 
necessitated a strong opposition to the notion of an independent, though restored by grace, natural 
capacity for revelation. Brunner was on his death bed, and Barth simply wanted to emphasize God’s 
gracious ‘Yes’ to humanity as the source of life. “. . .sagen Sie ihn doch ja, die Zeit da ich meinte, ihm 
ein ‘Nein!’ entgegenrufen zu müssen, sei längst vorüber, wo wir doch alle nur davon leben, daß ein 
großer un barmherziger Gott zu uns allen sein gnädiges Ja sagt” (Karl Barth - Emil Brunner 
Briefwechsel 1916–1966, ed. Eberhard Busch, Gesamtausgabe, V [Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2000], 
391). 
65 CD I/1, 119 (KD I/1, 122, “Offenbarung ist ja auch nicht verschieden von der Person Jesu Christi und 
wiederum nicht verschieden von der in ihm geschehenen Versöhnung”). 
66 This seems to be what Hunsinger has in mind in his identification of Barth’s ‘actualism’ as an important 
motif in shaping Barth’s attitude toward natural theology (How to Read Karl Barth, 96–99). 
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Assessment of Barth on Natural Theology 
It is safe to conclude that the fundamental difference between Barth and Brunner is not 
over their estimation of the noetic effects of sin, or the perseverance of a formal imago 
Dei, or even the possibility that creation and culture might be used in the service of divine 
self-revelation. What Barth rejects is a general revelation unrelated to God’s encountering 
us in Jesus Christ by the ministry of the Spirit. This does not entail that creation and 
culture cannot serve as media of divine revelation, whereby encounter with Jesus is 
actualized by God. For Barth it is possible to know God by his effects, but not merely by 
his effects. Even knowing God by his effects requires God’s immediate act. What this 
does entail is either an eradication or a heavy blurring of the distinction between general 
or natural revelation and special or supernatural revelation. Barth emphatically denounces 
the separation of nature and grace into two books of revelation.67 All revelation, whether 
through reflection on the cosmos or by means of the testimony of prophets and apostles is 
an activity of divine grace, and more specifically a gracious encounter with Jesus Christ 
by the transformative work of the Spirit. 
Barth’s position can be clarified further by distinguishing it from other options with 
respect to two considerations frequently operative in stronger demarcations between 
special and general revelation—namely, the availability of revelation and the kind of 
grace active in revelation. Starting with the question of the availability of revelation, we 
saw in chapter 4 that Plantinga follows Aquinas and Calvin in affirming some kind of 
innate capacity for a rudimentary knowledge of God activated in the presence of 
triggering conditions that might include an inward or outward experience of created 
existence. This is a natural knowledge in that the human cognitive equipment involved is 
part of the original design plan. We might continue to follow Calvin and suggest that this 
is a universal knowledge, in that the original design plan expresses an intention for every 
human being.68 Barth is willing to go along up to a point. In his exposition of Romans 
1:18ff, Barth grants that “It is unquestionable that knowledge of God is here ascribed to 
man in the cosmos, and knowability is ascribed to God.”69 For Barth, however, the very 
                                                 
67 Barth rejects what he calls the “dual system of book-keeping” (CD III/1, 414; KD III/1, 476, “doppelte 
Buchführung”). 
68 Institutes, I. ii–v. 
69 CD II/1, 119 (KD II/1, 131, “Zweifellos wird damit dem Menschen im Kosmos Erkenntnis Gottes und 
damit Gott Erkennbarkeit zugeschrieben”). 
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rubric of ‘universally available’ knowledge is perilously misleading. The knowledge of 
God is never like a cache of information deposited either in human nature or in the 
created order, as if it were a substance at our disposal that could be mined and acquired. 
Knowledge of God, no matter how rudimentary, in order to qualify as knowledge of the 
true God is personal, freely given, trinitarian self-disclosure. So Barth quickly adds, 
“There can be no doubt that Paul meant by this the revelation of the grace of God in Jesus 
Christ.”70 Edward Adams argues convincingly that for Calvin even the universal, natural 
knowledge of God is revealed knowledge. Though Calvin speaks of an implanted 
knowledge of God, “it does not come to human beings, nor do human beings come to it, 
apart from God’s action but as a direct consequence of divine initiative.”71 This is 
patently the case for Barth, who (also like Calvin) would for this reason never speak of a 
knowledge of God arising from a natural ‘capacity.’ The fact that it is part of the original 
designed intention for human beings to come to know God in no way changes Barth’s 
conviction that genuine knowledge of God involves the essential enabling action of the 
Spirit. This takes us to the second consideration—regarding kinds of grace. 
It should be obvious that for Barth, if there is no knowledge of God outside of active 
divine self-revelation, there is no natural knowledge of God independent of grace. Merely 
recognizing the necessity of grace for knowledge of God does not, however, distinguish 
Barth’s view. Without further definition, an insistence on grace might only amount to 
what Henri de Lubac calls the rejection of the hypothesis of ‘pure nature,’72 a relatively 
modest claim regarding the dependence of nature on divine sustaining. In this regard, 
Aquinas grants that “for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs divine help, 
that the intellect may be moved by God to its act.”73 Aquinas grants this pervasive divine 
activity which upholds and moves our natures, but distinguishes it from the activity of 
sanctifying grace which adds something to our nature thereby enabling a knowledge 
                                                 
70 CD II/1, 119 (KD II/1, 131, “Es kann kein Zweifel sein, daß Paulus damit die Offenbarung der Gnade 
Gottes in Jesus Christus gemeint hat”). 
71 Edward Adams, “Calvin’s View of Natural Knowledge of God,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 3, no. 3 (2001): 281–282. See also T.H.L. Parker, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God: a 
Study in the Theology of John Calvin (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1952); and the dissenting view of 
Edward A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1952).  
72 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (London: G. Chapman, 1967), 
50ff. 
73 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 109, a. 1. 
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which surpasses what can be known by natural light. Some later reformed thought 
observes a similar distinction, articulated as the difference between common grace and 
special or saving grace. Common grace, which accounts for general revelation, is a divine 
work that exerts a rational or moral influence but “leaves the heart unchanged.”74 For 
Barth, none of this will do. Genuine knowledge of God involves personal encounter with 
God which cannot leave us unchanged. Revelation is both personal and transformative in 
a way that defies a clean separation of mind, heart and life. In other words, revelation 
requires the gift of faith to be received. Barth’s dictum that “it is faith that hears, 
understands and obeys God’s speech”75 applies equally to all of God’s speech, whether the 
medium is Scripture or the starry heavens. For this reason, with respect to the gift of 
revelation, there can be no division of God’s grace into kinds. 
In conclusion, Barth’s rejection of natural theology is required by his understanding of 
revelation and should be understood only as a rejection of the possibility of a genuine 
knowledge of God outside of active, triune self-disclosure through gracious, personal and 
transformative encounter with Jesus Christ by the ministry of the Spirit. If there is room for 
a properly construed and constrained theologia naturalis, as Barth himself suggests, it will 
be “included and brought into clear light”76 in the theology of revelation. Barth’s position is 
not, in fact, as extreme as it is sometimes thought to be. There is no denial in his view of the 
significance of human cognition and reasoning in the reception of revelation, nor of the 
possibility that the created order or our general experience as creatures might indeed serve 
as a witness to the creator. Barth is merely denying that created human capacities, even 
once renewed from the deleterious effects of sin, are ever in and of themselves sufficient to 
attain genuine knowledge of God. Vigilance here is required, not only for German 
Christians in 1934, but wherever the church is tempted toward the inevitable idolatry which 
results from seeking a way to the knowledge of God which is other than God’s way to us. 
To choose to begin elsewhere constitutes disobedience and a de facto rejection of God’s 
self-disclosure. General revelation and natural theology are not dismissed, only their 
                                                 
74 By contrast, special grace is “spiritual and re-creative” (Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 4th rev. ed. 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969], 437). 
75 CD I/1, 135 (KD I/1, 140, “es ist der Glaube, der die Rede Gottes hört, versteht und ihr gehorcht”). 
76 “Church and Culture,” 342 (“Die Kirche und die Kultur,” 22, “mit enthalten und ans Licht gebracht”). 
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illusory status as independent of ‘special’ divine action.77 If there is a sensus divinitatis it 
operates within the realm of the action of the of the Holy Spirit. 
Having seen ourselves clear of several misconceptions of Barth’s position and having 
ventured a clarification of his core concerns, we are now ready to look at Plantinga’s 
thoughts about natural theology in order to determine the extent and seriousness of his 
disagreement with Barth. But before we do, it is worth acknowledging two areas for further 
investigation that bear upon the discussion of natural theology, but which we have here left 
untouched. The first has to do with my use of ‘genuine’ to qualify ‘the knowledge of God,’ 
which invites a question as to the meaningfulness of such a qualification. Could there be a 
knowledge of God that was in some sense fittingly referred to as knowledge that was at the 
same time not genuine? I have employed the qualification here to signal that more work 
needs to be done to specify just what qualifies as knowledge of God for Barth and 
Plantinga. The second area for further investigation is intimately related to the first. It has to 
do with the nature of faith, which I have noted plays an essential noetic role in Barth’s 
theology of revelation. Faith and the knowledge of God will occupy our attention in the 
next chapter. Both of these questions are raised by an obvious difficulty for Barth’s 
position—namely, that it certainly seems that some who do not have Christian faith still 
possess at minimum a rudimentary knowledge of God.78 The discussion of natural theology 
tees-up these questions nicely; and, until they are addressed, the conclusions of this chapter 
will remain provisional. 
Part II: Plantinga on Natural Theology 
One of Alvin Plantinga’s consistent objectives in the epistemology of religious belief 
has been to defend the possibility that accepting belief in God without an argument may 
be a perfectly rational and sensible thing to do. In the early days of his development of 
what would later be known as ‘Reformed Epistemology,’ one way in which Plantinga 
advanced his argument was by looking at what he termed ‘the Reformed Objection to 
Natural Theology.’ In its first published form Plantinga examined the positions taken by 
                                                 
77 As we have already pointed out, mere divine sustaining of the natural capacities is not enough. For 
Barth, the grace of revelation can never be taken to be an unspiritual, semi-automated process in which 
God remains personally distant and we remain unchanged. 
78 The question is pressed further by examples in Scripture, not least the notion that even the demons have 
some knowledge of God (Jas 2:19). 
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Herman Bavinck and John Calvin,79 but when he incorporated it into his truly seminal 
essay, Reason and Belief in God, it was expanded to include a treatment of ‘the Barthian 
dilemma.’80 For our purposes, we will first attempt to establish Plantinga’s position with 
respect to natural theology, and then turn to the connection with Barth. 
The Natural Theology that Plantinga Rejects 
The natural theology Plantinga considers—under that name—is much more narrowly 
defined than the natural theology debated by Barth and Brunner. Plantinga uses the term 
to identify strictly “the attempt to prove or demonstrate the existence of God.”81 He does 
not, for instance, extend the definition to the possibility of arriving at a knowledge of God 
by the application of our ‘natural’ faculties. Given this narrow definition, it is accurate to 
say that a central thrust of Plantinga’s work has been to attack the notion of the necessity 
of natural theology for belief in God.82 The non-necessity of natural theology is a 
corollary of his rejection of Cliffordian evidentialism and his defense of the proper 
basicality of theistic belief. Plantinga clearly sees himself in line with a tradition of 
Reformed thought on this point. He does not stop here, however, nor does the tradition 
with which he finds himself aligned. Natural theology is not only unnecessary for belief 
in God, there is also something fundamentally improper about it.83 
As we noted in the previous chapter, according to Plantinga, “If Christian beliefs are 
true, then the standard and most satisfactory way to hold them will not be as the 
                                                 
79 “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Philosophical Knowledge (Washington, DC: 
American Catholic Philosophical Assoc, 1980), 49–53. 
80 RGB, 68–71. Unfortunately, this is the only point in Plantinga’s corpus where he engages in any detail 
the thought of Karl Barth. 
81 RGB, 63; and, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” 49 
82 In Philip Quinn’s debate with Plantinga, he identifies the need for natural theology as the issue of 
deepest disagreement between them. “A great deal hangs on the fate of natural theology” (“The 
Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga,” in Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to 
Reformed Epistemology, ed. Linda Zagzebski [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993], 
162). 
83 Plantinga would disagree sharply with Norman Kretzmann’s assertion that, “natural theology still offers 
the best route by which philosophers can, as philosophers, approach theological propositions” (The 
Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997], 22). 
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conclusions of argument.”84 The impropriety of natural theology is its suggestion that 
rational inference from more certain, antecedently held beliefs provides the best 
foundation, not only for full-fledged Christian belief, but even for brute theism. Plantinga 
argues for the definitive superiority of a ‘testimonial model.’85 It is not rational inference, 
but the testimony of God the Spirit which is the truly adequate and stable source of 
warrant for belief. He cites a conclusion Calvin reaches in Calvin’s discussion of the 
proper basis for accepting the authority of Scripture: “we ought to seek our conviction in 
a higher place than human reasons, judgments or conjectures, that is, in the secret 
testimony of the Spirit.”86 While Calvin is directly addressing the authority of Scripture, 
Plantinga contends that the same holds true for belief in God’s existence.87 But what is it 
about the arguments of natural theology that make them unfitting grounds for belief in 
God? 
Plantinga seems to have two responses to this question, both of which suggest that 
stable belief requires a degree of warrant that is not delivered by human arguments. At 
some points, Plantinga simply says that he has never come across an argument for 
Christian or generally theistic belief that confers a degree of warrant sufficient for 
knowledge and strong conviction.88 But at other points he seems willing to suggest that 
such arguments are inherently inadequate.89 In the last chapter we saw that on Plantinga’s 
model, properly basic beliefs hold a stronger position than the non-basic beliefs inferred 
from them. He argues that a probabilistic argument from public evidence and historical 
                                                 
84 WCB, 201. 
85 WCB, 255–268. 
86 “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” 53; RGB, 67; and, WCB, 267; quoting John Calvin, 
Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1960) I, vii, 4, p. 79. 
87 I am deliberately postponing for now the question of the role of the Spirit in belief formation involving 
the sensus divinitatis. 
88 E.g., “I don’t know of good philosophical arguments for the claim that Christian belief is true (and I 
don’t know of conclusive philosophical arguments for the claim that theism is true)” (“Internalism, 
Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For Christian Belief,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 [2001]: 387). 
Or, “I don’t know of an argument for Christian belief that seems very likely to convince one who doesn’t 
already accept its conclusion” (WCB, 201). In God and Other Minds, Plantinga concludes that there are 
no noncircular arguments or evidence to support belief either for or against God. 
89 Arguments cannot deliver the kind of firm conviction that comes when belief is warranted in the basic 
way. “. . .they have (or can have) much more firmness and stability than they could sensibly have if 
accepted on the basis of rational argument” (WCB, 264). 
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investigation could never produce warranted belief in either the existence of God or the 
‘great things of the gospel.’ For Plantinga, the only adequate source of warrant for these 
beliefs exceeds the capacities of the arguments of natural theology and involves directly 
the design and action of God.  
 
If it’s to be the case that at least some people actually know some of the 
claims of Christianity, or even are rational in actually believing them, there 
will have to be a separate source of warrant for such belief, something like, 
following Calvin and Aquinas, the internal testimony (Calvin) or 
instigation (Aquinas) of the Holy Spirit.90 
 
So, for Plantinga, the rejection of natural theology is a recognition that human arguments 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for theistic or Christian belief. As we mentioned in 
chapters 3 and 4, however, the arguments of natural theology retain, in Plantinga’s view, 
considerable value. 
Plantinga’s Role for Arguments and Inference 
Plantinga emphatically denies the charge that he considers efforts to develop 
arguments for Christian belief to be “wrongheaded and inconsequential.”91 On the 
contrary, he maintains that such arguments “can be of use in many different and 
important ways.”92 In order to see the value of the arguments of natural theology for 
Plantinga we will need to relax his above-cited definition of natural theology. The proper 
function of the arguments of natural theology is not to prove or demonstrate God’s 
existence; nevertheless, such arguments can assist belief. For Plantinga, this assistance 
may be apologetical—assisting unbelievers in attaining belief, or pastoral—assisting 
believers in sustaining belief. In either case, arguments may be used by God to boost the 
positive epistemic status of belief or to neutralize and dispel doubt and defeat. In our 
treatment of Plantinga’s position, we will look first at the pastoral role of natural 
theological arguments and then turn to their apologetical function. 
                                                 
90 “Rationality and Public Evidence: a Reply to Richard Swinburne,” Religious Studies 37 (2001): 221. 
91 R. Douglas Geivett and Greg Jesson, “Plantinga’s Externalism and the Terminus of Warrant-Based 
Epistemology,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001): 338. 
92 “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments For Christian Belief,” 384–385. 
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Plantinga believes that rational arguments, which draw conclusions by inference from 
other beliefs, may be useful for those who have already arrived at theistic or Christian 
belief. That the arguments of natural theology might serve a pastoral role in the life of the 
believer is a possibility created by the reality that human faith has not yet been made 
perfect. Like Barth, Plantinga recognizes that our faith finds itself in tension to some 
degree with our unbelief.93 For Barth, our proper attitude is that of the father in Mark 
chapter 9 who cries out to Jesus, “Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.”94 In 
Plantinga’s view, help from the Lord may come in the form of an argument which “can 
help dispel the doubt.”95 The idea here seems to be that at points when faith is waning an 
argument for the reasonableness of faith in light of other beliefs may help to prop-up 
faith. Clearly, for Plantinga, Christian or theistic belief should not require the support of 
argument. Arguments only serve this purpose under less than optimal conditions, namely, 
when faith is in a weakened state. 
Plantinga’s thought diverges from Aquinas in an important way at this point. Plantinga 
repeatedly distinguishes his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, or 
philosophy and theology, as Augustinian rather than Thomist.96 At the heart of this 
distinction is the assertion that, for the Thomist, taking something by faith is 
epistemically inferior to knowing it by reason.97 The knowledge of faith is indirect, 
                                                 
93 Plantinga defers to Calvin, “in the believing mind certainty is mixed with doubt” (“Christian Philosophy 
at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth Century: 
Assessment and Perspective, eds. Sander Griffioen and Bert M. Balk [Kampen, Netherlands: Uitgeverij 
Kok, 1995], 40, quoting John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. 
Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960] III, ii, 18, p. 564). See also WCB, 260n35, 
264n43. 
94 CD I/1, 24 (KD I/1, 23). He also writes, “Even and precisely in the depths of unbelief faith hears the new 
summons to faith” (CD I/1, 255; KD I/1, 269). 
95 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 40. 
96 See “Augustinian Christian Philosophy,” The Monist 75, no. 3 (1992): 316–320; “On Christian 
Scholarship,” in The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University, ed. Theodore Hesburgh (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 157–159; and, “Faith & Reason: A Response to Pope 
John Paul II’s Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio,” Books and Culture 5, no. 4 (1999): 29–31. 
97 The locus classicus for this in Aquinas is Summa Theologiae, I, q. 12. Here we find that faith’s 
advantages over reason have to do with the limitations of reason. Knowledge by faith, however, is 
without intellectual vision and therefore lacks real understanding. Knowledge of God’s essence is not 
available in this mortal life, but awaits the beatific vision which surpasses faith because it is a direct 
seeing. 
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requiring an act of the will trusting in testimony, rather than the direct apprehension 
(scientia) provided by the light of reason. “Hence the knowledge of faith is more like 
hearing than seeing.”98 Plantinga rejects this Thomist characterization of faith and 
knowledge, and recommends instead an ‘Augustinian’ view. On this view, knowing 
something by way of testimony is not necessarily inferior to knowing something by way 
of deductive argument. Thinking back to Plantinga’s general model for how beliefs may 
have warrant, key conditions like design plan, truth orientation, environmental aptness 
and proper function are consistent across a number of different ‘faculties.’ There is 
nothing on Plantinga’s model to support the Thomist class distinction between testimony 
and demonstration. In fact, as Plantinga argues, there are many objects of knowing that 
are better known by testimony than by any other means (e.g., the speed of light, or one’s 
own name). The knowledge of God is a prime example. Genuine knowledge of God 
cannot be arrived at by reasoning alone, but requires God’s self-revealing design and 
action. In the case of God, therefore, hearing is better than seeing—or we might even say 
that hearing is a better seeing than that afforded by otherwise unassisted human 
intellectual vision. 
Plantinga unflinchingly maintains that the arguments of natural theology are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for Christian or theistic belief. How is it then that on Plantinga’s 
account of warrant, in times of weakened faith, such arguments may serve to assist belief 
and dispel doubt? Nowhere are we given a detailed answer;99 however, Plantinga does 
suggest that the warrant for a single belief could come from multiple sources which 
together boost warrant to a level required for knowledge.100 This affords an opportunity 
for the arguments of natural theology to play a positive role. In the previous chapter we 
saw that the impact of sin on cognitive environments and proper function may distort and 
attenuate doxastic experience and belief formation based on either the sensus divinitatis 
or the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS). The impact may diminish warrant to 
such a degree that it is no longer sufficient for knowledge. In this situation the warrant 
boost of a probabilistic or evidential natural theological argument may be such that 
                                                 
98 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 40, 3. 
99 Graham Oppy laments that Plantinga leaves the faith-bolstering role of arguments “seriously 
underdeveloped” (“Natural Theology,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Deane-Peter Baker [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007], 43). 
100 See “The Prospects for Natural Theology,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 311–312. 
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together with the deliverances of faith, “the combination of the two sources is sufficient 
for knowledge.”101  
We entered this discussion focused on the pastoral role of arguments, but the dynamics 
of the relationship between the deliverances of reason and the deliverances of faith are 
similar for the apologetical role. For the believer in the throes of doubt, struggling to 
maintain conviction in what once seemed more certain, arguments may be useful in either 
neutralizing or overwhelming doubt. Doubt may come because of specific defeating 
doubts, and/or it may indicate the weakening of the deliverances of faith.102 The 
arguments of natural theology may serve to defeat doubt directly and/or strengthen belief 
formation. The same is the case for the unbeliever whose warrant for belief is disrupted 
by defeaters and/or weakened by the noetic impact of sin.103 The apologetical role of the 
arguments of natural theology will take either a negative role in the defeating of defeaters, 
or a positive role in overwhelming defeaters (intrinsic defeater-defeaters) or in boosting 
warrant for belief in combination with the sensus divinitatis or IIHS.104 Understood in this 
way, Plantinga is open to the usefulness of both negative and positive apologetics.105 
Nonetheless, many of Plantinga’s interlocutors have wanted to see a greater stress in 
Plantinga’s work on the value of and need for the arguments of natural theology.106 
Plantinga’s primary objective has been to show that theistic and Christian belief may be 
                                                 
101 “Reply,” Philosophical Books 43, no. 2 (2002): 127–128. Plantinga is even willing to suggest that these 
two sources together may provide an “excess of warrant.” Perhaps this is how we are to understand 
Plantinga’s frequent suggestion that the arguments of natural theology may serve as confirmations. In the 
light of faith such arguments are not only more convincing, but actually confer an excess of warrant. 
102 I am not suggesting a weakening in what is offered by the Spirit, but a weakening in its appropriation in 
the human knower. 
103 The noetic impact of sin, it should be remembered, is not confined to noetic degradation due to the 
personal rebellion of the knower in question, but also includes a much broader form of noetic 
degradation due to brokenness in human relationships, thought forms and communication. 
104 For Plantinga’s thoughts on negative and positive apologetics, see “Augustinian Christian Philosophy,” 
292–296; and, “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 37–40. 
105 Michael Sudduth is right to conclude that, “Plantinga’s criticisms of theistic arguments should not be 
construed as undermining positive apologetics, but rather as shaping it in a constructively critical 
manner” (“Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics,” Religious Studies 39 [2003]: 316). 
106 E.g., “I can’t help but agree with David Basinger and the many critics of Reformed epistemology who 
echo his position, that the Christian has a duty to at least attempt to offer a positive apologetic for her 
beliefs” (Deane-Peter Baker, “Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?,” International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 [2005]: 100). 
Chapter 5: Natural Theology 
 
 
150
properly basic with no assistance from inferential reasoning. Some of Plantinga’s more 
sympathetic objectors, however, while not disagreeing with Plantinga’s main point, have 
been strongly critical of how understated the value of argument seems to be in Plantinga’s 
models. Philip Quinn and James Beilby seem to agree that, for many people living in the 
world today, theistic or Christian belief does require the assistance of argument to defeat 
defeaters and/or boost warrant.107 In chapter 4, I addressed the objection that Plantinga’s 
no-defeater condition leaves belief in need of support from arguments thereby 
undermining its basicality. There I argued that the employment of defeater-defeaters, 
which is the enterprise of negative apologetics, does not undermine basicality because the 
arguments do not lend anything themselves positively to warrant. Instead, negative 
apologetical arguments work to remove obstructions to the flow of warrant. Surely, 
though, the same cannot be said for positive apologetics or the kind of arguments that 
might serve cooperatively to boost warrant when human appropriation of the deliverances 
of faith are attenuated by the personal and environmental, cognitive impact of sin. In 
these cases, theistic or Christian belief is no longer purely basic. We will return to this in 
a moment in discussion with Barth where I will make an irenic proposal for how best to 
understand Plantinga’s notion of positive apologetics. 
Plantinga and the Barthian Dilemma 
The only aspect of the theology of Karl Barth that Plantinga ever entertains at any 
depth is Barth’s objection to natural theology, and even then it is only one aspect of 
Barth’s objection to natural theology. Plantinga homes in on an argument Barth makes 
against an apologetical motivation for natural theology. This argument is lifted from a 
larger exposition on how it is that God may be known. Barth’s broader theme in this 
section, simply put, is that the only explanation for the knowability of God is that in 
freedom God “gives Himself to us to be known, thus establishing our knowledge.”108 
                                                 
107 Quinn says this is the case for “intellectually sophisticated adults in our culture” (“In Search of the 
Foundations of Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 [1985]: 481–484). Beilby argues that “typical 
believers” do not take theistic or Christian belief in the purely basic way (Epistemology as Theology: an 
Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology [Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005], 135–137, 139; and “Plantinga’s Model of Warranted Christian Belief,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. 
Deane-Peter Baker [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 147–148). 
108 CD II/1, 69 (KD II/1, 74, “er selber sich uns, unsere Erkenntnis begründend, zu erkennen gibt”). 
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Revelation is “of the Father in Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit.”109 Since the knowledge of 
God is only received as freely given from above, natural theology, which claims an 
independent knowledge of God in hand from below, is impossible. Barth then undertakes 
to examine why it is that natural theology is so popular. One motivation he considers is 
the apologetical impulse, ceasing upon the mistaken assumption that natural theology 
could provide “a common basis of communication between the Church and the world.”110 
Barth strongly affirms the apologetical impulse: 
 
How can the Church be the Church if it is not actively engaged in this 
work; in the work of inviting and guiding from one point to the other, from 
the ignorance to the knowledge of God, and therefore from ungodliness to 
salvation; in the work of pointing the way that leads from the one to the 
other, and to that extent certainly also in the work of striving for a 
common basis of communication?111 
 
The problem with attempting to deploy natural theology in the service of this “work of 
love” is that it pretends to take a different starting-point than the only possible starting-
point, which is faith. Instead, faith masks itself as unbelief. This creates a dilemma. 
Plantinga’s reading of the dilemma is, I think, slightly different from what Barth 
actually proposes to be the dilemma. On Plantinga’s read, the problem is that the believer 
must either genuinely abandon the stand-point of faith or be dishonest toward the 
unbeliever. The resolution to this dilemma, according to Plantinga, is simply for the 
believer not to wear the mask of unbelief at all. In Plantinga’s view, the believer may 
deploy the resources of natural theology in the service of apologetics while being quite 
upfront about the fact that “her belief in God is not based on its relation to the 
deliverances of reason;”112 and, furthermore, that belief in God should not be based on 
arguments. For Barth, however, the whole enterprise of natural theology, as we have seen, 
rests on the assumption that there is a knowledge of God that can be accessed wholly 
from below, without God’s deliberative, personal, self-revealing action. It might be the 
                                                 
109 CD II/1, 68 (KD II/1, 73, “die Offenbarung des Vaters in Jesus Christus durch den Heiligen Geist”). 
110 CD II/1, 91 (KD II/1, 100, “einer gemeinsamen Gesprächsbasis zwischen Kirche und Welt”). 
111 CD II/1, 92 (KD II/1, 101, “Wie wäre die Kirche die Kirche, wenn sie heir nicht im Werk begriffen wäre 
. . . auch in dem Werk der Bemühung um eine gemeinsame Gesprächsbasis?”). 
112 RBG, 71. 
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case that the existence of a being bearing a few of the abstract metaphysical attributes of 
the classical definition of ‘God’ does follow or is highly likely given other propositions 
affirmed by the unbeliever. Moreover, attempting to point this out to the unbeliever may 
be a charitable Christian act. The grave danger of this endeavor, is that it appears to 
suggest that a genuine knowledge of God is humanly accessible without the Spirit’s 
immediate, deliberative, personal, self-revealing activity in the gift of faith. 
Barth’s dilemma is slightly different from the one Plantinga finds. For Barth, the 
apologetical deployment of natural theology entails a masking of faith. The first horn of 
the dilemma is not that faith would actually abandon itself to remain genuine, but that 
masquerading faith would achieve a ‘successful’ result. The second horn is that 
masquerading faith would fail to convince. Either result will not be the genuine 
knowledge of God that can only come with the gift of faith, but rather a hardening 
towards faith. In the case of ‘success’ it might be that the unbeliever agrees that 
something like theism could be affirmed on the basis of inference from propositions 
already held. The problem with this is that it is not faith; it is not a genuine knowledge of 
God; and, it has not served to move the unbeliever out of self-sufficient reliance on the 
deliverances of reason to receive a genuine knowledge of God by the Spirit’s gift of faith. 
What is more likely to happen, in Barth’s estimation, is that this weak ‘success’ will 
inoculate the converted against full-fledged Christian belief. By the introduction of a 
weak belief under the human steam of ‘reason alone’ “unbelief will . . . fortify itself all 
the more against faith.”113 The other horn of the dilemma is that the project will fail 
entirely. In this case, “unbelief will be of the opinion that it has successfully defended 
itself against faith,”114 serving to bolster all the more the self-assurance of unbelief. The 
unbeliever will think that the claims of faith have been considered and found wanting. In 
reality, the unbeliever has been allowed to resist a real encounter with the claims of faith, 
which are not met like a set of proposals to be considered from an academic distance 
according to their knowability in light of existing beliefs. The claims of faith not only 
make assertions about what is true and false about God and the world, but are 
accompanied with the authority of God’s own testimony known in a personal encounter 
with God by the Spirit where the criteria for evaluation of the asserted propositions is 
                                                 
113 CD II/1, 93 (KD II/1, 102, “der Unglaube wird . . . sich in ihr . . . häuslich niederlassen und gegen den 
Glauben erst recht verschanzt”). 
114 CD II/1, 93–94 (KD II/1, 103, “dann wird der Unglaube der Meinung sein . . . erfolgreich erwehrt zu 
haben”). 
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included itself with the gift. The deployment of natural theology in the service of 
apologetics fails because, instead of challenging human rational self-sufficiency, it 
panders to it. 
Plantinga’s conclusions from his brief excursus on Barth are right on target, even if 
they are an incomplete picture of Barth’s position. Plantinga is certainly correct that Barth 
rejects classical foundationalism and the notion that belief itself should be based on what 
we can infer from what we already believe. Though Plantinga is happy to countenance a 
roll for arguments in bolstering weak faith, Barth and Plantinga seem to agree that “the 
correct and proper way to believe in God. . .[is] not on the basis of arguments from 
natural theology or anywhere else.”115 There is, however, more to Barth’s concern. For 
Barth, convincing someone with an argument to affirm the existence of a being who 
possesses a number of the metaphysical attributes traditionally affirmed in classical 
theism is not a worthwhile accomplishment. Belief on the basis of argument could never 
be belief in the Christian God, because an argument could never warrant genuine 
knowledge of the true God. By playing up to reason’s assumed self-sufficiency, the 
approach of natural theology discourages faith. 
It is intriguing to think about just what Barth might have made of Plantinga’s proposal 
for escaping the dilemma. Plantinga’s suggestion is that apologetics which makes 
recourse to the positive arguments of natural theology need not be conducted in such a 
way as to imply that its arguments ought to be taken as the basis for belief. If Plantinga is 
right, and I think he is, this suggestion appears to neutralize Barth’s main concern. We 
could extend the proposal even further to address Barth’s concerns by adding that the 
Christian apologist would underscore the difference between an affirmation of the 
conclusion of a natural theological argument and genuine knowledge of the true God. It 
seems to me that such provisos would mitigate against the worries of Barth’s dilemma. 
The unbeliever who rejects the arguments of natural theology would understand that she 
has not rejected the basis for Christian belief as taken from the perspective of belief. The 
unbeliever who accepts the conclusions of an argument from natural theology would see 
that the warrant for belief in the God who exists derives from God and not the argument.   
                                                 
115 RBG, 72. 
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Part III: The Relationship Between Barth and Plantinga on 
Natural Theology 
The agreement between Barth and Plantinga on natural theology is substantial though 
not total. Both reject the common assumptions which have grown up around natural 
theology since the Enlightenment. They agree not only that human arguments are 
unnecessary for attaining a knowledge of God, but that the deliverances of human reason 
do not provide adequate warrant for Christian belief. It should not be a surprise that the 
ways they arrive at this shared conclusion are different. We saw that Barth reasons 
directly from his theology of revelation. God in his revelation is genuinely humanly 
known, but also known to be utterly free and unique—a knowledge beyond all 
independent human capacity. Revelation must be from above; it must be the personal self-
revelation of the Father. And, it must address the inadequacies of human fallenness and 
finitude; it must transform the human knower by communion with Jesus Christ. 
Moreover, it must create its own capacity for human reception; the Spirit of God must 
provide for the human knower, in the gift of faith, the subjective reception of revelation. 
The only revelation of God to human beings is provided by God is in this, his trinitarian 
act of self-revelation. This self-revealing describes, therefore, the only possible warrant 
for Christian belief. 
Plantinga does not argue from an elaborate trinitarian theology of revelation. His main 
point is to defend the possibility of the proper basicality of Christian belief from its 
flawed philosophical objections. It is, in this sense, a form of negative apologetics—
showing up the inadequacy of potential defeaters to divinely initiated revelation. His 
appeals to Christian theology are not an attempt to demonstrate the truth of the matter. 
Instead, he takes a model from Christian theology and argues that if it is true then all 
philosophical objections to it fail. It is significant that for both Barth and Plantinga, the 
theology of revelation is the pivot point of their arguments. Barth, as a Christian 
theologian, assumes the basis of faith and argues from it. Plantinga, as a Christian 
philosopher, considers how a theological account of warrant would impact questions and 
assumptions in religious epistemology. 
This is not to say that Barth and Plantinga fundamentally agree on all important 
aspects of the question of natural theology. There remain several areas of tension that 
need to be considered, which we will examine under the following three questions: 1) Do 
Barth and Plantinga agree on a negative role for natural theology? 2) Do they agree on a 
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positive role for natural theology? 3) Do they agree about the nature of the sensus 
divinitatis? 
Do Barth and Plantinga Agree on a Negative Role for Natural Theology? 
Important to answering this question is to be very clear about what is meant by ‘a 
negative role.’ We are not concerned here with via negativa natural theology, which 
attempts to arrive at a knowledge of God through a consideration of what God is not. We 
are, instead, interested in the possibility of natural theology providing a negative service 
through a challenging of unbelief. There is a suggestion in Barth’s writing that natural 
theology should not be allowed even a negative function. This arises particularly in 
connection with Brunner’s eristics, which Barth understands to be a kind of negative 
apologetics that serves as a propaedeutic to faith by confronting the resistance of human 
rational self-sufficiency.116 There are significant parallels to Plantinga’s negative 
apologetical enterprise. Plantinga seeks to undermine the reigning rationally self-
sufficient paradigms of justification and warrant in order to defend the possibility of 
warrant by faith. Why might Barth object to this? What Barth objects to is the idea that 
theology might depend in some way on the prolegomena of even a negative natural 
theology. What he opposes is the idea that a negative natural theology might contribute in 
any substantive way to the actualization of a genuine human knowledge of God. What we 
find, in fact, is that what Barth really rejects is the idea that negative natural theology 
might play a positive role in coming to faith.117 
For Plantinga, ‘negative’ apologetics responds to objections to Christian belief; it is 
aimed at defeating defeaters. In the language of warrant we could class negative natural 
theology as an attempt to remove barriers to the proper transfer of warrant for Christian 
belief, without contributing to that warrant. What moves a person to faith is not the 
human argument. It might seem unlikely, however, that Barth would be content even with 
these qualifications. Answering objections by appealing to reason might mean entering 
the realm of the “godless reason of man which is inimical to belief.”118 Faith has its own 
resources for defense. Revelation can defend itself. Should we understand Barth as 
                                                 
116 CD I/1, 26–31 (KD I/1, 25–30). 
117 As it is first encountered in the Church Dogmatics, apologetics and eristics are considered and rejected 
as necessary prolegomena to dogmatics (CD I/1, 25–31; KD I/1, 24–30). 
118 CD I/1, 28 (KD I/1, 27, “glaubenslosen und glaubenswidrigen Vernunft des Menschen”). 
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opposed to the work of Christian philosophers defending the faith against objections? 
From the material already covered, it should be clear that this is not at all the point of 
Barth’s comments on the rebellion of human reason and the self-vindicating nature of 
revelation. We can grant that Barth maintains that the struggle between reason and 
revelation should “not [be] oriented to the contradiction of reason but to the declaration of 
revelation.”119 This view, however, is not necessarily at odds with Plantinga’s approach. 
Optimally, faith will be so strong that it operates as an intrinsic defeater-defeater. Ideally, 
on the deliverances of faith alone, belief will be so compelling that any objection to it will 
be unbelievable, and, therefore, not require refutation. But, the fact that the refutation of 
objections is not required in ideal cases of belief, does not mean that refuting an objection 
is somehow unhelpful or that it might not be useful in defusing doubt. 
Extreme care is needed here to comprehend Barth’s position. We ought to ensure that 
we not reinstate the caricatures that were challenged in chapter 2. There we saw that it is 
not philosophy or human reason per se that Barth opposes, it is the orientation of human 
reason to unbelief and the false independence with which philosophy approaches the 
knowability of God. Plantinga’s approach, however, is nothing like what Barth is 
opposing. He certainly understands that the Christian philosopher need not work 
independently from the light of faith. The Christian apologist need not adopt an 
orientation of unbelief or assume the autonomy of human reason. In addition, Barth never 
claims that human reason cannot give us some provisional knowledge of what is true 
about the world, or the capacity to see in some instances what is logically impossible, 
even with respect to God. It is only the genuine knowledge of God that Barth insists must 
come by the transformative grace of God in Christ by the Spirit’s gift of faith. Nothing 
Plantinga affirms about a negative role for natural theology seems to violate these 
worries. Moreover, Plantinga’s position is entirely consistent with Barth’s nuanced 
trinitarian theology of revelation. He acknowledges the helpfulness of removing 
objections in the service of belief not because of inadequacies in the gift of faith, but 
because of human resistance. If we consider what Barth means by ‘natural theology,’ we 
must conclude that Plantinga’s negative natural theology is categorically not a subspecies 
thereof. In fact, it is exceedingly unlikely that Barth would place Plantinga’s negative 
natural theology under the rubric of ‘theology’ whatsoever. It is, perhaps, more accurate 
                                                 
119 CD I/1, 29 (KD I/1, 27, “nicht am Widerspruch der Vernunft, sondern am Spruch der Offenbarung 
orientiert”). 
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to classify Plantinga’s negative apologetics as a concern of Christian philosophy, while in 
no way demoting its importance or value for the church. In conclusion, therefore, while 
Barth does not explicitly endorse any role for negative apologetics,120 all things 
considered, Plantinga shows that it is possible to remain consistent with Barth’s theology 
of revelation and the all-sufficiency of the deliverances of faith while maintaining a vital 
role for and Christian approach to negative apologetics. 
We now turn to the question of a positive role for natural theology, where we would 
expect not to find the same degree of compatibility that we have found with respect to a 
negative role. 
Do Barth and Plantinga Agree on a Positive Role for Natural Theology? 
If negative natural theology removes barriers to warranted Christian belief without 
contributing to that warrant, positive natural theology attempts to bolster Christian belief 
by providing arguments that contribute directly to the warrant for belief. We saw that 
Plantinga is happy to endorse the benefits of such an enterprise. Arguments in support of 
Christian belief may be helpful when the warrant humanly received from the deliverances 
of faith is insufficient for knowledge and, therefore, belief. The value of natural theology 
is, again, the service it provides in the less than ideal situations of weakened faith. And, 
Plantinga is clear that the arguments of natural theology could never, on their own, 
provide sufficient warrant for belief. He seems to accept, nevertheless, the possibility that 
human arguments might, in some small way, contribute to the warrant for Christian 
belief. As we have seen, this just will not fly for Barth. The suggestion that the 
deliverances of human reason might be able to contribute even weakly to a genuine 
knowledge of God undermines Barth’s uncompromising theology of revelation from 
                                                 
120 Barth does in fact address the question of negative apologetics, but has in mind something much 
different than Plantinga’s proposals. The negative apologetics in Barth’s crosshairs is an approach like 
Brunner’s eristics, in which a positive case was built on an analysis of the problem of human existence 
(see Brunner’s “Die Andere Aufgabe der Theologie,” 255–276). Tjarko Stadtland suggests that Barth 
proposed a kind of negative natural theology ( Eschatologie und Geschichte in der Theologie des jungen 
Karl Barth [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1966], 116). Bruce McCormack objects to 
Stadtland’s proposal (Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 259–260). Barth also 
refuses a negative point of contact in his “Antwort an Erwin Reisner,” Evangelische Theologie 2 (1935): 
51–66; and, he objects to a via negativa approach to the knowledge of God in CD III/1, 372–375 (KD 
III/1, 426–429). 
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above. Even to crack the door slightly would be to open the flood gates from below, 
fueling the Feuerbachian suspicion and eclipsing any confidence in a genuine human 
knowledge of God from God. For Barth, we cannot afford to be epistemological semi-
Pelagians. Sola gratia in theological epistemology must be guarded vigilantly. What is 
more, any concession here would affirm the possibility of a supplementary revelation to 
the revelation of God in Christ. This might imply that there is more that can be known 
about the Father than is revealed in Jesus Christ, which would no less than shatter the 
unity of the Trinity.121 The question we face is whether there might be any way to 
understand Plantinga’s openness to a warrant-contributing role for natural theology that 
does not violate Barth’s concerns. 
We might begin with the question of whether and how it is possible that warrant for a 
single belief could come from multiple, combined sources. It seems to me that there are 
two ways this might go.122 To make the distinction between these two ways more evident, 
let me offer the following ordinary kind of belief scenario: 
 
The Mailman: At around ten in the morning as my wife is deeply 
engrossed in the translation of some French manuscript, she is distracted 
by a sudden though seemingly inarticulate sound. She walks to the front 
window where she catches a glimpse of a man in the shadows, just exiting 
through the gate. She does not know what to conclude from this until she 
realizes the time and remembers that at about this time each day, and 
without fail, the mailman delivers the post through the slot in our front 
door. She immediately forms the warranted conclusion that it was the 
mailman she saw and the sound of the mail coming through the door that 
she heard. 
 
                                                 
121 “If revelation is to be taken seriously as God’s presence, if there is to be a valid belief in revelation, then 
in no sense can Christ and the Spirit be subordinate hypostases. In the predicate and object of the concept 
revelation we must again have, and to no less a degree, the subject itself. Revelation and revealing must 
be equal to the revealer” (CD I/1, 353; KD I/1, 372). 
122 It should be clear that the following analysis is not a theological argument; instead, I am adopting a 
Plantinga-like inductive approach from instances of ordinary belief in support of a proposal for how we 
might conceive of the contribution of natural theology within a Barthian theology of revelation. 
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There are at least two ways to understand the nature of the combination of warrant in this 
scenario. One possibility (for ease of reference—CW1) is that warrant for the belief 
actually derives by an inference made on the basis of beliefs that issue from multiple 
independent faculties. Sense perception weakly captures a sound and a figure, and issues 
the belief, along with the attending obscure phenomenology, that a sound was heard and a 
figure seen. A belief about the time of day is formed perhaps purely on the basis of 
circadian rhythm. And, a belief about the regularity and punctuality of the mailman issues 
from memory. At this point, reason takes on a coordinating role forming the belief on the 
basis of inference from other beliefs that the mailman was seen and heard. As with any 
case of inference, the warrant for the inference in CW1 will only be as strong as the 
warrant for the beliefs it is inferred from. In CW1 there is a real combination of sources. If 
any of the sources mentioned is removed, warrant for the conclusion would be 
diminished.  
There is, however, a second possibility for how things might go—CW2. CW2 proceeds 
exactly as CW1 except that something interesting happens with respect to the faculty of 
sense perception. The faculty of sense perception does not always complete its task 
immediately. As my wife is processing the other sources of warrant for her conclusion the 
phenomenal experiences of the faculty of sense perception are still fresh in mind. In CW2 
the suggestion of the inference assists either external rationality in its formation of the 
phenomenal experience, or internal rationality in its forming of the appropriate belief in 
response to that phenomenology. In other words, the inference serves as a catalyst for the 
proper functioning of the faculty of sense experience. My wife now more clearly 
perceives the sound that initially broke into her state of concentration and the figure she 
saw exiting our gate. The belief she holds about having heard and seen the mailman is no 
longer a deduction, but, more securely, a perception. The warrant for the belief now 
swings free from the other sources and the inference. It is even possible that she might 
discover she was incorrect about the time, or forgot that the post is wildly unpredictable 
in our town. But, if it were indeed the mailman she encountered, she could now be 
warranted in her belief, held in the basic way on the basis of sense perception alone,123 
even if the same belief earlier held on the basis of the catalyzing inference was, in fact, 
unwarranted. 
                                                 
123 Note that I take the faculty of sense perception to be more than the presentation of strictly empirical data. 
Sense perception also includes the learned apprehension of the forms of that data. 
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Returning to the possibility of a positive role for natural theological arguments, we can 
now ask whether there is a construal of multiple sources of warrant along the lines of 
either CW1 or CW2 that would be free from Barth’s proscriptions. It seems to me that this 
is exactly what we have if the relationship between inference and basic belief is as it is in 
CW2. Consider another scenario, this time one of theistic belief: 
 
Theistic Belief (Faith + Human Testimony): Joe Bloggs does not believe 
that God exists, but he does notice that he has some inclinations to believe. 
Unbeknownst to Joe, the Holy Spirit is active in his life, offering him 
transforming faith. Unfortunately, because of internal and environment 
resistance, the deliverances of faith are not yet strong enough in Joe to 
warrant belief. He does, however, have a few new friends who are strong 
believers and insist to Joe that God is very real. On the basis of the 
testimony of his friends in combination with the otherwise insufficient 
deliverances of faith, Joe find himself believing and warrantedly so. 
 
The sources of warrant are different in this scenario than they were in the previous 
scenario, though inference may still play a role. Belief on the basis of testimony may 
involve an inference from a basic belief in the credibility of Joe’s friends and the 
earnestness of their conviction.124 There is, in any case, a CW2-like way to think about the 
relationship of the identified contributors to warrant. Warrant by way of testimony could 
be seen to be acting as a catalyst for belief that will properly rest on the deliverances of 
faith alone. If things go in the CW2-way, Joe’s belief will grow independent of the 
testimony and credibility of his friends. The testimony of friends serves to clarify the 
deliverances of faith in accordance with proper function. Human testimony cooperates 
with the testimony of the Holy Spirit not as an independent source of warrant, but as one 
condition under which faith by the Spirit is realized. 
                                                 
124 If we follow Thomas Reid’s thought on testimony and credulity, believing testimony involves no 
inference. Credibility is assumed, though it can be defeated by discrediting the witness. Credulity is an 
innate gift and a natural faculty—“a disposition to confide in the veracity of others and to believe what 
they tell us” (Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind: An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, eds. Dugald Stewart and G. N. Wright [London: T. Tegg, 
1843], Ch. 6, Sec. 24, 567).  
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This scenario is particularly helpful for thinking about the problem at hand for three 
reasons. Firstly, the scenario seems to capture the experience that many believers have 
when coming to belief. Many believers experience a transition from the partial support of 
the testimony of friends or parents to believing in the basic way. Secondly, the fact that 
this is so does not seem to violate any of Barth’s concerns. This scenario of belief, even 
though it begins with a belief based partially on inference (or a natural capacity to believe 
testimony), fits well with Barth’s theology of revelation. This is especially the case if we 
understand God to be directly involved with Joe’s believing the testimony of his friends 
or perceiving their credibility. Thirdly, we can quite easily alter the scenario by replacing 
the testimony of friends with a natural theological argument. If it is true that the 
deliverances of faith and human testimony could combine in the CW2-way and not violate 
Barth’s concerns, then it should be the same for an argument from inference.  
It seems that CW2-type warrant collaboration is the best way to understand Plantinga’s 
suggestion that other sources of warrant may combine with the deliverances of faith to 
bolster belief. Plantinga may tip his hat in this direction in the following comments on the 
warrant-boost of arguments: 
 
Theistic arguments can obviously be of value for those who don’t already 
believe, they can move them closer to belief, and can bring it about that 
belief in God is at any rate among the live options for them. Only God 
bestows saving faith, of course, but his way of doing so can certainly 
involve cooperation with his children, as in preaching and even 
argumentation.125 
 
The view here seems to be of arguments functioning as warrant catalysts within the 
orchestration of the sovereign action of God. There is no sense of an independent rational 
capacity to bring oneself to belief or even to contribute to the warrant for full fledged 
faith. Plantinga, moreover, draws a parallel between the testimony of preaching and the 
function of arguments. Taken in the CW2-way, what is compelling about a proclamation 
or what seems reasonable about an argument does not become a permanent fixture of the 
warrant for belief. Argumentation, like proclamation, serves (non-arbitrarily) as a catalyst 
                                                 
125 Plantinga, “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 40. 
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by the power of God to clarify the deliverances of faith according to proper function.126 
Read in the CW2-way, Plantinga’s notion of the positive role of natural theology does not 
conflict with Barth’s theology of revelation. 
There is a critical difficulty, however, with this proposal for harmonizing Plantinga 
with Barth. The problem is that, while Plantinga does seem to endorse the CW2 construal 
of warrant source collaboration, where mature belief will derive from the deliverances of 
faith alone, he certainly never repudiates CW1, where knowledge is enabled partially on 
the basis of the supplementary warrant of natural theological argumentation. Is this one 
point, therefore, where Plantinga and Barth simply part ways? Has Plantinga 
compromised on epistemological sola gratia? Not necessarily. To see why, we need to 
remember that on Plantinga’s system, the work of the Spirit and the deliverances of faith 
have a critical enabling impact on other sources of warrant. The IIHS is conceived of as 
part of a process that addresses the noetic effects of sin to restore proper function in other 
faculties. What is more, the deliverances of faith begin to transform one’s interpretive 
grid in ways that may be enormously influential to internal rationality, which is the place 
where belief formation is completed for all belief forming faculties or processes. 
Assessing the probabilities associated with historical evidence127 or the strength of the 
premises of an argument depends to a great degree on the relative priorities of one’s 
existing nexus of belief. It is, therefore, possible to maintain that even on the CW1 
construal of collaborative warrant, those sources of warrant that supplement the 
deliverances of faith, to the extent that they are contributing to the warrant for theistic or 
Christian belief, do so by the influence of the transformational work of the Holy Spirit. In 
this case, alternative sources of warrant are not understood strictly as catalysts for belief 
by the deliverances of faith, but rather as extensions of the deliverances of faith. In this 
light, even arguments that support faith can be seen as operating not by mere human 
strength, but by the deliberate action of God. God creates and sustains his own possibility 
                                                 
126 The interpretation of Plantinga in the above citation may also hang on the notion of ‘saving faith,’ which 
we will take up in the next chapter. 
127 While Plantinga is open to historical evidence supplementing warrant from the IIHS to boost the warrant 
for belief in the resurrection of Jesus, he is clear that properly judging the probabilities involved is not 
possible on the basis of the data alone. See WCB, 271–280, and, ‘Ad Wykstra’ in “Reply” (2002), 124–
128. Keith Mascord incorrectly suggests that Plantinga allows no role whatsoever for arguments from 
historical evidence in support of Christian belief (Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics, 168ff, 207–
209). 
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of being known, making use of arguments from reason as the harmonic cognitive 
reverberations of faith, creating a crescendo of warrant sufficient for knowledge. 
In summary, I have argued that there are good ways of thinking about the function of 
natural theological arguments that do not run afoul of Barth’s anathemas. Barth’s 
objections to natural theology are based on the impossibility of independent human 
sources of the knowledge of God outside of the deliberative action of God’s self-
revelation in Christ by the Spirit. If we understand the arguments of natural theology to 
function as catalysts to or extensions of the deliverances of faith, there is nothing 
independently natural about them. My proposal is not only that this gives us a way to 
understand Plantinga’s notion of the positive role of natural theology in a way that does 
not conflict with Barth’s theology of revelation or epistemological sola gratia. It also 
provides the best way to understand Plantinga’s direct comments on the matter and their 
coherence with his wider corpus. 
Do Barth and Plantinga Agree About the Nature of the Sensus Divinitatis? 
We return now to a question raised by Plantinga’s A/C model in chapter 4. In Barth’s 
view, the dangers of natural theology have to do not only with human arguments, but with 
any natural human capacity for the knowledge of God which functions independently of 
the supernatural activity of divine self-revelation. Does this rule out the possibility of a 
sensus divinitatis as Plantinga conceives? The distinction is drawn fairly clearly by 
Plantinga. “On my model, there is both natural knowledge of God by way of the sensus 
divinitatis (‘SD’) and non-natural or supernatural knowledge of God, knowledge that 
comes as a result of the IIHS.”128 The sensus divinitatis is “part of our original increated 
cognitive equipment.”129 The IIHS, by contrast, “consists in direct divine activity”130 and 
was inaugurated as “a special divine response to sin.”131 Sin has a debilitating effect on 
the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis; but, “by virtue of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the hearts of those to whom faith is given, the ravages of sin (including the 
cognitive damage) are repaired, gradually or suddenly, to a greater or lesser extent.”132 
                                                 
128 ‘Ad Sudduth’ in “Reply” (2002), 132. 
129 WCB, 246n10. 
130 Ibid. 
131 WCB, 180. 
132 WCB, 243–244. 
Chapter 5: Natural Theology 
 
 
164
This means that on Plantinga’s scheme a natural human capacity for knowledge of God 
can be restored to some degree as a result of the combined revealing and healing work of 
the Spirit who ministers to us the benefits of Jesus Christ. 
It would certainly appear that Barth dismissed Brunner for far less than this. 
Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis seems to fit the description of exactly what Barth rejects—
independent human access to a knowledge of God. But, just what does the sensus 
divinitatis deliver? Plantinga’s A/C model, which draws from Calvin’s development of 
the sensus divinitatis,133 is intended to explain how theistic belief might have warrant. 
The sensus divinitatis provides a rather minimalist ‘awareness of divinity,’ which, for 
Plantinga, does not amount to much more than an awareness that God exists and should 
be worshiped and obeyed.134 Specifying the content of this knowledge is a slippery 
business. What is meant by any assertion depends in part on what is meant by the 
referring terms. If God is to be the referent of the affirmation of existence, and the 
affirmation is meant really to affirm something, then God must somehow be known by 
the referrer. The sensus divinitatis cannot provide a knowledge of God’s existence 
without an accompanying knowledge of who exists. What is the nature of this knowledge 
of the referent who is known to exist? This is a difficult but important question—one that 
will inform decisively our understanding of the apparent disagreement between Barth and 
Plantinga. The question turns on precisely what they believe counts as knowledge of God, 
which we will address in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
The differences between Plantinga and Barth on the sensus divinitatis may be similar 
to the other differences on natural theology which we have considered. They do not 
expose a fundamental theological or philosophical incompatibility. The differences are 
better explained as the consequence of differences in the purpose and nature of their 
work. As a Christian theologian Barth is attempting to reflect the inner priorities of 
Christian theology and emphasize those priorities over and against critical areas of 
potential distortion. It would be antithetical to Barth’s task if he were to highlight the 
                                                 
133 “Here I want to propose a model based on Calvin’s version of the suggestion, not because I think Calvin 
should be the cynosure of all eyes theological, but because he presents an interesting development of the 
particular thought in question” (WCB, 170). 
134 WCB, 177. Plantinga is, in this respect, still following Calvin. 
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virtues of our epistemological gifts without emphasizing their utter inadequacy outside of 
God’s giving of himself to be known and his decision to involve our faculties in his self-
revealing. Plantinga’s purposes are considerably different. He operates as a Christian 
philosopher with the particular goal of defending the possibility that belief could have 
warrant without reposing on an argument or demonstrable evidence. Plantinga’s models 
are intentionally theologically minimalist. Though they are intended to be faithful to 
Christian theology, they make no pretenses of being comprehensive theological accounts. 
In this chapter we began with a clarification of the main concerns that drive Barth’s 
objection to natural theology. I argued that the only construal of natural theology that 
would be compatible with Barth’s theology of revelation is one that maintains that God 
can only be genuinely known in his personal, trinitarian act of self-revelation. Any aspect 
of the created order may serve as the locus of divine revealing, but never its source. We 
then turned to Plantinga’s much more modest objection to natural theology, which 
consists of an argument for both the insufficiency and the non-necessity of natural 
theological arguments for warranted theistic or Christian belief. Finally, we focused on 
the points of apparent tension where Plantinga’s proposals threaten to encroach on 
Barth’s concerns. I reasoned that natural theological arguments in Plantinga’s thought are 
best understood as functioning within the realm of supernatural revelation and not 
independent from it. Such arguments are either defensive, and do not contribute at all to 
the warrant for belief, or they function as catalysts to or extensions of the deliverances of 
faith. We left open for analysis in the next chapter the possibility of that Plantinga’s 
notion of the sensus divinitatis delivers the kind of natural knowledge of God Barth 
rejects. 
There remains a critical area of investigation that we have explicitly avoided in the 
discussion on natural theology. This is the question of the relationship between faith and 
what constitutes a genuine knowledge of God. An assessment of the compatibility and 
complementarity of Barth and Plantinga will require adequately understanding what is 
meant by their core conceptions of faith and the knowledge of God. 
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In chapter 5 we discussed the views of Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga on natural 
theology and apologetics. Taking advantage of the groundwork laid in chapters 1 and 2, 
we established that, Barth’s principal concern is to maintain that a genuine knowledge of 
God is only possible by the free, self-revealing action of the Father through the Son by 
the Spirit. I argued that there are ways of thinking about revelation and rational arguments 
which preserve Barth’s concern for the centrality of divine self-revealing action. I 
suggested, furthermore, plausible interpretations of Plantinga’s thought in which free 
divine action retained an exclusive warrant-contributing role. In that discussion, however, 
we bracketed a crucial question. Do Barth and Plantinga have the same thing in mind 
when they speak about knowing God? A difference on this point could be quite 
significant, either masking disagreement or exaggerating tension. The purpose of this 
chapter is to clarify what constitutes a genuine human knowledge of God according to 
Barth and Plantinga, and to assess the impact of the differences between them. We will 
find that Barth operates with a stricter notion of the nature of the knowledge of God, 
while Plantinga offers helpful distinctions among various kinds of knowledge. These 
differences highlight important areas for clarification and analysis regarding, particularly, 
the relationships between transforming faith, personal revelation and rational 
propositions. 
6 
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Barth and Three Aspects of the Knowledge of Faith 
In chapter 1, we noted that, for Barth, revelation is the miracle of divine personal self-
disclosure to human beings. Revelation is, in fact, personified in Jesus Christ, the 
incarnate Son.1 He is the real content of revelation. In the incarnation, Scripture and 
preaching, God uses creaturely means to speak to creatures. Not even in the incarnation, 
however, does revelation become transparent through the creaturely veil. Christ’s human 
nature remains human, it is not divinized. Human blindness remains not only because of 
the noetic effects of sin, but even more fundamentally, because of the limits of creatures 
and creaturely media to contain divine revelation. Knowledge of God only becomes a 
human possibility by the free decision of God, who, through the work of the Spirit and by 
means of creaturely media, gives human beings a sharing in the knowledge of Christ. This 
process of coming to know God is the gift of faith. Only in faith does the Spirit (the 
revealedness of God) become for us our subjective apprehension of the knowledge of 
God.2  
For Barth, a human knowledge of God is genuine if and only if it is knowledge by 
faith. Our objective here, therefore, is to discern, if possible, what it means to know God 
by faith. We made significant progress in this direction in chapter 1. There we saw, 
among other things, that for Barth the knowledge of God is personal, cognitive, and 
transformative. It is worth unpacking these notions again briefly here.3  
Perhaps the first thing to note is that personal, cognitive and transformative do not 
refer to three distinct kinds of knowing. It is better to think of these qualifiers as 
designating three aspects of an integrative, unitary knowledge. We will seek to 
distinguish each qualifier, one from the other, for the sake of understanding the breadth of 
                                                 
1 “For He is revelation, divine-human reality” (CD I/1, 18; KD I/1, 17). 
2 “If one asks about the reality of the knowledge of God, which is so inconceivable in its How, which can 
be revealed only by God, which can be proclaimed by man only in the service of God and in virtue of 
His presence; if one asks what this reality is in so far as the knowability of God is included within it, the 
only possible answer which is both accurate and exhaustive is that this reality is faith” (CD I/1, 228; KD 
I/1, 240). 
3 Barth felt that the most appropriate word for describing the knowledge of faith was Anerkennung 
(acknowledgement). He identifies three characteristics of the Word of God as the speech of God. The 
Word of God is spiritual, personal and purposive. These correspond respectively to our cognitive, 
personal and transformational. See CD I/1, 132–143, 205 (KD I/1, 136–148, 214). 
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Barth’s conception. It would, however, be a serious mistake to think that these three 
aspects of the knowledge of faith stand on their own or operate independently. 
As we have already mentioned, the controlling feature of Barth’s notion of revelation 
is the personal, free, trinitarian action of God. It is the personal nature of revelation that 
makes revelation both cognitive and transformative. The knowledge of God is said to be 
personal because it is fundamentally a being brought to Jesus Christ, the personal 
revelation of God. “Faith . . . is the gracious address of God to man, the free personal 
presence of Jesus Christ in his activity.”4 Knowledge by faith is not principally a transfer 
of information or abstract mental illumination. The knowledge of faith is personal on both 
the divine side and on the human side—it is God’s personal encounter with human 
persons.5 
One consequence of this personal encounter with God is human transformation, the 
inauguration of the healing of sinful humanity and the beginning of repentance. In Barth’s 
view, revelation is reconciliation,6 and the eschatological consummation of reconciliation 
is redemption.7 Revelation does not instantly and absolutely eradicate the corruption of 
human conceptuality and language; nevertheless, it overcomes the noetic effects of sin to 
provide genuine human knowing, thereby initiating the proper human response. 
Consequently, the impact of personal divine address includes human acknowledgement of 
and submission to Revelation. In Barth’s assessment of πι´στις in the New Testament, he 
concludes that, while the action and faithfulness of God is the foundational principle, the 
term also embraces faith’s human impact and response.8 The transformation of revelation 
                                                 
4 CD I/1, 18 (KD I/1, 17, “der Glaube . . . ist . . . die gnädige Zuwendung Gottes zum Menschen, die freie 
persönliche Gegenwart Jesu Christi im Handeln des Menschen”). 
5 Speaking of the reformers, Barth writes “they could understand the presence of the holy God among 
unholy men only as the grace of the strictly personal free Word of God which reaches its goal in the 
equally personal free hearing of men, the hearing of faith” (CD I/1, 68; KD I/1, 69). 
6 “The work of the Son or Word is the presence and declaration of God which, in view of the fact that it 
takes place miraculously in and in spite of human darkness, we can only describe as revelation. The term 
reconciliation is another word for the same thing” (CD I/1, 409; KD I/1, 429–30). 
7 “He is not just the Redeemer, so surely does redemption stand in indissoluble correlation with 
reconciliation, so surely does reconciliation reach its consummation in redemption” (CD I/1, 471; KD 
I/1, 494). 
8 “In the πι´στις ‘Ιησου Χριστου we see the divine decision made about man. Only then and on this basis 
does the word slip down, as it were, into the sphere of human actions; now . . . πι´στις is fairly frequently 
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is a feature of being drawn into participation by the Spirit in Christ’s knowing of the 
Father.9 
The other consequence of the personal nature of revelation is human cognitive content. 
As stressed in the first chapter, Barth’s affirmation of the personal character of faith 
should not be taken to mean that revelation is strictly numinous, amorphously experiential 
or exclusively meta-cognitional.10 He firmly underscores the cognitive, verbal and 
rational nature of divine address.11 Despite Barth’s forthright statements, his reserves 
about divine freedom and creaturely limitations leave some with the impression that Barth 
is finally endorsing bald irrationalism.12 It is my view that this confusion may have at its 
root a misunderstanding of Barth’s fundamental attitude toward propositions with respect 
to revelation. Is propositional knowledge a facet of the genuine knowledge of God given 
by faith? Getting clear about Barth’s views regarding propositions, furthermore, is 
important for our assessment of a tension raised in chapter 3, where we noted that Barth 
tends to emphasize the personal character of revelation, while Plantinga emphasizes the 
propositional. I will approach this question by first entertaining three contemporary works 
on revelation—those of C. Stephen Evans, Paul Helm and Nicholas Wolterstorff—each 
of which links Barth in some way to what might be called a non-propositional view. 
The Critiques of Evans, Helm and Wolterstorff 
C. Stephen Evans associates Barth with “neo-orthodox theologians” who advocate a 
‘non-propositional’ view of revelation.13 Evans does not directly assert that Barth himself 
                                                                                                                                                  
and clearly described as trust, as the attitude in men in which they honour and revere the worth of God” 
(CD I/1, 228; KD I/1, 240). 
9 As Barth says, “the mutual indwelling and indeed the union of the divine and human logos in faith 
cannot be ignored or denied. This mutual indwelling or union is the knowability of the Word of God” 
(CD I/1, 242; KD I/1, 253). 
10 Barth sharply dismisses Rudolf Otto’s “Das Heilige” as numinous, irrational and, therefore, 
indistinguishable from “an absolutised natural force” (CD I/1, 135; KD I/1, 140). 
11 See especially CD I/1, 135–138 (KD I/1, 139–143). 
12 See discussion and references in chapter 2. 
13 “Faith and Reason,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 325–327. 
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holds this view strictly, though it would be easy to take this as implied.14 Evans presents 
the neo-orthodox, non-propositional view as a reaction against liberal theology. Liberal 
theologians, adopting the “traditional understanding of revelation as propositional,”15 
subjected the propositions of the Bible to increasing suspicion, thereby compromising its 
authority. Evans concludes that the neo-orthodox response was to assert that revelation 
does not convey propositions. Revelation proceeds on the occasion of reading the Bible 
“as the Spirit of God illumines the hearts of those who read and listen with openness.”16 
Evans helpfully points out, however, that one need not adopt a strictly non-propositional 
view of revelation to appreciate the insight that “the primary object of revelation is God 
himself, not propositions about God, and the primary purpose of revelation is making 
possible a relationship with God.”17 We might term such a view the not-merely-
propositional view, over and against the strictly non-propositional view. It should be 
clear that the strictly non-propositional view cannot apply to Barth. As we have already 
demonstrated, Barth is adamant that revelation engages the mind. It is rational and verbal. 
Unless this is absolute double-speak, clearly he is affirming some propositional element 
to revelation. The not-merely-propositional view, I would suggest, is Barth’s actual 
view—that revelation has both non-propositional and propositional aspects. It is safe to 
say that Barth would agree with Evans’ conclusion that revelation, in its paradigmatic 
verbal forms, cannot be strictly non-propositional, and that God’s personal self-disclosure 
inevitably involves the revelation of “some truth’s about himself.”18 
Paul Helm draws a slightly different conclusion about Barth’s notion of revelation. 
Helm determines that if revelation is propositional, it must be epistemically objective. 
Something is epistemically objective “if what is known by one person about that object 
can be remembered and communicated to others for them to know.”19 Helm says that 
                                                 
14 Evans has confirmed to me in private conversation that he does not mean to assert that Barth’s view is 
best understood as the strictly non-propositional view. 
15 Evans, “Faith and Reason,” 325. 
16 Evans, “Faith and Reason,” 326 (emphasis mine). 
17 Evans, “Faith and Reason,” 327. 
18 Ibid. In fact, Barth’s view comports quite well with Evans’ later treatment of Kierkegaard and Plantinga 
(335-341). 
19 Helm, Paul, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues (London: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1982), 40. 
Plantinga’s notion of ‘objectivity’ as “being oriented toward . . . the object of knowledge” corresponds 
with Barth’s view. “What is objective may be thought of as coming from the object rather than from 
myself as subject” (WCB, 417–418). 
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Barth “denies the objectivity of revelation” because epistemic objectivity implies that 
revelation is static, and subject to human control, which is a violation of God’s sovereign 
freedom in revelation.20 He concludes, therefore, that Barth rejects the possibility of 
revelation being propositional.21 Helm’s primary critique of Barth is that he is wrong to 
assume that epistemic objectivity subjects an object to the control of those who have 
epistemically objective knowledge of it.22 Helm’s analysis suffers from a 
misunderstanding of the logic of Barth’s position. Barth is not worried that epistemic 
objectivity would subject God to human control. Barth is concerned to safeguard against 
the presumption that genuine human knowledge of God could be a human possession 
outside and independent of divine self-disclosure in the gift of faith.23 In fact, Barth has 
no problems with the epistemic objectivity of God, so long as it is not seen to be a 
function of an independently held human capacity, rather than the epistemic objectivity of 
faith.24 In Barth’s view, the gift of faith—divinely enabled epistemic objectivity—is the 
basis for preaching, which is precisely an attempt to ‘remember and communicate’ truth 
truly in the light of revelation.25 Directed against conclusions like those of Helm, Barth 
gives the following plea: “We have made a positive assertion, pronouncing a definite Yes 
                                                 
20 Helm, Paul, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues, 40–41. 
21 Helm, Paul, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues, 46. 
22 Helm, Paul, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues, 45–46. 
23 It is Barth’s understanding of the nature of revelation as thoroughly divine gift, not subject to human 
demonstration or isolated possession, that also eludes Keith Ward. He makes the mystifying claim that 
Barth’s view of revelation is motivated by pride and self-exaltation. “Of course one has an interest in 
thinking one’s own religion is the only true one; it enables one to dismiss the others as of no account and 
so bask in the superiority of one’s own possession of truth. . . . One can hardly get more proud, more 
self-righteous, and more short-sighted than that” (Religion and Revelation: A Theology of Revelation in 
the World’s Religions [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 17). 
24 “We can grasp [God’s Word] only in faith. We are set in the greatest clarity in relation to the one, in such 
clarity that we have very distinct and in themselves clear thoughts regarding what is said to us, and we 
can react thereto with the whole outer and inner attitude of our lives” (CD I/1, 174; KD I/1, 181). 
25 “We must be very clear that the simplest proclamation of the Gospel can be proclamation of the truth in 
the most unlimited sense and can validly communicate the truth to the most unsophisticated hearer if 
God so will” (CD I/1, 83; KD I/1, 85). 
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to the knowability of the Word of God. . . . others ought not so stubbornly to hear only the 
No in what has been said.”26 
Nicholas Wolterstorff offers a more careful and penetrating analysis of Barth’s 
theology of revelation. His conclusion, however, is similar to Helm’s. Wolterstorff claims 
that despite all of Barth’s talk about revelation as the speech of God, “there’s less in Barth 
on God speaking than first appears.”27 Wrestling with many of Barth’s intricate 
statements, Wolterstorff seems to grasp Barth’s key distinction between revelation per se 
and the media of revelation.28 He also grasps just how unflinching Barth is in maintaining 
that a medium of revelation can never be equated with revelation per se.29 While 
apparently noticing Barth’s insistence that there is a real revealing, a real divine speaking 
through the media of revelation, the connection between God’s speech and the medium of 
human speech is too tenuous for Wolterstorff. He draws the unfortunate conclusion that 
what Barth calls God’s speech, when encountered through a medium, is not, in fact, 
appropriately referred to as ‘speech.’30 Instead, what God does through the medium of 
human witness is to ‘speak to’ the heart not the head of the hearer. This conclusion is 
simply untenable in light of Barth’s consistent and emphatic declarations both that God 
speaks, particularly through Scripture and preaching, and that this speech is verbal, 
cognitive and rational.31 What has Wolterstorff missed? The chief failing in 
Wolterstorff’s assessment is a failure to come to grips with Barth’s view that a human 
medium could be appropriated for divine discourse without being equated with it. 
Scripture is not divine discourse, in and of itself. The qualifier ‘in and of itself’ is 
absolutely crucial. This does not mean, for Barth, that God does not speak through 
                                                 
26 CD I/1, 196 (KD I/1, 204–205, “Wir haben eine positive Feststellung gemacht, haben in bezug auf die 
Erkennbarkeit des Wortes Gottes ein bestimmtes Ja ausgesprochen. . . . der Andere sollte doch nicht so 
beharrlich in allem nur das Nein hören”). 
27 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 58,72. 
28 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 65. As we saw in chapter 1, Barth often refers to this as the 
distinction between content and form (CD I/1, 175; KD I/1, 182). 
29 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 68–70. 
30 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 72. 
31 It may be sufficient to observe that the first thing Barth says about the nature of the Word of God is that 
it is speech. And, according to Barth, part of what it means that the Word of God is the speech of God is 
that “the encounter of God and man takes place primarily, pre-eminently and characteristically in this 
sphere of ratio” (CD I/1, 135; KD I/1, 139).  
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Scripture. It means that what drives and enables that speech is not a property or capacity 
of the medium. The human medium does not contain or convey the Word of God on its 
own, but it does serve as a genuine medium when accompanied by the work of the Spirit 
in the gift of faith. 
There is, however, a deeper point to which Wolterstorff leads us—one that is pivotal 
for understanding Barth’s theological motivations. Wolterstorff says that to understand 
Barth one must “realize that he is the most relentlessly Chalcedonian of all Christian 
theologians.”32 It is clear from his discussion, however, that Wolterstorff is only thinking 
of one side of the Chalcedonian formula—that which stresses the unity of the natures in 
one person. From this he draws the mistaken conclusion that in the incarnation the 
humanity of Jesus unmediatedly communicates the divine. Barth has in mind both sides 
of Chalcedon, including the stipulation that in the unity of the person the natures are not 
to be confused. Consequently, Barth did not hold, as Wolterstorff suggests, that veiling 
and unveiling do not apply to revelation by means of the human Jesus33 or that the human 
speech of Jesus can be simply equated with divine discourse34 without the provisos that 
attend other kinds of human media taken up in revelation.35 For Barth, this mistake is at 
the heart of a cancer that plagues theology, which is precisely why the proper distinction 
between form and content in revelation is so important to grasp.  
 
Can the incarnation of the Word according to the biblical witnesses mean 
that the existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth was as it were in itself, in 
its own power and continuity, the revealing Word of God? Is the 
humanitas Christi as such the revelation? Does the divine sonship of Jesus 
Christ mean that God’s revealing has now been transmitted as it were to 
the existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth, that this has thus become 
identical with it? At this stage we can only reply that when this view has 
                                                 
32 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 64. 
33 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 65. 
34 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Divine Discourse, 73. 
35 As Trevor Hart explains, “the vehicle of revelation, even when it is hypostatically united with God, is not 
itself God. Information about Jesus’ life, character, actions, death and resurrection is not knowledge of 
God in the sense that Barth intends it and in the event of revelation it is precisely God himself who is 
known” (“Revelation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John B. Webster [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000], 52). 
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really been held, there has always been more or less clearly discernible the 
very thing which, as we have seen, the Old Testament tried to avoid with 
its concept of the holiness of the revealed God, namely, the possibility of 
having God disclose Himself through man, of allowing man to set himself 
on the same platform as God, to grasp Him there and thus to become His 
master. The “fairest Lord Jesus” of mysticism, the “Saviour” of Pietism, 
Jesus the teacher of wisdom and friend of man in the Enlightenment, Jesus 
the quintessence of enhanced humanity in Schleiermacher, Jesus the 
embodiment of the idea of religion in Hegel and his school, Jesus a 
religious personality according to Carlyle’s picture in the theology of the 
end of the 19th century—all this looks at least very dubiously like a 
profane and sacrilegious intrusion in the Old Testament sense in which it is 
thought possible to come to terms, as it were, with the presence of God in 
Christ and to take control of it with the help of certain conceptions 
deriving from the humanity.36  
 
Benefiting from the fruit of our engagement with Wainwright, Helm and Wolterstorff, 
we are ready to attempt to clarify how Barth conceives of the relationship between 
revelation and propositional knowledge. But, before we do, we may benefit from a brief 
digression in order to clarify what we mean by ‘propositional knowledge.’ 
The Propositional Form and Content of the Knowledge of Faith 
A Digression on Propositional Knowing 
We have already suggested that the kind of knowledge Plantinga is primarily 
concerned with is propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is, simply, 
knowledge of propositions. In order to count as knowledge, of course, the proposition 
known must be true, it must be understood and it must be warrantedly believed. Just what 
is a proposition? According to Plantinga, “these are the things that are true or false; they 
are also the things we believe, and the things expressed by our sentences.”37 This implies 
                                                 
36 CD I/1, 323 (KD I/1, 341). 
37 “Replies to My Colleagues,” In Alvin Plantinga, eds. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1985), 355. 
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an obvious, though occasionally overlooked, distinction between propositions and the 
sentences used to express them. Plantinga explains further, “when one sincerely asserts a 
proposition p, then one believes p (and hence grasps or understands it) and asserts p by 
way of assertively uttering a sentence that expresses p.”38 I take it that when Plantinga 
says ‘a sentence expresses a proposition’ this is short-hand for ‘a sentence is used by a 
person to express a proposition.’39 The truth or falsehood of a sentence is judged on the 
basis of the truth or falsehood of the proposition which is intended to be expressed by 
means of the sentence.40 The suitability of a sentence as the vehicle of the expression of a 
proposition will depend on all of the many factors that impact communication. A 
sentence, therefore, does not have the capacity perfectly to convey a proposition. Instead, 
as Plantinga affirms, the expression of a proposition by a sentence is successful when, 
“my interlocutor, upon hearing the sentence I use, grasps or apprehends the very 
proposition in question—the very proposition I believe, intend to assert, and express by 
my sentence.”41 In Plantinga’s view, our grasp or apprehension of a proposition is not an 
all or nothing venture, it is a matter of degree.42 One more obvious point to make is that 
propositions are about things, things that are referred to in sentences under some 
description or proper name. Sentences expressing propositions are typically composed of 
subjects, predicates and predicating terms; to grasp a proposition firmly one must 
apprehend clearly what is meant by each of these components.43 
                                                 
38 “Replies to My Colleagues,” 355. 
39 In other words, I believe the proposition Plantinga means to assert with the sentence ‘a sentence 
expresses a proposition’ is better expressed using the sentence ‘a sentence is used by a person to express 
a proposition.’ 
40 See Plantinga, “Divine Knowledge,” in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, eds. C. Stephen 
Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 43, where he also notes that not every 
sentence is intended to express a proposition. 
41 “Replies to My Colleagues,” 355. 
42 “Replies to My Colleagues,” 356. 
43 It is important to note that the traditional ‘propositional’ sentence is certainly not the only vehicle for 
expressing propositions. Propositions can be given expression by means of other linguistic genres (e.g., 
poetry, parable, etc.). Propositions can also be expressed through non-linguistic means (e.g., sculpture, 
interpretive dance, etc.). These forms may serve to evoke or express more than propositions, though 
often not less. These forms may have the advantage of addressing non-cognitive barriers to and personal 
dimensions of knowing. The advantage of the traditional sentence in ‘propositional form,’ adopted as the 
primary form in research literature, is the precision with which it is able to express an intended 
proposition. Some suggest, however, that the impotence of ‘propositional’ form to address the fuller 
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Propositional knowing may be distinguished from other kinds of knowing. 
Propositional knowing takes the form of knowing that p (where p is a proposition). There 
is also practical knowledge—knowing how to do x, which just means being capable of 
doing x. There is experiential knowledge or the knowledge of acquaintance whereby one 
is familiar with x. The personal knowing we have discussed could be considered a special 
kind of experiential knowing. It is significant to note that practical, experiential and 
personal knowledge can and usually do have propositional content. Practical, experiential 
or personal knowledge is accompanied by propositional knowledge about the object that 
is known practically, experientially or personally. The relationship between propositional 
knowing and other kinds of knowing is complex.44 Growing in propositional knowledge 
is often a means to growing in other kinds of knowledge. Growing in other kinds of 
knowledge often involves the discovery of new propositional knowledge. Belief also has 
more than one sense. Belief as a component of propositional knowledge indicates assent 
to the truth of a proposition—belief that p. Belief that indicates trust in or submission to 
something or someone takes the form of belief in x. Each of these distinctions regarding 
belief, knowledge, propositions and their means of expression will be important for 
avoiding ambiguity as we now pick up where we left off with Barth. 
Barth and Propositional Knowing 
We have already confirmed that, for Barth, revelation is principally personal divine 
self-disclosure. Revelation, therefore, cannot be reduced to propositions.45 This leaves 
                                                                                                                                                  
dimensions of knowing can so impede successful communication of meaning that other means of 
expressing propositions are, in fact, superior. Kevin Vanhoozer, for example, suggests that “fixation on 
sentence-long statements only fails to do justice to the particularity and plurality of the Bible’s diverse 
literary forms because certain aspects of meaning, and reality, emerge only under certain literary 
frameworks of description” (“The Apostolic Discourse and Its Developments,” in Scripture’s Doctrine 
and Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian Dogmatics, eds. Markus Bockmuehl 
and Alan J. Torrance [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, forthcoming 2008]). 
44 This complexity is compounded by other non-cognitive dimensions which directly impact knowledge 
structures. The interconnectedness of the affective and the cognitive is commonly acknowledged. See 
WCB, 205–209, 301–310. 
45 On the question of whether revelation can be equated with doctrinal propositions, Barth’s view is clear. 
“Will the truth of revelation submit to such materialisation and depersonalisation? Can one have it in 
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open the question of whether, in Barth’s view, revelation has propositional content that is 
in some way available to human subjects. Does revelation as personal knowing eclipse 
the propositional? Does Barth believe that revelation is indifferent to propositional 
content, or merely that the propositional content of faith cannot be known outside of the 
gift of personal divine self-revealing? It may be helpful to look at some of Barth’s sterner 
warnings regarding propositions (Sätze). 
 
The concept of truths of revelation in the sense of Latin propositions given 
and sealed once for all with divine authority in both wording and meaning 
is theologically impossible if it is a fact that revelation is true in the free 
decision of God which was taken once for all in Jesus Christ.46 
 
we cannot view [revelation] in such a way that propositions may be taken 
from it which, isolated from the giving of God’s Word in revelation, 
Scripture and proclamation, can be known as general truths by man, . . . so 
that they for their part can then be made—and this is the decisive point—
the presupposition of an understanding of God’s Word or the basis of 
theology.47 
 
It is for this reason and in this sense that we finally speak of the Word of 
God as the mystery of God. . . . as one might put it, a theological warning 
against theology, a warning against the idea that its propositions or 
principles are certain in themselves like the supposed axioms of the 
mathematicians and physicists, and are not rather related to their theme 
and content, which alone are certain, which they cannot master, by which 
they must be mastered if they are not to be mere soap-bubbles.48 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
abstraction from the person of Him who reveals it and from the revelatory act of this person in which it is 
given to other persons to perceive?” (CD I/1, 270; KD I/1, 285). 
46 CD I/1, 15 (KD I/1, 14). Barth is not suggesting that the truth of what is revealed is relative to God’s 
decision to reveal it, rather than absolute, anchored in the reality of the object of revelation. It is rather 
that God’s decision to reveal is part of who God is, as the object of revelation. God is also his revealing. 
47 CD I/1, 130 (KD I/1, 134). 
48 CD I/1, 165 (KD I/1, 171). 
Chapter 6: Faith and the Knowledge of God 
 
178
These are strong warnings, yet rather than supporting the conclusion that revelation has 
no propositional content, propositional content is assumed and given a strict qualification. 
Barth’s apparent anxiety about propositions is directed at a view of revelation as the 
lossless transmission of divine data in self-contained human statements. In each instance, 
his intent is to highlight the utter incapacity of human words, conceptions and noetic 
equipment to contain the personal revelation of God. We must remember, however, that 
in the miracle of faith this incapacity is overcome. Having remembered this, we must not 
forget that even the propositional content of revelation remains ever dependent on the 
gracious action of divine self-disclosure—the gift of faith. It may be illuminating to 
consider how this might proceed for a particular proposition—one which would 
traditionally be considered a revealed ‘truth.’ 
Consider the proposition Plantinga often returns to, “God was in Christ, reconciling 
the world to himself.”49 How might grasping this proposition be related to Barth’s notion 
of revelation, such that, on the one hand, it constitutes a genuine human grasp of the 
proposition, while on the other hand, it remains fundamentally dependent on the personal 
knowing of faith? Throughout this analysis it will be important to keep in mind the 
difference between a proposition and its means of expression. The way in which the 
proposition in question is expressed may, of course, vary. The appropriateness of the 
expression will depend on a multitude of situational variables. Perhaps one hears a 
sermon that explicitly addresses the sentence ‘God was in Christ, reconciling the world to 
himself’ or, what may be more likely, one encounters a presentation of the Gospel 
narrative that expresses the proposition in question and many others. The question is: 
How might one be given a grasp of this proposition which is a genuine human grasp and 
also derivative of the faith-giving activity of the Sprit? 
Consider again what is involved in grasping a proposition. The strength of one’s grasp 
of a proposition is dependent upon how clearly one apprehends the subject, predicate, and 
the nature of the predication involved. There may be many ways in which one comes to 
acquire a new or strengthened apprehension of these things—through experience, 
inference, testimony, etc. There are also different ways of apprehending a proposition. It 
is possible to have no prior knowledge of a subject and still apprehend a proposition in a 
certain sense. Take for example the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Newg is 
unhappy today’. One might have no other knowledge of Newg and still firmly apprehend 
                                                 
49 WCB, 7, 36, 42, 56, 105, 244, 250, 260, 261, 267, 331, 376, 378–9, 448, 454. 
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that Newg has the property of being unhappy today. There is a difficulty with this, 
however. What is meant by the expression ‘being unhappy today’ depends, in part, on the 
nature of the thing about which it is expressed. Think of the difference it would make if 
Newg were an amoeba, a tropical storm, a personal computer, or a new-born baby. We 
can see, therefore, that the stronger one’s apprehension of the realities involved the better 
one’s grasp of a proposition about them.  
Now let us consider what it takes to have a relatively strong grasp of the proposition 
that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. If we are correct in what we 
have said so far, it requires a relatively strong apprehension of what is being expressed by 
the proper names ‘God,’ and ‘Christ,’ as well as what is meant by ‘reconciling,’ etc. 
Where might we turn to find greater clarity about these realities? Principally, Barth 
suggests, this clarification comes though God’s own transforming work of self-revelation 
through the witness of the Bible and the proclamation of the Church. In Christian 
scripture and preaching, however, we find more expressions in human words which are 
used together in an attempt to clarify what those expressions intend. The problem, which 
is for Barth patent, is that all those words are never adequate, by themselves, to give a 
sufficient grasp of the reality referred to by the proper names ‘God’ and ‘Christ.’ 
Certainly one can become competent in using the words, and still lack a basic 
understanding of and familiarity with the realities to which they refer. Plantinga has a 
great deal to offer in navigating the subtleties involved with proper names, real referents, 
and propositional utterances. Of particular assistance on this issue is the extremely helpful 
distinction Plantinga draws between de dicto and de re belief.50 
De Dicto Assertion and De Re Belief 
Plantinga’s primary deployment of the de dicto/de re distinction is in discussions of 
modality where de re and de dicto distinguish two kinds of necessity.51 De dicto necessity 
applies to a dictum—that is, to the abstract proposition. De re necessity applies to the 
res—that is, to the individual realities referred to by the abstract proposition. This same 
distinction can also be applied to distinguish two kinds of belief. De dicto belief affirms 
                                                 
50 “A competent speaker could use his words to assert a proposition of which he has only an inchoate grasp 
or even no grasp at all” (“Replies to My Colleagues,” 357). 
51 See “De Re et De Dicto,” Noûs 3, no. 3 (1969): 235–258. For the distinction in Aquinas, see Summa 
Theologica, I.2.1. 
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the truth of the abstract proposition. De re belief affirms, of that to which the proposition 
refers, what is ascribed to it by the proposition. This is a subtle, but enormously 
consequential distinction. We can illustrate the distinction formally if we consider the 
proposition expressed by ‘a is x.’ De dicto belief affirms the abstract assignment of the 
property x to a. Believing de dicto of ‘a’ that it has the property x may involve knowing 
little else about the reality referred to by a. De re belief affirms that x is true of the actual 
reality referred to by a. De re belief is always of some specific ‘concrete’ reality. This 
formal illustration struggles to give us a clear conception of de re belief because a is itself 
a pure abstraction with no specific reference. Let us take, therefore, a somewhat far-
fetched, though much more concrete example. 
Consider the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the fastest typing ventriloquist in 
the world is performing tonight in St Andrews.’ One need not know exactly who is the 
fastest typing ventriloquist in the world to believe that there is a fastest typing 
ventriloquist and that he or she is performing tonight in St Andrews. This would be to 
believe de dicto of ‘the fastest typing ventriloquist in the world’ that he or she is 
performing tonight in St Andrews. Suppose, however, that the fastest typing ventriloquist 
in the world is actually my close friend and colleague Kelly D. Liebengood. This would 
enable me to believe de re of Kelly both that he is the fastest typing ventriloquist in the 
world and that he is performing his act tonight in St Andrews. We could, perhaps, take an 
illustration that is right at the heart of our broader concern. Consider the proposition 
expressed by ‘God is omniscient.’52 One may assert this proposition de dicto. One may 
form the de dicto belief with respect to the proper name ‘God’ that it stands for a thing 
that has the property of omniscience. One may also form the de re belief of God, the 
personal being to which ‘God’ refers, that he has the property of omniscience.53 De re 
belief, therefore, seems to require some knowing contact with the real referent(s) of the 
proposition. Since God’s knowledge of himself is perfect, he is in the best position to 
form de re beliefs about himself with respect to true propositions referring to him. 
Furthermore, Jesus Christ as God incarnate, the Son who knows the Father, stands in a 
                                                 
52 See WCB, 293, where Plantinga considers the de dicto assertion that ‘there is an all-powerful, all-
knowing, wholly good person who has created and sustains the world.’ 
53 “. . . the theist believes that there is such a being, but also, no doubt, believes of God, the being who in 
fact meets this description, that he exists. It isn’t necessary, however, that he does the latter; perhaps he 
forms the de dicto belief but never performs the de re act of believing something or other of the being in 
question” (WCB, 293–294). 
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unique position with respect to human knowledge of God. In Christ we find God’s human 
knowledge of himself. 
It is clear that, for Barth, genuine human knowledge of God that comes by the self-
revealing Word of God in the gift of faith involves not merely de dicto assertion, but de re 
belief. This gives us another way of framing our question regarding the propositional 
content of revelation. According to Barth, how is it that God’s self-disclosure enables 
human knowing to transcend the de dicto, yielding warranted de re belief? We are now 
ready to tackle three, very much interconnected, nodal issues for coming to grips with 
Barth’s theology of revelation. We will treat them in the following order: 1) the 
hiddenness of God, 2) the problem of analogical predication, and 3) the significance of 
historical knowledge. 
Hiddenness, Analogy and History 
The Hiddenness of God Revisited 
As eluded to in chapter 1, the hiddenness of God, for Barth, is neither an a priori 
assumption nor a demonstrable truth. The conviction that human language, conceptuality 
and noetic equipment are insufficient for arriving at a knowledge of God is only known in 
the light of the knowledge of God. “Even knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge of 
the Word of God outside its reality is possible only on the presupposition of this real 
knowledge.”54 This is significant for our discussion in at least two ways. Firstly, here we 
have another clear example of Barth affirming that the event of revelation has 
propositional content. The proposition that human language, conceptuality and noetic 
equipment are insufficient for arriving at a knowledge of God is a revealed ‘truth.’ This 
very proposition is grasped on the basis of God’s having overcome the insufficiency of 
human language, conceptuality and noetic equipment. 
Secondly, the fact that Barth does not posit the hiddenness of God as a demonstrable 
presupposition keeps him from internal incoherence and direct conflict with Plantinga. 
One of the de jure objections to theistic belief that Plantinga dismantles is the argument 
that the existence of God is not something that could be known by human beings because 
human concepts cannot apply to God. At the heart of Plantinga’s critique is the 
                                                 
54 CD I/1, 197 (KD I/1, 206, “Auch die Erkenntnis der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis des Wotres Gottes 
außerhalb ihrer Wirklichkeit ist nur möglich unter Voraussetzung dieser wirklichen Erkenntnis”). 
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observation that to suggest that human concepts cannot apply to God is to apply at least 
one human concept to God.55 It is also important to see that Barth never claims that 
human concepts cannot apply to God. What Barth claims is that human concepts are 
inadequate to deliver the fullness of what it is to know God.56 For Barth, the knowledge 
of God must be de re not merely de dicto. What makes reference to God possible is not a 
capacity latent in human concepts. 
 
The Bible, the Church and theology undoubtedly speak this language on 
the presupposition that there might be something in it, namely, that in this 
language God’s revelation might be referred to, witness might be given, 
God’s Word might be proclaimed, dogma might be formulated and 
declared. The only question is whether this possibility is to be understood 
as that of the language and consequently of the world or man, or whether it 
is to be regarded as a venture which is, as it were, ascribed to the language, 
and consequently to the world or man, from without, so that it is not really 
the possibility of the language, the world, or man, but the possibility of 
revelation.57 
 
How does this help us with our question about the propositional content of revelation 
and the wider question of what constitutes a genuine knowledge of God for Barth? 
Firstly, it reaffirms the fact that for Barth there is indeed propositional content to 
revelation, the propositional content of revelation depends on a gracious divine enabling, 
and the creaturely form God enables to serve as the means of revelation may itself be an 
expression of propositions. We have also established that genuine knowledge of God for 
Barth must give us real reference to God, de re knowledge. Minimally this must entail 
that in the gift of faith what is meant by the proper name ‘God’ is personally revealed. We 
should be careful, however, what conclusions we draw from this. One is tempted to 
                                                 
55 “One who makes the claim seems to set up a certain subject for predication—God—and then declare that 
our concepts do not apply to this being. But if this is so, then, presumably, at least one of our concepts—
being such that our concepts don’t apply to it—does apply to this being” (WCB, 6). See also WCB, 38. 
56 Barth asks in his lectures on ethics, “Does man really know God when he admittedly does not know him 
totally, in his nature, as the Lord in the pregnant and comprehensive biblical sense of the term?” Eet, 31 
(EI, 49). 
57 CD I/1, 339 (KD I/1, 358). 
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suggest that the knowledge of faith is the knowledge of religious experience,58 such that 
how one knows God is principally by reference to an experience or memory of an 
experience of God. On this view, one’s grasp of a proposition about God is dependent on 
understanding that the proper name ‘God’ refers to the one who I religiously experience. 
One difficulty with this is the implication that the religious experience is numinous, that 
is, utterly non-propositional. This simply is not Barth’s view.59 God’s personal revealing 
is inextricably connected to the propositions expressed in the medium of revelation. 
God’s Word is speech, it is experienced as it is heard.60 The knowledge of God by faith 
(at least in the paradigmatic instances) puts us in contact with the real referent by means 
of human language, despite the inadequacies of human language and human cognition.61 
This means that the de re knowledge of the real referent of the proper name ‘God’ given 
in revelation is not independent of a clarified apprehension of the other elements of 
linguistic description, particularly predicates and predications.62 This brings us to the 
second of three nodal issues—the problem of analogical predication. 
                                                 
58 Barth was cautious in his use of the term ‘religious experience’ (CD I/1, 193; KD I/1, 201). 
59 Barth emphasizes that, while revelation is rightly construed as an experience (Erfahrung) of the Word of 
God, it is an experience which impacts all ‘anthropological centres’—‘intellect’ as well as ‘feeling’ and 
‘conscience’ (CD I/1, 202–203; KD I/1, 211–212). 
60 Some parallels can be found in William Alston’s view of the relationship between beliefs about God’s 
activity and an experiential awareness of that activity. See “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,” 
in Faith and Rationality, eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983); and, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).  
61 As stressed in Chapter 2, Barth is no Kantian with respect to pure reason. No doubt his thinking about 
cognition is shaped by Kant, but for Barth a cognitive human knowledge of the noumenal God is a real 
possibility thanks to God. Barth rejects Kant in explicitly Kantian terms when he says that the initiating 
divine action in faith generates a corresponding authentic and clear human knowing, from “intuitive 
apprehension to [linguistically] formulated comprehension” CD I/1, 12 (KD I/1, 11, “vom intuitiven 
Ergreifen bis zum sprachlich formulierenden Begreifen”). For Kant, the futility of a cognitive knowledge 
of God is a function of his being that which lies beyond our sensibility and understanding. See especially 
book II, chapter iii of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith (London: Macmillan Press, 1920), 485–531. 
62 Trevor Hart draws the parallel to Christ’s humanity. Though there is no “co-mingling of the divine and 
the creaturely which presents the divine to us immediately,” there also can be no “docetic indifference to 
the humanity of the Lord,” whose “life, death and resurrection constitute the primary objective locus or 
site of God’s self-revealing” (Regarding Karl Barth, 185; “Revelation,” 52). So also, “God defines 
himself for us, assuming our words and conceptuality just as surely as he assumes our flesh in order to 
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The Problem of Analogical Predication 
The way in which human language and concepts are said to refer to God is neither 
univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. Most relatively orthodox theologians agree 
on this. When it comes to analogical predication, however, the devil is in the details.63 
One’s grasp of what is predicated in a proposition typically relies, in part, on 
generalizing from previous knowledge based on direct or indirect experience. If I assert 
that Dabgib likes flowers, one’s grasp of my assertion will involve picking out of the 
range of what it means to like flowers the sense or senses in which I mean to predicate 
liking flowers of Dabgib. As it stands the assertion is rather ambiguous. It would be much 
less ambiguous were I to specify the sense of liking flowers I mean with the addition of 
‘as is common to all herbaceous dinosaurs’ or ‘just like any useful bumble-bee.’ Grasping 
my assertion would then usually involve making an appropriate generalization from one’s 
previous knowledge of what is typical of herbaceous beasts or bees. If this is a straight 
forward instance, my predication is univocal. I mean to assert that liking flowers applies 
to Dabgib in exactly the same way it applies to a general class of beings. Of course, I 
could be equivocating, prevaricating or simply being sarcastic. I might also employ a 
figure of speech, as in Dabgib likes to stop and smell the roses. It is possible that Dabgib 
actually despises the smell of roses. In this case the predicate applies to Dabgib 
metaphorically.64 There is a relation of some kind between what is literally predicated and 
what is actually predicated. In the way that some like to stop and smell roses, Dabgib 
likes to deviate from a regimented schedule to appreciate life’s ad hoc gifts. What applies 
to Dabgib is a similarity shared with the predicate. Picking out the kind of relation that is 
intended is, like other communication skills, dependent on a complexity of 
environmentally conditioned rules and assumptions which structure human discourse 
within particular contexts. What is significant to notice, is that even in cases of analogical 
predication, grasping what is predicated typically involves drawing the appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                  
reveal himself, and yet doing so in such a way that it never lies within our grasp to cash out the 
metaphors in literal terms, any more than we can capture the eternal Son simply by analysing the 
humanness of the historical Jesus” (Regarding Karl Barth, 194). 
63 Barth’s words are infamous: “I regard the analogia entis as the invention of Antichrist” (CD I/1, xiii; KD 
I/1, viii). 
64 For our purposes, we not need be detained at this point with the distinction between analogy and 
metaphor. Cf. Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 39-51. 
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generalization. Whether univocally or analogically predicated, predication involves 
situating something with respect to generalizations drawn from existing beliefs or 
experience. 
Barth sees that merely stipulating that reference to God is analogical is not sufficient to 
safeguard against the critique of Feuerbach. If our knowledge of God is finally derived 
from generalizations and extrapolations of relations to human phenomena then we have 
simply projected a ‘God’ in our own image. A knowledge of God originating from below 
cannot escape anthropomorphism. These concerns, which were at the forefront of Barth’s 
rejection of natural theology, also drive his rejection of an analogia entis.65 As Barth 
understood it, an analogia entis suggests that the being of God can be subsumed under a 
general category of being which applies to all beings thus providing an analogical basis 
for a human knowledge of God.66 On this view, the power of analogical predication to 
communicate truths about God resides in the suitability of the human knower’s prior 
knowledge and experience to provide a noetic bridge according to a particular analogical 
relation. For Barth, this is as good as having no hope whatsoever of knowing God.67 
                                                 
65 It has been well established that the notion of the analogia entis Barth so strongly criticized was not, in 
fact, held by Aquinas. While Aquinas affirms an analogia entis (ST I.4.3) and suggests that human 
language for God is analogical (ST I.13.10), it is far from clear that his notion of the analogia entis 
provides the basis for a ‘natural’ knowledge of God. We find, furthermore, that for Aquinas the Holy 
Spirit bestows the natural light (ST I–II.109.1). An extremely illuminating discussion of Aquinas and 
Barth on the question of analogical predication is found in Alan Torrance, Persons in Communion, 127–
203. For other comparisons of Barth and Aquinas on analogy see Henri Chavannes, L’Analogie entre 
Dieu et le Monde Selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin et Selon Karl Barth, Cogitatio Fidei, 42 (Paris: Éditions 
du Cerf, 1969), Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), and, Albert Patfoort “Vers une réconciliation entre saint Thomas et Karl 
Barth” Angelicum 48 (1971): 226–232. 
66 The analogia entis is construed “as an analogy that can be surveyed and perceived, as an analogy that 
can be understood in a synthesis from an onlooker’s standpoint.” It posits “a being which the creature 
has in common with the Creator,” resulting finally in “a deification of man” (CD I/1, 239; KD I/1, 252). 
67 “The question: What is God’s Word? is utterly hopeless [völlig hoffnungslos] if it is the question as to 
the category in which God’s Word is to be put or the syllogism by which it might be proved. Questions 
of category and syllogism obviously presuppose that the Word of God is one of the realities that are 
universally present and ascertainable and therefore created. All concepts tending in this direction, even 
that of a supreme being, an ens perfectissimum or an unconditioned, even that of the breaking through 
and knowledge of such a supreme being, are not as such—as general concepts—the concept of the Word 
of God. As general concepts, they suppress the essential point that the Word of God is a reality only in 
its own decision. The fact that the Word of God is decision means that there is no concept of the Word of 
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Given the freedom and uniqueness of God, analogical predication of this sort requires two 
earth-shattering moves on the part of the human knower. The first is having a priori 
possession of knowledge and experience which may serve as a suitable analogue. The 
second is being able to discern precisely the analogical relation—perceiving the exact 
boundaries of the sense in which the analogy holds. 
Is Barth’s rejection of an analogia entis equivalent to the rejection of any reference to 
God by means of analogical predication? Do all forms of analogy run aground on the 
shoals of anthropomorphism? Barth seems to concede that some form of analogy is the 
only option standing between the extremes of univocation and equivocation. Barth 
categorically denies that human language and conceptions apply univocally to God; and, 
he just as vociferously affirms that, by grace, human language can transcend mere 
equivocation. What Barth rejects is not analogy, but the presumption that a human 
potency enables its success. The problem arises when the power of analogical reference to 
God is “ascribed to the language, and consequently to the world or man, from without.”68 
The kind of analogy which is operative in revelation is not an analogia entis but the 
analogia fidei.69 The critical difference is that, in the gift of faith, the power enabling the 
success of the analogical predication is the grace of God’s own self-revealing. This means 
that, rather than relying on an a priori grasp of the analogue and a human perception of 
the precise range and sense of the analogical relation, God himself provides cognitively 
what human knowers cannot provide themselves. This involves a reversing of the 
epistemic relationship between subject and object that has tacitly informed all of our 
illustrations up to this point. Rather than starting with the noetic capacities and 
preconditions of the human knower, revelation proceeds—yes, by means of the analogy—
but according to the self-interpreting priority of the object of knowing, the real referent 
God. Genuine human knowledge of God does not begin with a human grasp but with God 
grasping the human by means of an encounter with the Word of God, which results in a 
                                                                                                                                                  
God apart from the name of God, which we love and fear and worship because it is identical with the 
Bearer of the name” (CD I/1, 158–159; KD I/1, 164). 
68 Quoted at length above, CD I/1, 339 (KD I/1, 358); emphasis mine. 
69 “Our reply to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the analogia entis is not, then, a denial of the concept of 
analogy. We say rather that the analogy in question is not an analogia entis but according to Rom. 126 
the α‛ ναλογια τηˆς πίστεως” (CD I/1, 243; KD I/1, 257). 
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corresponding human grasp.70 Barth explains the analogia fidei in light of Galatians 4:8, 
where the priority of being known by God establishes a Christian knowledge of God.71 
This has a decisive impact on how we conceive of the propositional content of revelation. 
Let us consider how this goes for specific analogues, for instance, our expression of 
God in Christ ‘reconciling’ the world, or the seemingly more straightforward ascriptions 
of God as ‘father,’ or even simply ‘person.’ No matter how much additional description 
we pile on to clarify the analogy from the disanalogy between God and our own prior 
knowledge and experience of mundane reconciling, fathers and persons, we can never lift 
ourselves out of the limitations inherent in human language, particularly in light of the 
sinfulness of the human condition and the freedom of God. Overcoming this problem, 
Barth believes, requires a reversal of the movement from mundane knowledge to divine 
knowledge. Barth’s expression, encountered earlier, is again apposite here, “the power of 
this reference does not lie in itself; it lies in that to which it refers.”72 What anchors the 
analogical reference cannot be a conception of the mundane analogue, but the active roll 
taken by the object of knowing to illumine himself in the reference.73 The analogue is 
commandeered and filled out by the referent. The object of knowing assumes epistemic 
priority over the human preconceptions and experience associated with the reference. The 
reconciliation, fatherhood and personhood of God becomes paradigmatic reconciliation, 
fatherhood and personhood. The mundane notions become derivative of the uniquely 
divine and thus paradigmatic instantiations. For Barth, this is the only solution to the 
                                                 
70 “. . .not therefore that man has grasped at the Bible but that the Bible has grasped at man” (CD I/1, 110; 
KD I/1, 113). 
71 “This analogia fidei is also the point of the remarkable passages in Paul in which man’s knowledge of 
God is inverted into man’s being known by God. Paul calls Christians γνόντες θεόν only to amend it at 
once: µαˆλλον δε γνωσθέντες υ‛ πο θεουˆ. It is obviously this γνωσθηˆναι that distinguishes their γιγνω΄ σκειν as 
Christians from their previous non-knowing of God as pagans (Gal. 48f)” (CD I/1, 244; KD I/1, 257). 
72 CD I/1, 197 (KD I/1, 205, “Die Kraft dieses Verweises liegt nicht in ihm selber, sondern in dem, worauf 
er verweist”). 
73 Jay Wesley Richards rightly identifies Barth’s commitment to God’s action in revelation as the 
motivation for his rejection of an analogia entis and an intrinsic analogia attributionis (The Untamed 
God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability and Simplicity [Downers Grove, 
Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003], 124). 
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problem of anthropomorphism. He therefore quips, “the doubtful thing is not whether 
God is person, but whether we are.”74 
We can now see with greater clarity why, for Barth, one cannot separate the question 
of the propositional or cognitive content of revelation from the personal and 
transformative character of revelation, which together constitute a genuine human 
knowledge of God. In the analogia fidei human noetic structures and linguistic forms are 
reconciled (though not yet redeemed) by the Spirit of God so that we may grasp the 
propositions feebly, though properly and non-arbitrarily, expressed in human language by 
receiving a de re knowledge of the referent, God. This also means that, for Barth, any 
successful reference to God or communication about God that counts as or results in a 
genuine human knowledge of God must always be by faith—that is, it must involve the 
free gift of active, personal, transformative divine self-disclosure. It is not possible, 
having been revealed to propositionally, to come as it were back down the mountain with 
those propositions in hand to conceive and speak of God outside of his presence and very 
present active self-revealing.75 Of course this is not a reason to despair, but merely a 
reminder of our faithful hope and confident dependence on his grace. 
As always, much more can be said about the nature of this transformative self-
revealing. We may be guilty in this section of seeming to approach the question of 
propositional content as if such knowing were highly theoretical, abstract and 
individualistic. We have said very little here to recall discussions in chapter 4 of the 
importance of broader environmental factors, particularly what we, in Planting’s terms, 
referred to as the Spirit’s engendering of conducive ecclesial cognitive environments.76 
We have also, up to now, given relatively little explicit attention to the relevance of the 
historical dimension of the knowledge of God. This brings us to the third of three 
interconnected, nodal issues, which I have suggested are essential to understanding 
Barth’s idea of the character of genuine human knowing and its relation to propositional 
content. In our discussion of the first two issues, the hiddenness of God and analogical 
predication, we established that Barth unambiguously affirms propositional content as a 
                                                 
74 CD I/1, 138 (KD I/1, 143, “Nicht das ist problematisch, ob Gott Person ist, sondern das ist 
problematisch, ob wir es sind”). 
75 As Trevor Hart puts it, we cannot “climb up the vapour trails left by the divine descent, and find our way 
to heaven” (Regarding Karl Barth, 192). 
76 For a fuller and far richer exploration of ecclesial, doxological and semantic participation and 
transformation in revelation see Alan Torrance’s tour de force, Persons in Communion. 
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key element of revelation by faith in which God transforms human conceptions and 
language to give a de re knowledge of himself through propositional expression. Now we 
turn to the significance of the not merely abstract, but historical nature of divine self-
disclosure. 
The Significance of the Historical Character of Divine Self-Revealing 
Barth maintains that the Word of God is indivisible from God’s concrete action in 
history.77 
 
The distinction between word and act is that mere word is the mere self-
expression of a person, while act is the resultant relative alteration in the 
world around. Mere word is passive, act is an active participation in 
history. But this kind of distinction does not apply to the Word of God. As 
mere Word it is act. As mere Word it is the divine person, the person of the 
Lord of history, whose self-expression is as such an alteration, and indeed 
an absolute alteration of the world, whose passio in history is as such 
actio. What God does when He speaks, in exactly the same way as what 
He says, cannot, of course, be generally defined either by way of 
anticipation or by that of reproduction. We can refer only to the 
concretissima of the acts which are attested in the Bible and which are also 
to be expected from God in the future.78 
 
                                                 
77 For Pannenberg, grasping the historical character of revelation requires that one jettison Barth’s notion of 
revelation as Word of God and as the self-revelation of God. Like Barth, Pannenberg wants to avoid the 
conclusion that revelation is handed over in complete, self-contained truths. The alternative for 
Pannenberg is to see that until the consummation of history, revelation remains provisional. For Barth, 
however, what enables the self-revelation of God as a truly successful, through irreducibly historical, 
speech-act, is not a completeness of the medium, but the gracious decision of God to draw human 
knowers, by the gift of faith, into an historical participation in Christ’s knowledge of the Father through 
a verbal encounter with God’s self-disclosure in history. Pannenberg draws the unfortunate conclusion 
that Barth’s position is fundamentally Hegelian and unravels into a denial of the possibility of mediated 
revelation. See Pannenberg’s “Einfuhrung” to Offenbarung als Geschichte, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, 3. 
Aufl. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 7–11. 
78 CD I/1, 144 (KD I/1, 149). 
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There are at least two inseparable though distinguishable senses in which, for Barth, the 
revealed knowledge of God is historical—two ways in which revelation is act. Revelation 
is historical in that it is simultaneously act that reveals and revelation that acts. It is 
historical in character with respect both to the acts of revelation proper and to the 
subsequent acts of witness to revelation. Barth, consequently, differentiates the historical 
concreteness of revelation into three ‘times’ according to his threefold form of the Word. 
There is, firstly, the time of revelation proper, what Barth calls “the time of the direct, 
original speech of God Himself in His revelation, the time of Jesus Christ (which was also 
and already that of Abraham according to Jn. 8:56).”79 The time of the witness given by 
the prophets and apostles is the second time, the time of the composition of Scripture. The 
third time is the time of the witness of the Church, “the time of derivative proclamation 
related to the words of the prophets and apostles and regulated by them.”80 Revelation is 
temporally located without being temporally constrained.81 
Another way of getting at what I am calling the inseparable though distinguishable 
twofold nature of the historical character of revelation is to think in terms of the 
distinction between the content of revelation and the reception of revelation. As we saw 
above, what it means for revelation to be concretely historical is that the speech of God, 
the act of God, involves “an absolute alteration of the world.” The content of the 
knowledge of revelation, therefore, is knowledge of God in his absolute world-alteration, 
which is received by human knowers only by God’s radical alteration of their world.82 
This is to say that there is an overlap between what it means that revelation is historical 
and all that we have already said about revelation being transformative. The work of the 
                                                 
79 CD I/1, 145 (KD I/1, 150, “die Zeit der direkten ursprünglichen Rede Gottes selbst in seiner 
Offenbarung, die Zeit Jesu Christi”). 
80 CD I/1, 145 (KD I/1, 150, “die Zeit der abgeleiteten, auf die Worte der Propheten und Apostel bezogenen 
und durch sie normierten Verkündigung”). 
81 James A. Veitch makes the untenable assertion that, in Barth’s view, revelation “never participates in 
world history.” The relationship between revelation and history he far better expresses as revelation’s 
being located “in time” without being “relativised by the historical process” (“Revelation and Religion in 
Karl Barth,” Scottish Journal of Theology 24, no. 1 [1971]: 3–4). 
82 This radical alteration is the New Testament notion of µετάνοια (metanoia)—as Murray Rae describes:  
“variously translated in the English New Testament as ‘repentance’ or ‘conversion’, the conjunction of 
meta and nous means literally, ‘a change of mind’, but is employed by the New Testament writers to 
suggest a profound transformation of the whole person” (Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation: By 
Faith Transformed [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997], 115; cf. CD I/1, 387 [KD I/1, 408]). 
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Spirit in human knowers to “open up man and make him capable and ready for Himself, 
and thus achieve His revelation in him”83 is a concrete world-altering historical act. What 
human knowers are opened up to is God in his world-altering action. This distinction, 
therefore, is nothing more than the indivisible way in which God becomes both object and 
subject for us in his revelation.84 
What are the implications of this twofold historical character of revelation for our 
discussion of revelation’s propositional content and expression? I am suggesting that we 
have already given some attention to the subjective or receptive nature of God’s speech as 
action, but we have not considered what it means for the content of revelation, and 
therefore the propositions of revelation, to be fundamentally historical in character. 
Consider again the expression: ‘God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself.’ In 
our discussion thus far of what it would mean to have a genuine human grasp of the 
proposition expressed by means of this expression, we have treated the notions of 
reference, analogy and de re belief in more or less abstract terms. For Barth, however, the 
knowledge of God is never a knowledge of God’s essence in abstraction from his acts in 
human history.85 Who God is is who God has made himself known to be in Jesus Christ.  
 
But who is the Lord and therefore the God to whom the Bible is referring? 
As we have seen already, it is typical of the Bible in both the Old 
Testament and the New that its answer to this question does not point us 
                                                 
83 CD I/1, 450 (KD I/1, 473, “den Menschen für sich selbst öffnen, bereit und fähig machen und so seine 
Offenbarung an ihm vollstrecken kann”). 
84 With reference to Bonhoeffer, Paul Janz critiques the positivist tendencies in Barth’s notion of revelation 
as act. He charges that the result of Barth’s position is that God remains ‘non-objective’ resulting in a 
“basic loss of rational integrity.” This clash with reason comes when Barth tries to maintain that “in 
revelation God both ‘posits’ himself as a possible referent of rational discourse or thinking, and yet does 
so while contradictorily (and therefore ‘miraculously’) remaining entirely immune from the intrinsic 
obligations of the very rational discourse into which revelation posits itself” (God, the Mind’s Desire: 
Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 118–120). 
Janz never demonstrates the contradiction in Barth, but more significantly, he fails to grasp that the 
whole purpose of God’s action of bringing the human knowing subject into a participation in God’s self-
knowing is to enable not the contradiction of reason but the true miracle of an objective human 
knowledge of God. 
85 “This ‘God with us’ has happened. It has happened in human history and as a part of human history” 
(CD I/1, 116; KD I/1, 119). 
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primarily to a sphere beyond human history but rather to the very centre of 
this history.86 
 
This means that all of our inquires into the real reference of expressions used in the 
communication of revelation by faith finally come to rest upon Jesus Christ—not an 
abstract logos asarkos but the incarnate Christ of human history. This confirms what we 
noted earlier, that a de re knowledge of God cannot merely consist of a subjective, back-
stage, numinous encounter. To know what it means that God has the property of being the 
one who ‘reconciles the world to himself,’ involves thicker description of the concrete 
reconciling of the incarnation in his life, death, resurrection and ascension.87 The way in 
which the Spirit transforms human concepts and language will be by means of exposure 
to this history and not in abstraction from it. As we have stressed all along, for Barth, the 
knowledge of God is not reducible to propositions, nor is an apprehension of the acts of 
God equivalent to having access to a specific historical dataset. It does mean, however, 
that the propositional content of revelation has this irreducibly historical character in both 
reference and expression. 
The obvious consequence of this is that genuine human knowledge of God in the full 
sense we have been considering from Barth involves knowledge of and therefore belief in 
historical details. Minimally, some grasp of and belief in the historical actuality of the 
incarnation seems to be required.88 Plantinga explicitly references affirmations of the 
incarnation, suffering, death and resurrection of Christ as key components of Christian 
belief.89 It is critical to see, however, that the way in which these beliefs have warrant is, 
                                                 
86 CD I/1, 384 (KD I/1, 405). 
87 Though Barth is not expressly referenced, in a discussion of what it might mean for theological 
propositions to be true, Robert Jenson echoes Barth’s thoughts on revelation and history when he asserts 
that “accounts of reality other than the biblical story are abstractions from the full account of what we 
actually inhabit, that is, they are abstractions from the story of God with his creatures.” He laments that, 
for theology, “the fact of the Incarnation has made far too little difference; most of what we say could 
equally well be said if God’s Logos were that immaterial mirror and Jesus simply a great prophet or 
rabbi—or beach-boy guru” (“What If It Were True?,” CTI Reflections 4 [2001]: 7, 15). 
88 Barth laments the ‘blind alley’ of Docetic Christology, which abstracts the ‘idea’ of Jesus from history. 
“The fact that the manifestation of this idea was seen in Jesus of Nazareth was more or less accidental 
and indifferent, so indifferent that the concrete humanity of His earthly existence, or finally even its 
historical reality, could be queried” (CD I/1, 403; KD I/1, 423). 
89 WCB, vii, 117, 180, 205, 241, 243, 270, 285, 357, 374. 
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for both Barth and Plantinga, not finally on the basis of inference from historical research 
and human testimony.90 Witness to this history is the principle means by which we are, by 
the Spirit, given a grasp of its truth. It is the ministry of the Spirit in the gift of faith and 
not the historical propositions themselves which is their proof. Barth and Plantinga agree, 
furthermore, that this remains the case even for eyewitnesses.91 Even at the interface 
between Barth’s first two ‘times’, when the prophets and apostles were confronted by the 
direct and original speech-act of God, hearing was by the gift of faith in the work of the 
Spirit.92 
This concludes our cursory sketch of the key facets of Barth’s notion of the genuine 
human knowledge of God given by the Spirit in the gift of faith. We have established that 
the propositional content and character of revelation is fundamental to revelation, though 
derivative of the personal encounter with God wherein human knowers are given a 
participation in the risen Christ’s knowledge of the Father by the Spirit. We have seen the 
impact of the transformational character of God’s concrete speech-act which enables real 
reference to God, i.e. de re belief, by liberating earth-bound preconceptions, allowing the 
object of knowing to recondition human thought in language. All of this is included in 
what Barth calls ‘faith.’ Along the way we have made recourse to some of Plantinga’s 
helpful distinctions and pointed out a few areas of explicit agreement. We are ready now 
to give an assessment of the differences between Plantinga and Barth on the nature of 
faith and the knowledge of God. 
                                                 
90 Barth clarifies that, “historical does not mean historically demonstrable or historically demonstrated” 
(CD I/1, 325; KD I/1, 343). Plantinga, as we have discussed, does not regard historical evidence 
sufficient to warrant Christian belief. See WCB, 268–280, 378–380. 
91 Barth writes: “What a neutral observer could apprehend or may have apprehended of these events was 
the form of revelation which he did not and could not understand as such. . . .The neutral observer who 
understood the events recorded in it as revelation would cease thereby to be a neutral observer” (CD I/1, 
325; KD I/1, 343). Plantinga discusses the limits of empirical perception: “it is certainly possible to 
perceive Jesus the Christ and perceive that he is saying that he is the Christ; still, can we perceive that 
Jesus actually is the Christ? That he actually is the second person of the trinity? I’m inclined to doubt it” 
(WCB, 288). 
92 Murray Rae, reflecting on Kierkegaard’s Fragments, puts it this way: “Whoever sees the God-Man with 
the eyes of faith sees not only differently, but also more truthfully than the contemporary eyewitness” 
(Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation, 129). 
Chapter 6: Faith and the Knowledge of God 
 
194
Plantinga and Barth on Faith and Knowing  
For both Barth and Plantinga it is clear that knowledge of God has propositional 
content and the means of its expression may be in propositional form. They each affirm 
the critical and indispensable role of the Spirit in coming to Christian faith. Moreover, 
they each affirm the importance of the transformative character of the Spirit’s work in 
overcoming the noetic effects of sin. The differences between them, it seems to me, lie in 
two areas that we will address in the following order: first, the manner and extent to 
which revelation is to be considered personal; and second, the scope that may be allowed 
for a knowledge of God that lies outside of faith. 
In Barth’s theology of revelation and Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief it is 
safe to say that knowledge conceived narrowly as de dicto assent to propositions falls 
short of the kind of knowing that is enabled by the self-revelation of God in the gift of 
faith. And yet, on Plantinga’s model, the kind of knowledge that is delivered by the work 
of the Spirit in the cognitive process of faith is primarily propositional. For Plantinga this 
follows from the fact that he is interested in an analysis of the possibility of warrant for 
Christian belief, and “what one believes are propositions.”93 For Barth, however, 
propositional knowing—belief that—is built on something more foundational—a 
personal, transforming encounter with the self-revealing God. “Revelation in fact does 
not differ from the person of Jesus Christ nor from the reconciliation accomplished in 
Him.”94 This is what I have meant to signal in calling Barth a ‘theo-foundationalist,’ the 
foundation for theology and the knowledge of God is not a basic proposition, but “the real 
encounter between God and man, which is faith.”95 Barth refers to this as the “personal 
quality”96 of divine address. Propositional content does not therefore stand independent of 
the person, for God is “present in person in and with what is said by Him.”97 So it is the 
personal knowing of God in faith that provides the arena in which propositional 
knowledge is possible. Language and concepts are means through which God makes 
himself known and thoughts or beliefs about God are generated by God’s personal self-
                                                 
93 WCB, 248, emphasis mine. 
94 CD I/1, 119, emphasis added (KD I/1, 122, “Offenbarung ist ja auch nicht verschieden von der Person 
Jesu Christi und wiederum nicht verschieden von der in ihm geschehenen Versöhnung”). 
95 CD I/1, 18 (KD I/1, 17, “des realen Gegenüber von Gott und Mensch — und daß ist eben der Glaube”). 
96 CD I/1, 136 (KD I/1, 141, “Persönlichkeit”). 
97 CD I/1, 137 (KD I/1, 141, “in Person in und mit dem von ihm Gesagten gegenwärtig ist”). 
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revealing. The ground for all of this is personal relationship with God. “For the point of 
God’s speech is not to occasion specific thoughts or a specific attitude but through the 
clarity which God gives us, and which induces both these in us, to bind us to Himself.”98 
While the final end is relationship not propositional assent, propositional assent remains a 
natural outcome and important aspect of personal relationship. 
It might appear that this underlying personal nature of the knowledge of God is not a 
perspective shared by Plantinga.99 And yet Plantinga clearly agrees with Barth that the 
final goal is a close fellowship with God, “some kind of union with God, a being united 
to, at one with him.”100 The difference with Plantinga is at least partially semantic. 
Plantinga acknowledges the personal character of Christian belief, but distinguishes, for 
the sake of his project, propositional knowledge (belief that) from belief in God.101 With 
appeals to Calvin, Aquinas, and of course, Jonathan Edwards, Plantinga distinguishes 
between the noetic and affective impact of the work of the Spirit. Following this tradition, 
Plantinga does not use noetic terms to refer to the overarching transformational encounter 
with the Spirit; but, the priority of this encounter for propositional knowing is 
unambiguous.102 In Plantinga’s model the stipulation of the design plan gives the crucial 
                                                 
98 CD I/1, 175 (KD I/1, 181–2, “weil das ja der Sinn der Rede Gottes ist, nicht uns zu bestimmten 
Gedanken oder zu einer bestimmten Haltung zu verlassen, sondern durch die Klarheit, die er uns gibt, 
und die uns allerdings zu beidem veranlassen wird, uns an ihn selbst zu binden”). 
99 There is no indication in Plantinga’s writings of interaction with the likes of Michael Polanyi or Marjorie 
Grene. 
100 WCB, 317. 
101 See RBG, 18, and, WCB, 291–294. My thanks to Olive Crisp for raising a potential red herring in the 
discussion with Barth on this point. Plantinga points out that one may have a de re belief in God on the 
occasion of some experience of God, without affirming even basic theism. This is, however, different 
from what I have referred to as having de re knowledge of God. In the scenario Plantinga gives (294), de 
re belief in God occurs when one in fact refers to the object of an experience who is in reality God, 
without knowing in fact that the one to whom one refers is in reality God. De re knowledge of God, on 
the other hand, involves a knowing who in reality is the referent. 
102 The difference between Barth and Plantinga can be illustrated in the way in which they handle the 
demonic knowledge of God referred to in James 2:19. For Barth, the demonic abstraction noted in James 
2:19 is in no sense a genuine knowledge of God (CD IV/1, 765; KD IV/1, 855–856). For Plantinga, what 
distinguishes demonic knowledge of God from Christian faith does not seem to be something that is 
principally noetic in character, but simply their failure to believe in God. “The demons, no doubt, are 
theists and also believe of God that he exists; the demons do not believe in God, because they do not 
trust and love God and do not make his purposes their own” (WCB, 294). 
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initiating role to an encounter with the Spirit who is personal God. There may be, 
however, more than a mere semantic difference between Barth and Plantinga on the 
nature of the relationship between propositional knowledge and personal encounter with 
the God. The priority of personal encounter is entailed in Plantinga’s model, and 
propositional knowledge is dependent on it; but, the nature of that dependency is mostly 
undefined.103 Plantinga’s presentation of the model might easily create the impression that 
the IIHS serves as a mechanistic trigger occasioning belief, rather than a personal 
encounter of which propositional belief is one facet of a connected, organic, and 
relational whole. The IIHS may be the trigger for its noetic and affective effects, but it is 
not clear that those effects remain connected to and derivative on personal fellowship 
with the Spirit, as they are for Barth. It is possible again on this point that we are merely 
coming up against the boundaries of the scope for Plantinga’s project, focused as it is on 
warrant for propositional beliefs. Plantinga’s description in many of these areas is 
intentionally minimalist. His intent is not to write a theology of revelation, but instead to 
provide philosophical cover for the notion of Christian belief as a product of revelation 
enabled by the design and action of God. 
The more pointed difference between Barth and Plantinga appears to be in the scope 
that Plantinga seems to allow for a knowledge of God that lies outside of faith, to which 
we now turn. This issue comes to a head in a question raised at the end of the last chapter 
regarding Plantinga’s notion of the sensus divinitatis. It seems relatively certain that what 
the sensus divinitatis delivers would not qualify as knowledge of God for Barth. A 
generic theism could only be a knowledge of God if it were a knowledge given by God in 
his self-revealing. If the referent of the theistic affirmation is not the Father-Son-Spirit 
God who is who He is in his act of revelation, then the theistic affirmation falls short.104 
                                                 
103 Andrew Dole criticizes Plantinga for “giving faith not only the last, but the strategically crucial—but 
somewhat imprecise—word in what is otherwise a rigorous philosophical argument” (“Cognitive 
Faculties, Cognitive Processes, and the Holy Spirit in Plantinga’s Warrant Series,” review of Warrant 
and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, Faith and Philosophy 19 [2002]: 41). Dole 
believes the lack of definition leaves Plantinga open to the critique that the cognitive process of faith is 
not sufficiently similar to our other cognitive faculties. But why think that the work of the Spirit need 
have any other similarity with our other cognitive faculties than those set out in Plantinga’s general 
requirements for warrant? 
104 It is not that de re knowledge of God requires an affirmation of the trinity, nor is it the case that an 
argument for ‘theism’ might not be used by God in his personal self-revealing. The point is that de re 
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This God can only be known in his act of revelation, which would have to be added to the 
sensus divinitatis to enable a genuine knowledge of God and therefore a knowledge of his 
existence. For this reason we have suggested that for Barth if there is a sensus divinitatis it 
must operate within the realm of the action of the Holy Spirit. It is not enough to uphold a 
generic epistemological sola gratia. Plantinga would certainly affirm that the sensus 
divinitatis is a gift of grace, it is a gift of creation that involves God’s gracious design and 
sustaining. For Barth, however, there is an additional stipulation: the grace of the 
knowledge of God can only be God’s revelation in the action of self-revelation by the 
Spirit in Jesus Christ. “Only in the One who acts on us as the Reconciler through the cross 
and resurrection could we perceive the Creator.”105 
Does this mean that Plantinga and Barth simply disagree about the sensus divinitatis? 
Not definitely. Barth would only reject Plantinga (and Calvin’s) sensus divinitatis if it 
were a truly independent source of a genuine knowledge of God.106 And, by 
‘independent,’ I mean independent of God’s trinitarian self-revealing action.107 It is 
possible to read Plantinga as indicating this kind of independence. Clearly the sensus 
divinitatis was originally designed to function without what Plantinga refers to as the 
IIHS. If the divine self-revealing of the IIHS is entirely unrelated to the sensus divinitatis, 
then the sensus divinitatis would indeed have the kind of independence Barth denounced. 
But, the fact is, Plantinga never claims this kind of independence and it is highly doubtful 
that either he or Calvin108 have this kind of independence in mind, even for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
knowledge of the true ‘God’ for Barth is only possible by the trinitarian action of God (as earlier 
described) in the gift of faith. 
105 CD I/1, 412–13 (KD I/1, 433–434, “Nur in dem als Versöhner durch Kreuz und Auferstehung an uns 
Handelnden konnten wir den Schöpfer . . . erkennen”). 
106 Barth indicates that there may be many special hidden anthropological faculties, but that they could not 
qualify in and of themselves as “points of entry for the determination of man by God’s Word” (CD I/1, 
203–204; KD I/1, 212–213). 
107 In Barth’s view, the qualifier ‘trinitarian’ does not mark off merely one variety of self-revealing action 
available to God. Trinity and revelation are inseparable, and nearly redundant. “One may sum up the 
meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity briefly and simply by saying that God is the One who reveals 
Himself” (CD I/1, 380; KD I/1, 400). “God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He 
reveals Himself. . . . The Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also identical with its effect” 
(CD I/1, 296; KD I/1, 312). 
108 Recall the fore-mentioned argument of Edward Adams that, for Calvin, natural knowledge of God is 
revealed knowledge (“Calvin’s View of Natural Knowledge of God,” 280–292). 
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knowledge of God prior to the fall. Although Plantinga is not explicit about it, it is wholly 
consistent with his A/C model to suggest that the sensus divinitatis is dependent on the 
accompanying action of God giving himself to be known—that is, the action of the 
trinitarian God of Christian faith. What is required for Barth is not that God is known to 
be triune, but that the triune God (i.e. the true God) is the one known de re, which is only 
a possibility for creatures by God’s active self-revelation. The sensus divinitatis could 
still function exactly as Plantinga describes, with its triggering conditions and its divine 
design to deliver doxastic experience resulting in an affirmation of the existence of God. 
But, the sensus divinitatis could never by itself provide an awareness of God de re, even 
by the grace of its being a divinely increated endowment, unless God has also given 
himself to be known. That is to say that we could take the sensus divinitatis merely to 
describe one aspect of the human reception of divine self-revealing, affirming as it does 
strict dependence on the grace of creation and redemption. Seen in this way, the sensus 
divinitatis describes one dimension of one way in which we receive a knowledge of God 
from above; rather than an independent human capacity to grasp a knowledge of God 
from below. There is nothing in Plantinga’s description of the natural faculty of the sensus 
divinitatis which would require a commitment to its functioning independently of the 
supernatural activity of God’s giving himself to be known. Plantinga does affirm the 
possibility of de dicto only assertions of theistic propositions, but whether this counts as 
knowledge is merely a semantic difference. De dicto only assertions simply fail to qualify 
as knowledge on Barth’s view where the only genuine knowledge of God is the 
knowledge of Jesus Christ by the gift of faith. Plantinga seems to agree, at least in part, 
when he stipulates that “only God bestows saving faith.”109 And yet, he leaves open the 
door to a generically theistic de re knowledge of God independent of the work of the 
Spirit.110 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have taken a closer look at Barth’s understanding of what 
constitutes a genuine knowledge of God by faith. This is cognitive revelation with 
propositional content, which is expressible in propositional form by the enabling of the 
                                                 
109 “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 40. 
110 See WCB, 293–294. 
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personal, transformative work of the Spirit. In an effort to clarify Barth’s views, we drew 
on Plantinga’s helpful distinctions with respect to propositional expression and the 
character of assertion and belief. Genuine human knowledge of God for Barth means 
being given an apprehension of the real reference of statements about God—that is, the 
one true God made known in Jesus Christ. This knowledge, however, is not humanly 
accessible outside of the gift of faith. For Barth, the cognitive and transformative aspects 
of faith are indivisible acts of the personal self-revelation of God. Plantinga agrees that 
fully fledged Christian belief is a result of the personal, transformative work of the Spirit 
in the gift of faith. Plantinga’s notion of revelation, however, is much less developed—
and quite understandably, given his objectives. As a consequence, Plantinga appears to 
leave open the possibility for an authentic knowledge of God independent of the work of 
the Spirit. While warranted abstract theistic belief falls far short of Christian faith, it may, 
in Plantinga’s view, count as quite limited, though nevertheless authentic, knowledge of 
God. To the extent that this is the case, it would seem to be the one point in all of 
Plantinga’s epistemology which crosses Barth’s uncompromising line. 
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In this study, we have examined two strikingly different Christian approaches to the 
question of the nature and possibility of a human knowledge of God. Our goal has been to 
test the compatibility and complementarity of the thought of two of the brightest minds 
dominating Christian theology and Christian analytic philosophy. 
We began in Part 1 with two chapters aimed at elucidating the central features of Karl 
Barth’s theology of revelation and clarifying his attitude toward the place of philosophy 
in theology. In the first chapter, we established that, for Barth, human knowledge of God 
is the gift of God’s self-revealing. It is an objective, personal and cognitive, genuine 
human knowing, enjoyed when, as one is confronted by the human forms of God’s 
speech, one is given a transforming participation, by the Spirit, in Christ’s human 
knowing of the Father. We dispelled the criticism here, and again in the final chapter, that 
Barth’s opposition to the idea of a knowledge of God as an independently possessed 
human deposit commits him to a non-cognitive conception of revelation. 
In chapter 2, we addressed the common misconception that Barth refuses any role to 
philosophy in the service of theology. We saw that Barth understands that philosophy per 
se is in fact indispensable for the theologian. What Barth especially opposes are those 
Enlightenment assumptions that make the human knower the ground of human knowing 
and thereby reduce theology to anthropology. 
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In Part 2, our focus was on Alvin Plantinga’s Christian epistemology of warranted 
belief, and its contrasting relationship to Barth’s theology of revelation. We 
acknowledged the formal dissimilarity of these approaches and trained our sights on areas 
of apparent material agreement, disagreement or tension. In chapter 3, we found a general 
alignment emerging as Plantinga shares Barth’s rejection of specific Enlightenment 
assumptions, and Plantinga’s epistemological externalism leaves open the possibility for 
Barth’s notion of revelation as divine self-revealing. This general agreement, however, 
reached a limit with Plantinga’s openness to natural theology—a tension with Barth, 
flagged for closer analysis in chapter 5.  
In chapter 4, we explored Plantinga’s theologically driven models for warranted 
theistic and Christian belief. The general alignment between Barth and Plantinga grew 
into an argument for essential compatibility on all but two substantial points. Both 
thinkers adopt an inductive approach, accepting, without attempting demonstration, the 
givenness of Christian revelation. Plantinga agrees with Barth that a demonstration of the 
truth of what is known is neither required for knowledge, nor something that philosophers 
are competent to offer. Furthermore, on Plantinga’s model, a priority in origination and 
formation resides with the free action of God, without at any point undermining or 
overriding its thoroughgoing humanness. We also found a complementarity in bringing 
together Barth’s robust theologizing and Plantinga’s trenchant philosophizing. While 
Barth offers greater theological depth, Plantinga offers additional philosophical argument 
to support, for instance, Barth’s rejection of various potential philosophical 
encroachments on theological knowing, and Barth’s openness to warranted belief as the 
gift of God. Two issues, however, surfaced as significant potential exceptions to the 
general pattern of compatibility. The first of these was again the question of natural 
theology, specifically the potential for deploying philosophical arguments in support of 
belief. The second issue had to do with what constitutes genuine human knowledge of 
God, and was raised by Plantinga’s apparent openness to a natural human faculty for 
arriving at theistic belief. 
Part 3 devoted two chapters to an analysis and appraisal of those significant areas of 
potential disagreement just mentioned. In chapter 5, we examined Barth’s thorough-going 
rejection of natural theology and Plantinga’s acknowledgement of a role for negative and 
positive apologetics. We moved past their agreed rejection of the necessity and 
sufficiency of human arguments for warranted Christian belief, and explored the apparent 
discontinuity in their thought about a contributing role for human arguments. On the 
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question of negative apologetics, we extended our thesis of complementarity. I argued 
that Plantinga demonstrates the possibility of remaining consistent with Barth’s theology 
of revelation and the all-sufficiency of the deliverances of faith while maintaining a vital 
role for a Christian approach to negative apologetics. On the question of positive 
apologetics, I argued that we are not obliged to accept a divergence between Barth and 
Plantinga if one interprets Plantinga to be endorsing the arguments of natural theology as 
catalysts to or extensions of the deliverances of faith, rather than independent sources of 
warrant. We reserved for the final chapter a question raised about the relationship 
between the deliverances of faith and those of Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis. 
In chapter 6, we concluded our study by looking at the role of faith and what 
constitutes a genuine human knowledge of God. Here we found that, for both Barth and 
Plantinga, knowledge of God has propositional content and the means of its expression 
may be propositional in form. Moreover, they both affirm the critical and indispensable, 
transformative role of the Spirit in overcoming the noetic effects of sin and coming to 
Christian faith. Plantinga offers the key distinction between de re and de dicto belief. 
Given Barth’s theology of revelation, clearly there could be no genuine human 
knowledge of God that does not yield de re belief. Plantinga, on the other hand, seems to 
part ways with Barth in his openness to the possibility of a generically theistic de re 
knowledge of God independent of the work of the Spirit in the gift of faith. 
In summary, with a few tensions noted, we have found an extraordinary depth of 
compatibility between Karl Barth’s theology of revelation and Alvin Plantinga’s 
epistemology of Christian belief. The specters of confrontation and discord have, with 
closer inspection, largely dissolved into a recognition of essential agreement. The 
Christian notion of revelation that Plantinga defends philosophically aligns with Barth’s 
rigorously nuanced theological view. Furthermore, the philosophical approach informing 
Plantinga’s defense falls within Barth’s understanding of the proper deployment of 
philosophy for theology. It is hoped that, along the way, the dialogue between Christian 
theology and Christian analytic philosophy has provided an opportunity to clarify the 
thought of two extremely influential figures in those disciplines, and to that extent might 
serve to encourage further mutually illuminating exchange. 
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